Weaver v. Recreation Dist.
| Decision Date | 02 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Opinion No. 27991,Appellate Case No. 2019-000920 |
| Citation | 848 S.E.2d 760,431 S.C. 357 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Don WEAVER, Appellant, v. RECREATION DISTRICT, Recreation Commission of Richland County, Paul Brawley, as Auditor of Richland County and David A. Adams, as Treasurer of Richland County, Respondents. |
John E. Schmidt III and Melissa J. Copeland, of Schmidt & Copeland, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Charles H. McDonald and William C. Dillard Jr., of Belser & Belser, PA, of Columbia, for Respondents Recreation District and Recreation Commission of Richland County; and Bradley T. Farrar, of Richland County Attorney's Office, of Columbia, for Respondents Paul Brawley and David A. Adams.
Don Weaver ("Appellant") brought this declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of S.C. Code Ann. section 6-11-271 (2004), which addresses the millage levied in certain special purpose districts. The circuit court found Appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing any constitutional infirmity. We affirm.
Appellant owns property and is a taxpayer in the Recreation District, a special purpose district created to fund the operation and maintenance of parks and other recreational facilities in the unincorporated areas of Richland County. The Recreation Commission of Richland County, which oversees those facilities, is governed by an appointed board of commissioners. Richland County's Auditor and Treasurer administer the levy and collection of taxes for the Recreation District, as well as Richland County.
Appellant instituted this action in 2017 against the Recreation District, the Commission, the Auditor, and the Treasurer (collectively, "Respondents"), seeking a declaration that Act No. 397, 1998 S.C. Acts 2389, in particular the part that added section 6-11-271, violates several provisions of the South Carolina Constitution, including article X, section 5 (); article III, section 34 (prohibiting special legislation); and article VIII, section 7 (regarding Home Rule by counties), as well as the Home Rule Act, S.C. Code Ann. sections 4-9-10 to -1230 (1986 & Supp. 2019).
Section 6-11-271 was added by the South Carolina General Assembly for the stated purpose of clarifying the authority of certain special purpose districts—those without elected governing bodies—to levy millage and provide governmental services after this Court found another provision, Act No. 317, 1969 S.C. Acts 382, was unconstitutional. In Weaver v. Recreation District , a case that was also instituted by Appellant, the Court held Act No. 317 violated the prohibition on taxation without representation because it authorized the levying of taxes on property in a special purpose district without any oversight by an elected body. 328 S.C. 83, 87, 492 S.E.2d 79, 81–82 (1997) (citing S.C. Const. art. X, § 5 ).
The Court held "the legislative power to tax may not be conferred on a purely appointive body but must be under the supervisory control of elected bodies ...." Id. at 86, 492 S.E.2d at 81 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned "the power to fix and levy a tax should only be conferred upon a body which stands as the direct representative of the people, to the end that an abuse of power may be directly corrected by those who must carry the burden of the tax." Id. (quoting Crow v. McAlpine , 277 S.C. 240, 244–45, 285 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1981) ). The Court concluded Act No. 317 was an impermissible delegation of legislative authority because it gave "the Recreation Commission the complete discretion to determine its annual budget, and to levy anywhere from one to five mills taxes to meet its budget." Id. at 87, 492 S.E.2d at 81 (emphasis added). The Court recognized that its holding could disrupt the financial operation of numerous special purpose districts, boards, and commissions throughout the state, so it applied the decision prospectively (beginning December 31, 1999), "to give the General Assembly an opportunity to address this problem." Id. at 87–88, 492 S.E.2d at 82.
In response to Weaver , the General Assembly added section 6-11-271 of the South Carolina Code in 1998. See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-11-271 (2004) (). Subsection (A) defines the term "special purpose district" to mean any special purpose district or public service authority, however named, created by the General Assembly prior to March 7, 1973. Id. § 6-11-271(A).
Subsections (B) and (C) apply only to special purpose districts whose "governing bodies ... are not elected but are presently authorized by law to levy [millage] for operations and maintenance." Id. § 6-11-271(B)(1), (C)(1). Subsection (B) concerns districts that were then authorized to levy millage up to a certain limit, and (C) concerns districts then having no limit as to the millage amount. Id. The General Assembly instructed that, beginning in fiscal year 1999, "[t]here must be levied annually in each special purpose district described" (i.e., those described in (B)(1) and (C)(1)), tax millage equal to the amount imposed in fiscal year 1998. Id. § 6-11-271(B)(2), (C)(2).
