Webb v. Board of Education of Dyer County, Tennessee
| Decision Date | 17 April 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-1360,83-1360 |
| Parties | Leonard WEBB, Petitioner v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF DYER COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
After respondent Board of Education of Dyer County, Tennessee, terminated petitioner's employment as a schoolteacher in 1974, he retained counsel to represent him in administrative proceedings before the Board. Petitioner contended, inter alia, that his discharge was racially motivated and that his constitutional rights had been violated. In 1978, the Board ultimately decided to adhere to its decision. In 1979, petitioner instituted this action in Federal District Court, seeking relief under various civil rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was subsequently settled in 1981 by the entry of a consent order awarding petitioner damages and other relief, and reserving the matter of an award of attorney's fees for future resolution by the parties or by the court. After negotiations proved unsuccessful, petitioner filed a motion for an award of fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce" certain statutes, including § 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." The District Court awarded a fee, but rejected petitioner's contention that it should cover services performed by counsel in the administrative proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. Petitioner is not entitled to a fee award for counsel's services during the Board hearings on the theory that they were "proceeding[s] to enforce" § 1983 within the meaning of § 1988. The reasoning in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 64 L.Ed.2d 723—which held that a provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorized fees for counsel's work performed pursuing a state administrative remedy—is not applicable since the statute involved in Carey expressly required the claimant to pursue state administrative remedies before commencing proceedings in a federal forum, whereas there is no comparable requirement in § 1983. Cf. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746. The Board proceedings here simply do not have the same integral function under § 1983 that state administrative proceedings have under Title VII. Pp. 240-241.
2. Nor is petitioner entitled to recover on the theory that the time spent by counsel in the Board proceedings was "reasonably expended" in preparation for the court action and therefore compensable under the rationale of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40. The Court in Hensley emphasized that the amount to be awarded under § 1988 necessarily depends on the facts of each case, and that the exercise of discretion by the district court must be respected. The time that is compensable under § 1988 is that "reasonably expended on the litigation." Id., at 433, 103 S.Ct., at 1939 (emphasis added). In this case, there is no difficulty in identifying the dividing line between the administrative proceedings and the judicial proceeding. Petitioner did not suggest that any discrete portion of the work product from the administrative proceedings was work that was both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the civil rights litigation to the stage it reached before settlement. Thus the District Court's decision to deny any fees for time spent between 1974 and 1979 pursuing optional administrative remedies was well within the range of reasonable discretion. Pp. 241-244.
715 F.2d 254 (CA6 1983) affirmed.
Charles Stephen Ralston, for petitioner.
S. Russell Headrick, Memphis, Tenn., for respondents.
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, authorizes a court to award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in "any action or proceeding" to enforce certain statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Petitioner was represented by counsel in local administrative proceedings and in a subsequent § 1983 action challenging the termination of his employment as a public school teacher. He ultimately prevailed and was awarded attorney's fees for the time his lawyer spent on the judicial proceedings, but denied fees for the time spent in proceedings before the local School Board. The question presented is whether the District Court correctly excluded the time spent pursuing optional administrative proceedings from the calculation of a "reasonable fee" for the prevailing party.
In the spring of 1974 respondent Dyer County Board of Education, terminated the employment of petitioner, who was a black elementary school teacher with tenure. Petitioner retained counsel to assist him in demonstrating that his discharge was unjustified and to obtain appropriate relief.
A Tennessee statute provides that public school teachers may only be dismissed for specific causes, and guarantees a hearing on charges warranting dismissal.2 Petitioner sought and eventually obtained a series of hearings before the Board at which his counsel presented testimony supporting his claim that the dismissal was unjustified. Because the Board had not provided him with written charges or a pre-termination hearing, and because there was reason to believe that the Board's action was racially motivated,3 petitioner also claimed that his constitutional rights had been violated. Negotiations with the Board continued until the summer of 1978 when the Board finally decided to adhere to its decision to dismiss the petitioner.
On August 13, 1979, the petitioner commenced this action in the United States District for the Western District of Tennessee. He alleged that the Board action was unconstitutional and that various civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, afforded him a basis for monetary and equitable relief against the respondent Board and various individual defendants associated with his dismissal.4 The respondents filed an answer to the complaint, a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and certain discovery requests to which the petitioner responded. App. 21-29, 48. In March 1981, the petitioner filed with the District Court a partial record of the administrative proceedings. Id., at 30-31.
On October 14, 1981, the case was settled by the entry of a consent order awarding the petitioner $15,400 in damages and dismissing the action with prejudice.5 Under the consent decree, the Board also agreed to reinstate the petitioner and treat him as having resigned on the day of dismissal. Adverse comments were to be removed from his employment file. The matter of an award of attorney's fees was reserved for future resolution by the parties or by the court.
During subsequent negotiations, the Board conceded that the petitioner was a "prevailing party" entitled to an award of attorney's fees, but the parties could not agree on the amount of the award. After the negotiations proved unsuccessful, petitioner filed a motion for an award of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The motion was supported by an affidavit containing an itemized description of the time spent by the petitioner's counsel on the matter from April 5, 1974, through September 11, 1981.6 The affidavit also set forth the attorney's professional qualifications and his regular charges during the period involved.7 The petitioner requested a total fee of $21,165, based on an hourly rate of $120 and including an upward adjustment of 25% "in light of the peculiar difficulties involved in this particular kind of case and the unusual nature of the hours involved in the Board proceedings." App. 56.
Respondents, on the other hand, took the position that a reasonable fee would not exceed $5,000. They objected to the hourly rate,8 to certain miscellaneous, unrecorded hours, and to the request for an upward adjustment of 25%. In addition, the respondents contended that the petitioner was not entitled to receive a fee for services performed by counsel in the administrative proceedings.
The District Court awarded a fee of $9,734.38 plus expenses. In making that award, the District Court accepted respondents' position that the time spent in the School Board proceedings should be excluded, but otherwise resolved all issues in petitioner's favor.9 The Court of Appeals affirmed. 715 F.2d 254 (CA6 1983).10 Because of an apparent conflict in federal authority on the availability of attorney's fees under § 1988 for time spent in state administrative proceedings prior to the filing of a federal civil rights action,11 we granted certiorari. 466 U.S. 935, 104 S.Ct. 1906, 80 L.Ed.2d 456 (1984).
The petitioner argues that he is entitled to a fee award for the services of his counsel during the School Board hearings on either of two theories: (1) that those hearings were "proceeding[s] to enforce a provision of [§ 1983]" within the meaning of § 1988; or (2) that the time was "reasonably expended" in preparation for the court action and therefore compensable under the rationale of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). We consider each of these theories.
The relevant language in § 1988 12 is similar to language in § 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which authorizes an award of attorney's fees in "any action or proceeding" under that Title.13 In New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980), we held that § 706(k) authorizes fees for work performed pursuing a state administrative remedy "to which the complainant was referred pursuant to the provisions of Title VII." Id., at 71, 100 S.Ct., at 2034. The petitioner argues that the reasoning in Carey supports a comparable award for the services performed in the School Board proceedings in this case.
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