Weaver v. Motor Transit Mgmt. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 December 1930
• Docket Number: No. 10.,10.
• Citation: 233 N.W. 178,252 Mich. 64
• Parties: WEAVER v. MOTOR TRANSIT MANAGEMENT CO. (GREYHOUND LINES).
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

252 Mich. 64

233 N.W. 178

WEAVER

v.MOTOR TRANSIT MANAGEMENT CO. (GREYHOUND LINES).

No. 10.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 2, 1930.

Error to Circuit Court, Washtenaw County; George A. Sample, Judge.

Action by Van M. Weaver against the Motor Transit Management Company (Greyhound Lines), an Illinois corporation. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Reversed, and new trial granted.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Payne & Payne, of Detroit, for appellant.

Louis E. Burke, and Carl A. Lehman, both of Ann Arbor, for appellee.

WIEST, C. J.

The evening of July 23, 1928, plaintiff was a guest, riding in an automobile over a paved highway, followed at a distance of 35 or 40 feet by an interurban passenger bus owned by defendant, when an approaching Cadillac automobile turned from the opposite line of traffic, and plaintiff's driver, in an effort to avoid a head-on collision, turned his car slightly to the right or side of the pavement, made a sudden stop, and the auto bus collided from the rear and, it is claimed, bumped the car into the approaching automobile, plaintiff was injured, brought this suit, and recovered damages against defendant Motor Transit Management Company.

Upon review we find one error commanding reversal. The circuit judge gave the following instruction:

‘I instruct you under the law of this state when a motor vehicle traveling in a certain direction overtakes and strikes the rear end of another motor vehicle traveling in the same direction, or lawfully standing upon any highway, the driver or operator of the first mentioned vehicle is deemed to be prima facie guilty of negligence and in this case I instruct you that under this rule the driver of the defendant's bus at the time in question, under the facts as here related is prima facie guilty of negligence in running into the rear end of the car in which the plaintiff was a passenger and this fact causes the burden to shift and the driver must establish by the preponderance of the evidence that he was not guilty of negligence in striking the rear end of a car lawfully on the highway ahead of him. That is the burden would shift for the driver of the bus to show that.’

The burden of proof in an action for negligence never shifts to the defendant. The presumption mentioned tentatively supplies enough to prevent a directed verdict against plaintiff and to require a defendant to go ahead with his proofs on the subject of negligence and, if credible evidence is submitted, the plaintiff still has the burden of establishing defendant's negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. Depue v. Schwartz, 222 Mich. 309, 192 N. W. 713;Noonan v. Volek, 246 Mich. 377, 224, N. W. 657.

The trial judge shifted the burden from plaintiff to defendant and permitted the jury to find defendant guilty of negligence, unless defendant established, by a preponderance of...