Weaver v. Watson

• Decision Date: 27 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. 5-84-0051,5-84-0051
• Citation: 130 Ill.App.3d 563,474 N.E.2d 759,85 Ill.Dec. 799
• Parties: , 85 Ill.Dec. 799 Rosemary WEAVER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hugh H. WATSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 759

474 N.E.2d 759

130 Ill.App.3d 563, 85 Ill.Dec. 799

Rosemary WEAVER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hugh H. WATSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5-84-0051.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fifth District.

Dec. 27, 1984.

Elmer Jenkins, Benton, for defendant-appellant.

Harris, Lambert & Wilson, Marion, for plaintiff-appellee.

WELCH, Justice:

Plaintiff Rosemary Weaver filed her complaint on February 19, 1981, in the circuit court of Franklin County against defendant Hugh Watson, seeking that a receiver be appointed to operate the business known as Watson's Jewelry, that Mr. Watson be enjoined from operating Watson's Jewelry and disposing of its assets, that the business be ordered wound down, that a full accounting be made as to the assets and business of Watson's Jewelry, and that Mrs. Weaver be paid for her share of Watson's Jewelry. After a bench trial and an accounting, the court entered judgment for Mrs. Weaver and against Mr. Watson in the sum of $93,789.77 plus costs of suit. Mr. Watson appeals. There is no cross-appeal.

Most of the pertinent facts are undisputed. Mr. Watson and his brother Allie, Mrs. Weaver's husband, entered into a written partnership agreement dated May 27, 1950, concerning the operation of Watson's Jewelry, the partnership business. The agreement by its terms was to run for a period of 25 years, should both partners so long live. Under the articles of partnership, Mr. Watson was to devote the whole of his time and attention to the business; Allie was not required to devote any time to the business; Mr. Watson was to draw a monthly salary, to be determined by the partners, payable out of profits of the business; if there were no profits, Mr. Watson was to be paid whenever there were profits. Under the articles of partnership, if either partner were to die during the partnership, then his executor or administrator, or any person or persons to whom he should by will bequeath his share, was entitled to the share of such deceased partner in the capital, stock, property, and effects of the partnership, and might either continue as a partner or partners in the business or terminate the partnership as therein provided by a living partner. Under the agreement's provisions governing termination, the partners were to fully and correctly account to each other, and were to divide everything in the same shares as their capital contributions; the agreement stated that the capital had been brought in by the partners in equal shares.

Allie died September 17, 1974, in his will leaving his entire estate to his wife, Mrs. Weaver. There is no indication of record that said will was ever admitted to probate. Mr. Watson and Mrs. Weaver met at various times after Allie's death to discuss the business; the substance of these conversations is disputed. By written notice to Mr. Watson dated November 21, 1980, Mrs. Weaver gave Mr. Watson 90 days notice of termination of the partnership.

Mrs. Weaver testified that in a meeting between herself and Mr. Watson about four days after Allie's death, she and Mr. Watson agreed to carry on the business as partners; that, a few days later, Mr. Watson brought her a bank signature card, which she signed, after which her name was added to the business checking account together with Mr. Watson's and Allie's name was dropped; she discovered in 1980 that on September 26, 1978, her name had been dropped, and Mr. Watson's wife's added, without Mrs. Weaver's knowledge or permission; in 1976, she received from Mr. Watson a check for $1,000 with the note "dividends" on the face of the check; she received a $750 check in 1977 and a $500 check in 1978; in May, 1979, Mr. Watson told her that the business had had a bad year and that there had been no profits and hence no checks; in June, 1979, Mr. Watson offered her $15,000 for her share of the business.

Mr. Watson testified that his discussions with Mrs. Weaver after Allie's death concerned what amount she would take for Allie's interest in the business; she never set a price; she turned down an offer of $20,000; he never agreed to be her partner; the "dividend" payments were gratuitous and were made out of his affection for his deceased brother; he had put her name on the checks of the business to make her feel better; she had no interest in the business.

Per order of the trial court, Mr. Watson caused to be prepared a proposed accounting, dated September 17, 1981. After a hearing, the trial court found that accounting insufficient. A second accounting was filed December 1, 1981. After another hearing, the trial court on September 30, 1983, entered the judgment complained of. Inter alia, the court found that the partnership had dissolved upon Allie's death and that at all times since Allie's death Mr. Watson had been under a duty to render an accounting for Allie's interest in the business, but had failed to do so and instead had used Allie's property in the operation of Watson's Jewelry. The judgment included amounts for (1) Allie's estate's share of the partnership property as of his death; (2) the estate's share of the net profits of the business from Allie's death to December 31, 1982, due to Mr. Watson's retention of the estate's property; and (3) statutory interest on the amounts owed for property and profits, less the amounts paid by Mr. Watson to Mrs. Weaver from 1976 to 1978. The court reserved jurisdiction as to accounting for 1983 profits, if any. Mrs. Weaver's prayer for appointment of a receiver was denied.

Mr. Watson argues that the trial court erred in failing to find Mrs. Weaver's claim barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Mr. Watson argues that Mrs. Weaver's cause of action accrued upon Allie's death and thus is barred by the five year statute of limitations applicable to actions on unwritten contracts and for actions for injury done to property, real or personal, or to recover the possession of personal property or damages for the detention or conversion thereof, and all civil actions not otherwise provided for. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 83, par. 16.) Mrs. Weaver argues that she had no right to sue for an accounting until she dissolved the partnership by letter, effective 90 days after the receipt thereof, and that her cause of action accrued when the partnership was dissolved. Alternatively, Mrs. Weaver contends that her cause of action accrued on January 7, 1980, when she discovered that her name had been dropped from the business checking account and thus discovered Mr. Watson's position that she had no interest in the partnership. Mrs. Weaver also argues that her action is based on the written partnership agreement and hence that the applicable statute of limitations is the 10 year statute governing actions on written contracts or other evidences of indebtedness in writing. Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 83, par. 17.

The statute of limitations to be applied is to be determined by the type of injury sustained, rather than the nature of the facts from which the claim arises. (Schrebier v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. (1976), 38 Ill.App.3d 556, 348 N.E.2d 218, 219-20.) Under section 16 of the Limitations Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 83, par. 17), a contract cannot be said to be in writing unless the parties thereto, as well as the terms and provisions thereof, can be ascertained from the instrument itself. Thus, where parol evidence must be resorted to show the existence of a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, the five year statute rather than the 10 year statute applies. Novosk v. Reznick (1944), 323 Ill.App. 544, 56 N.E.2d 318, 321.

Recognizing the applicability of the rule in Novosk v. Reznick, Mrs. Weaver argues that Mr. Watson's duty was to account to his brother, and that this is what the trial court ordered him to do. However, Mrs. Weaver's action was brought in her own right, and judgment entered in her favor personally, not as representative of an estate. Parol evidence was necessary to show her personal right to recover based on the contract of the partners. The five year statute applies in this case.

Accordingly, we must decide whether Mrs. Weaver's...