Weaver v. State
| Decision Date | 16 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. SC00-247.,SC00-247. |
| Parties | Jeffrey Lee WEAVER, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Richard L. Rosenbaum, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL and Leslie T. Campbell and Debra Rescigno, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Jeffrey Lee Weaver appeals his conviction of first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer and a sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. In sentencing Weaver to death, the trial judge overrode the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment. See § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2003) (authorizing judicial overrides). For the reasons expressed below, we affirm Weaver's conviction but reverse the trial judge's override of the jury's recommendation of a life sentence and remand with instructions to enter a life sentence without the possibility of parole.1
On the evening of January 5, 1996, Jeffrey Weaver attempted the armed burglary of a car. When the attempt failed, he headed south. The victim contacted authorities and a BOLO ("be on lookout") was issued. Shortly thereafter, someone spotted Weaver lurking in the bushes and shoving what appeared to be a gun down his pants. About two hours after the attempted burglary, Officers Bryant Peney and Ray Myers saw Weaver near a local vocational school. Officer Peney saw that Weaver was acting suspiciously, activated his patrol car's lights, and stopped Weaver. Weaver ran. The officers chased him across a highway. When Weaver reached the other side of the road, and as Officer Peney approached the median, Weaver turned around, crouched in a shooting position and shot Officer Peney in the chest. Officer Peney fell to the ground. Weaver then aimed at Officer Myers, who was approaching. Officer Myers fired one shot, but missed Weaver. Weaver continued to run and eluded capture by making his way into a lake, where he spent the night in hiding.
When the paramedics placed Officer Peney on a gurney, a bullet fell to the ground. The bullet underwent testing and proved to be a .357 bullet containing Officer Peney's blood and DNA. At the hospital, doctors discovered that Officer Peney had suffered a single gunshot wound that went through his right arm, into his chest, and through his lungs, resulting in a perforated aorta and torn vena cava. The operating physicians noted that this combination of wounds was uniformly fatal. Officer Peney died the next morning while undergoing surgery for his wounds. That same morning authorities found Weaver near some bushes close to the lake.
Weaver was indicted for first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer (Officer Peney), aggravated assault (Officer Myers), armed resisting of an officer with violence (Officer Myers), carrying a concealed weapon, and attempted burglary of an occupied conveyance. Before trial, the attempted armed burglary charge was severed.
Officer Myers and various eyewitnesses testified at trial. Weaver told detectives that he was the person who shot Officer Peney. He performed a walk-through of the crime scene, where he reenacted how he shot Officer Peney. At trial, Weaver testified that he did not intend to shoot Officer Peney and that he fired at the officer in order to stop the foot chase and force Officer Peney to chase him in the patrol car.
Weaver was convicted of all charges. As to the murder conviction, by a vote of eight to four the jury recommended that Weaver receive a sentence of life imprisonment. The court held a Spencer hearing,2 denied Weaver's motion for a new trial, and sentenced him to death. The court found four aggravating factors: (1) contemporaneous violent felony convictions involving Officer Myers; (2) that the victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in his official duties; (3) avoiding lawful arrest; and (4) disrupting or hindering a law enforcement officer. Aggravators two through four were merged into one. The court found one statutory mitigator, "no significant history of prior criminal activity" little weight) and three nonstatutory mitigators, which included good employment record (moderate weight), cooperation with police (moderate weight), and adaptation to a life of incarceration/future value to society (little weight).3 This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
Weaver raises many issues on appeal. We discuss only the following: (1) whether discharge of appellant's second counsel was a proper exercise of discretion; (2) whether the trial court conducted proper Faretta4 and Nelson5 inquiries; (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in requiring appellant to wear a stun belt; (4) whether the trial judge's decision to override the jury's eight to four life recommendation was proper; and (5) sufficiency of the evidence.6
Weaver's first appointed counsel was dismissed on conflict grounds and Hillard Moldof was appointed. During the course of Mr. Moldof's tenure as court-appointed counsel, the trial court granted ten continuances totaling about two years. Mr. Moldof's busy trial calendar threatened to delay the case even further due to a pending retrial in another case (referred to in the record as the Penalver case). Finally, over Weaver's objection the court removed Mr. Moldof and appointed Edward Salantrie. Weaver appeals that decision.
The crime occurred on January 5, 1996. Mr. Moldof was appointed as a Special Public Defender on February 27, after Weaver's first counsel withdrew on conflict grounds. At a March 5 hearing, Mr. Moldof advised the court that the State had listed about 120 witnesses and that because this was a death penalty case he planned to depose virtually every single witness on the list. He notified the court that he would not be ready for trial in April. Thereafter, the court granted continuances at status conferences held on April 25, September 25, December 6, and February 13, 1997.
At a status conference on March 26, 1997, the State requested a firm trial date, but Mr. Moldof responded that the State was going to present DNA evidence that could prove crucial. Defense counsel also noted that he was the only lawyer handling the case and he already had conducted about 100 depositions; he had taken as many as 20 depositions in one day. He argued that his inability to go to trial was a function of the State's lengthy witness list, which had approximately 200 potential witnesses, and the complexity of the case.
On May 1, 1997, the court granted another continuance. Defense counsel mentioned the pending trial in Penalver and estimated that it would take five to six weeks. The court did not set a firm trial date for July because it had not heard any pretrial motions and depositions were still ongoing.
On July 10, defense counsel, who was in the middle of trial in another case, received another continuance and the court set a September trial date.
On September 19, defense counsel noted that the Penalver trial was in its sixth month. He told the court that he would not be ready for Weaver's trial. The court allowed another continuance.
On November 20, Mr. Moldof informed the court that he was still in trial, but he hoped that the jury deliberations would begin December 15. The court granted another continuance. The trial judge informed the parties that she was leaving the criminal division and would not try the case and that another trial judge would take over the case.
On December 23, 1997, at a status conference before the new trial judge, defense counsel informed the court that he still needed to conduct 140 depositions. The court continued the case and set a loose trial date for the end of March. The following exchange took place:
The court asked Mr. Moldof if he wanted to stay on the case and he responded:
The court then mentioned to Mr. Moldof that after Penalver a host of other judges wanted him to start trying cases that he had pending before them. Defense counsel did not dispute this assertion. The court predicted that this situation presented the possibility that Weaver's case would not get to trial until December 1998. The court set a status conference for March 19, 1998.
On February 6, 1998, defense counsel filed a "Motion for Special Status and Determination of Continuous Circumstances." A hearing was held on February 16, where defense counsel informed the court that the nine-month trial in Penalver had ended in a mistrial. The retrial in Penalver was...
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...influenced him not to testify, or that the restraints "distracted him or affected his demeanor before the jury"]; accord, Weaver v. State (Fla.2004) 894 So.2d 178, 196 ; Stanford v. State (2000) 272 Ga. 267, 528 S.E.2d 246, 249–250 ; State v. Odenbaugh (La.2011) 82 So.3d 215, 257–258 ; Stat......
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