Weaver v. State
| Decision Date | 15 November 1910 |
| Citation | 69 S.E. 488,135 Ga. 317 |
| Parties | WEAVER et al. v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
A conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence.
The defendants were charged with murder. On the trial there was positive evidence that the deceased was slain under such circumstances as to make the homicide murder. The evidence relied upon to connect the defendants on trial with the perpetration of the crime was entirely circumstantial, and it was error requiring the grant of a new trial for the judge to omit to charge upon the law of circumstantial evidence though not requested so to charge.
(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
A "confession" is a voluntary statement, made by a person charged with the commission of a crime, wherein he acknowledges himself to be guilty of the offense charged.
Error from Superior Court, De Kalb County; L. S. Roan, Judge.
Ed Weaver and others were convicted of murder, and bring error. Reversed.
L. B Norton, D. P. Phillips, and L. J. Steele, for plaintiff in error.
Rosser & Brandon, Wm.Schley Howard, Sol. Gen., and H. A. Hall, Atty. Gen., for the State.
On the evening of April 23, 1910, shortly after 8 o'clock, W. H. Bryson, the conductor of an electric street car, and S. T. Brown, the motorman of the same car, were assaulted with an attempt to rob, and each of them was shot with pistols; the latter dying instantly from his wound. The crime was committed in the county of De Kalb at the end of the car line leading from the business section of the city of Atlanta to Druid Hills. A special term of the court was called; and Charles Walker, Ed Weaver, Jim Black, and Charles Julian were jointly indicted for the murder of Brown. The three last-named defendants were tried and convicted, and each sentenced to be hanged. They moved for a new trial, and excepted to the judgment refusing to grant it.
1. Complaint was made of certain portions of the charge in which the jury were instructed to the effect that if the defendants were parties to an agreement to rob the conductor and motorman, each being present, aiding or abetting the others in any way, and one of their number in furtherance of the conspiracy fired a shot at the motorman and killed him, the act of the one so firing the shot would be the act of all, and each would be equally guilty. The criticism upon the charge was that it was not authorized by the evidence. There was no positive or direct evidence of an agreement between any of the defendants to commit robbery or murder, but there was evidence of circumstances sufficient to authorize the judge as to each of the defendants to charge upon the subject of a conspiracy. A conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence. McLeroy v. State, 125 Ga. 240, 54 S.E. 125; Owens v. State, 120 Ga. 296, 48 S.E. 21; Dixon v. State, 116 Ga. 186, 42 S.E. 357. As a new trial will be granted on other grounds, and the case may be tried again, we will not enter into a discussion of the evidence for the purpose of showing its sufficiency to authorize the charge upon the subject of a conspiracy.
2. In his charge the judge omitted to instruct the jury upon the law of circumstantial evidence, as embodied in Pen. Code 1895, § 984; and complaint is made of the failure to so charge, although there was no written request to do so. While the robbery was in progress, Bryson, the conductor, was shot and wounded, but not killed. The defendants were not on trial for that offense, but were on trial for the murder of the motorman, S. T. Brown. Bryson testified as a witness for the state; and according to his testimony, when the car arrived at the end of the line at about 8:30 o'clock, he saw three negroes waiting. He got out of the car to turn the trolley, preparatory to returning to the city, and they approached as if to get on, and just as he (the conductor) reached the rear of the car and went to adjust the trolley to the wire, one of them ordered him to throw up his hands and deliver what money he had. That one he identified as Charley Walker, one of the defendants named in the indictment, but not one of those on trial. As soon as the conductor pulled out his pocketbook, another person, identified by the conductor as Julian, one of the defendants on trial, who also "had a gun" on the conductor, turned around and went toward the front of the car, and when about sufficient time elapsed for him to reach the front of the car the conductor heard the report of a pistol. In preparing to return to the city, while the conductor was changing and adjusting the trolley from the outside, the motorman walked through the car, and had just about sufficient time to reach the front when the shot was fired that killed him. The conductor did not know that the motorman was at the front end, and did not see him on the ground, before the shot was fired. He called to the motorman for assistance, but received no reply. After being robbed by Charles Walker, the conductor was ordered by him to run, and did so, but was fired on by Walker and wounded, so that he could get only about 150 yards from the scene of the tragedy. He did not see the actual shooting of the motorman. He was unable to identify the third man whom he saw, further than to say that he was a little slender, not near as tall as Walker, but taller than Julian, and that "Black fills the description of him pretty well," and that he thought it was Black, but could not identify him positively. He did not see the third man have any gun, or do anything, but merely noticed him present. After the robbery and murder, he heard them run off toward the creek. All of this occurred near the shack of the defendant Charles Walker. A_ woman who lived with Walker, but who was not his wife, testified that she heard shooting on the night of April 23d, and after the shooting all of the defendants named in the indictment came to her house. When they arrived they were blowing, and had their sleeves rolled up; looked frightened and as if they had been running. They gave her a pocketbook, with the request that she burn it up, one of them (Jim Black) saying, "I will give you 50 cents if you will burn it up," and, after it was burned, saying further, "You are as much in it as we are," but witness did not know what he was talking about. At the trial Black entered into a detailed statement purporting to show an alibi, and in doing so stated that during a period practically including the time of the murder he was in company with defendant Julian, whom the conductor identified as a person who had participated in the robbery.
There was other evidence to the effect that, some days after the homicide, Ed Weaver made certain statements to a detective in one of which it was said that he (Ed Weaver) and Jim Black, Will Johnson, and Emmet Walker (the latter two being included among those who were named in the indictment) were at the scene of the tragedy, and that they had concealed themselves in the bushes, and Jim Black remarked that he was going to have some money from the first two men who came that way, and, having two pistols, he gave Will Johnson one, and just as the car was...
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Sheffield v. State
... ... such statements, and to charge on that subject was an ... expression or intimation of opinion that the defendant had ... made incriminating statements. Whether or not sufficient to ... show a confession (as to which see Owens v. State, ... 120 Ga. 296, 48 S.E. 21; Weaver v. State, 135 Ga ... 317, 321, 69 S.E. 488; Jones v. State, 139 Ga ... 104(3), [188 Ga. 6] 76 S.E. 748; McCloud v. State, ... 166 Ga. 436, 143 S.E. 558; Brown v. State, 168 Ga ... 282(2), 147 S.E. 519), testimony of the deputy sheriff to the ... effect that the defendant admitted ... ...
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Johnson v. State
...42 S.E. 779 (1902); Owens v. State, 120 Ga. 296, 48 S.E. 21 (1904); Jones v. State, 130 Ga. 274, 60 S.E. 840 (1908); Weaver v. State, 135 Ga. 317, 69 S.E. 488 (1910); Roberson v. State, 135 Ga. 654(1), 70 S.E. 175 (1910); Jones v. State, 139 Ga. 104(3), 76 S.E. 748 (1912); Thomas v. State, ......
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Johnson v. State, 33446
...State, 194 Ga. 773, 781, 22 S.E.2d 487, 492. (b) A conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. Weaver v. State, 135 Ga. 317(1), 69 S.E. 488; McLeroy v. State, 125 Ga. 240, 54 S.E. 125; Owens v. State, 120 Ga. 296, 48 S.E. 21; Dixon v. State, 116 Ga. 186, 42 S.E. 35......