Brehm v. Lorenz

• Decision Date: 22 March 1955
• Docket Number: No. 105,105
• Citation: 112 A.2d 475,206 Md. 500
• Parties: George A. BREHM and Ruth M. Brehm, his wife, v. Arthur L. LORENZ, Jr.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 500

206 Md. 500

112 A.2d 475

George A. BREHM and Ruth M. Brehm, his wife, v. Arthur L. LORENZ, Jr.

No. 105.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 22, 1955.

Thomas F. Dempsey and Edward D. Martin, Baltimore (John J. Sweeney, Jr., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.

Kenneth C. Proctor, Towson, and Michael P. Crocker, Baltimore (Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and DELAPLAINE and COLLINS, JJ.

DELAPLAINE, Judge.

This action was brought by George A. Brehm and Ruth M. Brehm, his wife, against Arthur L. Lorenz, Jr., to recover damages sustained when an automobile in which Mrs. Brehm was sitting, and which had momentarily come to a stop on Reisterstown Road in Baltimore, was struck in the rear by an automobile driven by defendant.

The accident occurred on the morning of November 14, 1952, about an hour after midnight. Mrs. Brehm, age 29, an employee in the Social Security office in the Candler Building on Pratt Street, had been working on November 13 on the late shift. As the friend who had been driving her home had been called away from his work on account of his wife's illness, Mrs. Brehm asked A. Frank Gramazio, another employee in the office, to drive her home. At about 12:30 a. m. she left in Gramazio's car, a 1951 Plymouth. Shortly after 1 a. m., while they were driving through the 5000 block of Reisterstown Road at a speed of about 25 miles an hour, a cat ran in front of the car. Gramazio applied the brakes and the car came to a stop within five or ten feet. Almost instantaneously the car was bumped in the rear by defendant's car. When Gramazio again applied the brakes, Mrs. Brehm was thrown forward, her knees hitting the dashboard. The impact pushed Gramazio's car forward about five or six feet. Gramazio and defendant got out of their cars and looked at the license numbers and operator's licenses. Gramazio admitted in the Court below that he told defendant that the accident was unavoidable. As a result of the sudden jerk in the car, Mrs. Brehm suffered a pain in her neck, side and arm, but was able to go back to work the next night.

Plaintiffs averred that Gramazio was driving in a careful manner, and that the accident was due solely to the negligence of defendant. Mrs. Brehm's claim was for personal injuries and for loss of wages resulting from her incapacitation. Her husband's claim was for loss of her services and for her medical expenses.

At the close of plaintiffs' case, the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of defendant. The judge stated that, in view of the sudden stop of Gramazio's car and the fact that the impact of the automobiles was slight, the verdict should be for defendant on the evidence submitted by plaintiffs alone. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and plaintiffs appealed from the judgment.

The general rule has been established in this State that every automobile driver must exercise toward other travelers on the highways that degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under similar circumstances. State v. Magaha, 182 Md. 122, 32 A.2d 477; Cocco v. Lissau, 202 Md. 196, 95 A.2d 857; Domeski v. Atlantic Refining Co., 202 Md. 562, 97 A.2d 313. In the Maryland Motor Vehicle Law there is also this provision: 'The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.' Code 1951, art. 66 1/2, § 189(a). Thus it is the duty of the rear driver to keep a safe distance between vehicles, and to keep his machine well in hand, so as to avoid doing injury to the machine ahead, so long as the driver is proceeding in accordance with his rights. Mitchell v. Dowdy, 184 Md. 634, 642, 643, 42 A.2d 717.

Just how near the driver of an automobile may follow another automobile and still exercise ordinary care depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Sieland v. Gallo, 194 Md. 282, 287, 71 A.2d 45; Christman v. Weil, 196 Md. 207, 212, 76 A.2d 144. The driver of the front car must exercise ordinary care not to stop or slow up without giving the driver of the rear car adequate warning of his intention to do so. The driver of the rear car must exercise ordinary care to avoid colliding with the front car. Just how much warning the driver of the front car must give of his intention to stop or slow up, and what precautions the driver of the rear car must take to avoid colliding with a car which stops or slows up in front of him, cannot be formulated in any precise rule. The question whether due care was used by either of the drivers is a question for the jury except when the case is one where reasonable minds would not differ. Cardell v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 5 Cir., 79 F.2d 934, 937.

However, in any action for damages the court is not justified in inferring negligence merely from possibilities. A mere surmise that there may have been negligence on the part of the defendant will not justify the court in submitting the case to the jury. The plaintiff must produce some evidence that the defendant, either by his act or omission, violated some duty incumbent upon him that caused the injury. If there is no evidence upon which a rational conclusion may be based in support of the plaintiff's claim, the court should withdraw the case from the jury. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. State, to Use of Savington, 71 Md. 590, 599, 18 A. 969; Riley v. New York, Philadelphia & Norfolk R. Co., 90 Md. 53, 58, 44 A. 994; Sullivan v. Smith, 123 Md. 546, 558, 559, 91 A. 456.

The basic rule that the burden of proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of the issue, as determined by the pleadings and the nature of the case, applies, of course, to actions arising out of motor vehicle collisions. Accordingly, in an action for injuries sustained in an automobile collision, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the defendant was guilty of negligence which directly contributed to the accident, since the happening of the accident does not of itself constitute negligence, and evidence of negligence does not give rise to liability unless the negligence was the cause of the injury. Gloyd v. Wills, 180 Md. 161, 165, 23 A.2d 665; Finney v. Frevel, 183 Md. 355, 362, 37 A.2d 923.

In this case plaintiffs alleged in their declaration: (1) that defendant did not keep a proper lookout, (2) that he was traveling at an excessive rate of speed, and (3) that he did not have his car under proper control. But they failed to...