The General Assembly outlined several methods for a special purpose district to attempt to alter this tax millage. Subsection (D) provides a special purpose district may request that the county election commission conduct a referendum proposing a modification of the millage. Id. § 6-11-271(D). If the voters approve, the "modification in tax millage shall remain effective until changed in a manner provided by law." Id.
Subsection (E) authorizes all special purpose districts located wholly in one county to modify their millage limits, "provided the same is first approved by the governing body of the district and by the governing body of the county in which the district is located by resolutions duly adopted." Id. § 6-11-271(E)(1) (emphasis added). However, any modification is only temporary, as the General Assembly stipulated that "[a]ny increase in millage effectuated pursuant to this subsection is effective for only one year. " Id. (emphasis added).
Appellant alleged in his complaint in the current action that the addition of section 6-11-271 still imposes taxation without representation because it allows the Commission, an appointed body, to levy taxes on property within the Recreation District without any oversight from elected representatives, and he further alleged the statute is special legislation that violates Home Rule. The circuit court ruled Appellant did not meet his burden of establishing any constitutional infirmity, finding the statute (1) does not impose taxation without representation, (2) is not special legislation, and (3) does not violate Home Rule. Appellant challenges all three findings by the circuit court.1
"This Court has a very limited scope of review in cases involving a constitutional challenge to a statute."
Joytime Distribs. & Amusement Co. v. State , 338 S.C. 634, 640, 528 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1999). "All statutes are presumed constitutional and will, if possible, be construed so as to render them valid." Id. "A legislative act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the constitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citing Westvaco Corp. v. S.C. Dep't. of Revenue , 321 S.C. 59, 467 S.E.2d 739 (1995) ). "A possible constitutional construction must prevail over an unconstitutional interpretation." State v. Neuman , 384 S.C. 395, 402, 683 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2009) (citation omitted).
Appellant first argues section 6-11-271 is unconstitutional because it violates the South Carolina Constitution's prohibition on taxation without representation.
Article X, section 5, of our state constitution provides, in relevant part: "No tax ... shall be established ... without the consent of the people or their representatives lawfully assembled." S.C. Const. art. X, § 5.
Appellant argues the General Assembly's passage of section 6-11-271 "is inconsistent in part with Weaver " and should, therefore, be invalidated. He notes subsection (B)(1) refers to unelected bodies that "are presently authorized by law to levy for operations and maintenance," but under Weaver , "unelected bodies are not authorized to levy taxes," so the General Assembly's enactment "did not correct the taxation without representation issue ... and instead reiterated and relied on the very provisions that were struck by the Court as unconstitutional."
Appellant further argues subsections (B)(2) and (C)(2) "initially appear to have millage rates set by statute and, consequently, by the General Assembly," but they use the amount imposed in fiscal year 1998, which is the rate impermissibly imposed prior to Weaver , so "the taxation without representation by the Commission is made permanent by statute."
Appellant asserts that, in addition to the problem of using the millage amounts originally set by the unelected bodies, an additional problem exists in subsection (E)(1) because it states millage limitations may be modified "provided the same is first approved by the governing body of the district and by the governing body of the county in which the district is located by resolutions duly adopted." Appellant maintains subsection (E)(1) "therefore provides that the unelected bodies previously setting millage rates are kept in a position of authority as to require that these unelected bodies first approve any change in the millage rates." Appellant states, "This makes the authorized, governing body of a district directly responsible to the very unelected bodies that are not authorized to set millage rates due to such being a violation of taxation without representation."
Finally, Appellant contends "[t]he special legislation continues the current [funding] rate to infinity" because "taxpayers have no recourse to seek to...
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...our scheme is not facially invalid, especially given the threshold presumption of constitutional validity. Weaver v. Recreation Dist. , 431 S.C. 357, 363, 848 S.E.2d 760, 762 (2020) ("A possible constitutional construction must prevail over an unconstitutional interpretation." (quoting Stat......