Webb v. Imperial Life Ins. Co. Inc

• Citation: 216 N.C. 10,3 S.E.2d 428
• Decision Date: 16 June 1939
• Docket Number: No. 751.,751.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Parties: WEBB . v. IMPERIAL LIFE INS. CO., Inc.

3 S.E.2d 428

216 N.C. 10

WEBB .

v.IMPERIAL LIFE INS. CO., Inc.

No. 751.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 16, 1939.

Appeal from Superior Court, Durham County; G. V. Cowper, Special Judge.

Action by Eugene Webb against the Imperial Life Insurance Company, Inc., on a life and accident insurance policy. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

New trial.

This was an action upon a policy of life and accident insurance. The issuance of the policy, the payment of premiums, and the accidental death of the insured, Charles Webb, as result of being struck by an automobile, were admitted. Plaintiff is the beneficiary named in the policy. Defendant set up as defense want of insurable interest on part of plaintiff, and breach of condition in the policy as to intoxicating liquor on the part of the insured.

Upon issues submitted to the jury there was verdict for plaintiff, and from judgment thereon defendant appealed.

R. M. Gantt, of Durham, for appellant.

Victor S. Bryant and John D. McConnell, both of Durham, for appellee.

DEVIN, Justice.

Two questions are presented by this appeal: (1) Did the plaintiff have an insurable interest in the life of the insured? (2) Was there error in the charge of the court relative to intoxicating liquor?

1. It was admitted that the plaintiff and the insured were brothers, and that the defendant executed and delivered the policy to the plaintiff who paid the

premiums thereon. It was also in evidence, uncontradicted, that the insured was married and had children, that the relation between the brothers was cordial and brotherly, and that the plaintiff had aided in the support of the insured during a recent illness. The trial judge charged the jury if they found the facts to be as testified to answer the issue addressed to the question of insurable interest in favor of the plaintiff. This is assigned as error.

Does one have an insurable interest in the life of his brother by virtue of that relationship alone? We do not find a definite answer to that question among the decided cases in this jurisdiction. The nearest approach was in Crump v. Ins. Co., 204 N. C. 439, 168 S.E. 514, where it was held that the plaintiff in that case had no insurable interest in the life of the illegitimate daughter of plaintiff's father. In Howell v. Ins. Co., 189 N.C. 212, 126 S.E. 603, 604, citing Vance on Insurance, 147, insurable interest is defined as follows: "An insurable interest in the life of another has been defined to be 'such an interest, arising from the relation of the party obtaining the insurance, either as creditor of or surety for the assured, or from ties of blood or marriage, to him as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life.'" May on Ins., sec. 102a; Trinity College v. Ins. Co., 113 N.C, 244, 18 S.E. 175, 22 L.R.A. 291; Hinton v. Ins. Co., 135 N.C. 314, 47 S.E. 474, 65 L.R.A. 161, 102 Am.St.Rep. 545; Slade v. Ins. Co., 202 N.C. 315, 162 S.E. 734.

The authorities from other jurisdictions where the point has been decided are not in harmony. 14 R.C.L. 923; 37 C.J. 393. The rule prevails in some states that in order to constitute insurable interest there must be some expectation of pecuniary advantage in addition to ties of blood. This seems to have been derived from the early English statute (14 Geo. Ill, C. 48), prohibiting wager policies. It has been held according to this doctrine that, in cases where the relationship of brother is established, an insurable interest, which will take the insurance policy out of the class of wagering contracts, is such an interest arising from ties of blood as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of the life of the assured, though it is hot necessary that the expectation of benefit should be always capable of pecuniary estimation. This is the principle stated in Warnock v. Davis 104 U.S. 775, 779, 26 L.Ed. 924, and followed in Life Insurance Clearing Co. v. O'Neill, 3 Cir., 106 F. 800, 54 L.R.A. 225. To the same effect is Abernathy v. Springfield Mut. Ass'n, Mo.App., 284 S.W. 198; Miller v. Ins. Co., 81 Ind.App. 618, 144 N.E. 554; Lewis v. Ins. Co., 39 Conn. 100; Lee v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc, 195 Mo.App. 40, 189 S.W. 1195; Locher v. Kuechenmiester, 120 Mo.App. 701, 98 S.W. 92; Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. 115, 7 Am. Dec. 38.

But we think the better reasoning supports the view that the close relationship by ties of blood between brothers is alone sufficient to constitute insurable interest even when the beneficiary takes out the policy and pays the premiums thereon. One of the leading cases upholding this principle is.Etna Life Ins. Co. v. France, 94 U.S. 561, 565, 24 L.Ed. 287, where it was said: "But as between brother and sister * * * presumed to be actuated by "considerations of strong morals, and the force of natural affection between near kindred operating often more efficaciously than those of positive law' * * * the case is divested of that gambling aspect which is presented where there is nothing but a speculative interest in the death of another, without any interest in his life to counterbalance it."

From the well considered case of Rogers v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 135 S.C. 89, 133 S.E. 215, 218, 45 A.L.R. 1172, holding that the mere relationship of brothers was sufficient to constitute an insurable interest, we quote the following language: "While in some jurisdictions it is held that a brother has no insurable interest in the life of his brother by reason of kinship alone, it does not seem unreasonable or against public policy, but more in keeping with an enlightened humanitarian view, that such insurable interest should exist, at least where the brother whose life is insured agrees to, and collaborates with the other in securing, the insurance. The natural laws of kinship and blood, the ties of affection and friendship which ordinarily exist between brother and brother, negative the idea and belief that one would desire the removal of the other by reason of the existence of such insurance." To the same effect is the holding in Crosswell v. Connecticut Indemnity Ass'n, 51 S.C. 103, 114, 28 S.E. 200.

In Century Life Ins. Co. v. Custer, 178 Ark. 304, 10 S.W.2d 882, 61 A.L.R. 914, where this question was considered for the first time by that court, it was held that brothers have an insurable interest in the lives of each other by virtue of the relationship alone, citing in support of the doctrine Etna Life Ins. Co. v. France, supra; Hosmer v. Welch, 107 Mich. 470, 65 N.W. 280, 67 N.W. 504; Williams v. Fletcher, 26 Tex.Civ.App. 85, 62 S.W. 1082; Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 24 N.J.L. 576; Lane v. Lane, 99 Tenn. 639, 42 S.W. 1058; Goodwin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life...