Webb v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

Decision Date30 April 1941
Docket Number1.
Citation19 A.2d 704,179 Md. 407
PartiesWEBB v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Edwin T. Dickerson, Judge.

Suit by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore against R. Legare Webb, administrator of the Estate of Henry H. Mormann deceased, to recover amount of their claims filed against estate of decedent for money alleged to have been expended by plaintiffs for maintenance of decedent while an inmate in State Hospital. From an adverse judgment, the defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Willis R. Jones, of Baltimore, for appellant.

Hector J. Ciotti, Asst. City Sol., of Baltimore (Charles C. G Evans, City Sol., of Baltimore, in the brief), for appellee.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and SLOAN, JOHNSON, DELAPLAINE, COLLINS and FORSYTHE, JJ.

COLLINS Judge.

Henry H. Mormann died on April 24, 1934, at Springfield State Hospital where he had been a patient since September 12 1928. On November 2, 1936, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City filed a claim against his estate for money alleged to have been expended by it for the maintenance of the said Henry H. Mormann while an inmate in said hospital. This claim was filed before the filing of the final administration account. On June 14, 1937, R. Legare Webb, administrator of the estate, notified the Mayor and City Council in writing of his refusal to pay this claim. Within nine months thereafter, on March 24, 1938, the Mayor and City Council entered suit to recover the amount of its claim. From the ruling of the court in refusing his two prayers the appellant excepted.

Article 43, Section 63, Flacks Code provides as follows: 'Any expenses incurred by the authorities of any city, town or county in maintaining in a hospital, or in a temporary place for the reception of the sick, a patient who is not a pauper shall be deemed to be a debt due from such patient to the authorities aforesaid, and may be recovered from him at any time within twelve months after the discharge from such hospital or place of reception, or from his estate, in the event of his dying in such hospital.' The single question before this court on appeal is, all other questions having been abandoned by the appellant, does the limitation of twelve months imposed by the statute above referred to, apply as a special limitation against his estate in the event of a patient dying within the institution.

This court said in the case of Healy v. State, 115 Md 377, at page 379, 80 A. 1074, at page 1076, 'Primarily, the intention of the Legislature must be sought in the words employed to express it. If the meaning of the language used be plain and unambiguous, the Legislature must be understood to intend what is plainly expressed, and nothing then remains but to give the intent effect. If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted, what the circumstances were under which the action was taken, what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed, and what was the leading object of the law.' Stoll v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 163 Md. 282, 292, 162 A. 267; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Home Credit Company, 165 Md. 57, 64, 166 A. 604, 167 A. 552; Davis v. Board of Education, 166 Md. 118, 121, 170 A. 590; State v. Fleming, 173 Md. 192, 196, 195 A. 392. The above statute was enacted as Chapter 155, Section 10 of the Acts of 1...

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2 cases
  • Dept. of Environment v. Underwood
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • March 5, 2002
    ...before the qualifying phrase...." Sullivan v. Dixon, 280 Md. 444, 451, 373 A.2d 1245, 1249 (1977) (citing Webb v. City of Baltimore, 179 Md. 407, 409-10, 19 A.2d 704, 705 (1941)). In consideration of that principle, we are unable to adopt Respondents' The language of § 9-276 does not contai......
  • ANNAPOLIS MARKET PLACE v. Parker
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • July 18, 2002
    ...prevents such a spillover application of the qualifying phrase to the latter portion of § 2-105(a)(3). See Webb v. Balt., 179 Md. 407, 409, 19 A.2d 704, 705 (1941) ("It appears also that subsequent clauses should not be limited by independent precedent clauses unless the intention be clearl......

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