Webb v. Pearson

• Decision Date: 19 February 1968
• Docket Number: No. 5--4484,5--4484
• Citation: 244 Ark. 109,424 S.W.2d 145
• Parties: Callie L. WEBB, Appellant, v. Tom PEARSON, Jr., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 145

424 S.W.2d 145

244 Ark. 109

Callie L. WEBB, Appellant, v. Tom PEARSON, Jr., et al., Appellees.

No. 5--4484.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Feb. 19, 1968.

Lewis D. Jones and John E. Butt, Fayetteville, for appellant.

Walter B. Cox, Putman, Davis & Bassett and Charles W. Atkinson, Fayetteville, for appellees.

WARD, Justice.

Callie L. Webb, appellant, was injured when she stepped on a grease spot on a board walkway. The walkway ran along the west side of, and was attached to, a building owned by Sonneman Trusts and in which Tom Pearson, Jr. and Guy Pinkerton (also lessees) operate 'Razorback Bowling Lanes'--all appellees.

Appellant filed a complaint alleging, in essence, that: she slipped on a patch of grease, foreign to a public sidewalk, and fell, causing severe injuries; that defendants, being in complete control of the sidewalk, are guilty of negligence, viz, (a) in allowing the grease to be on the public sidewalk, (b) allowing the grease to remain on the sidewalk more than a reasonable period of time, and (c) allowing this dangerous situation to be created amounts to 'wilful, wanton and malicious conduct toward the general public, and more particularly toward the plaintiff'. The prayer was for $28,000.

To the above complaint appellees entered a general denial, and then filed a Motion for a Summary Judgment.

The matter was presented to the trial judge on affidavits and, in granting the same, he made findings as follows: (1) Appellant was not a trespasser or an invitee, but was a mere licensee; (2) The Walkway was on the private property of Sonneman Trusts who owed appellant no duty other than to be free of wilful and wanton misconduct; (3) Since the Razorback Bowling Lanes was only a lessee it owed appellant no duty other than to exercise due care not to do anything to cause her injury after her presence on the premises was discovered. The trial court then held there was no material issue of fact to be resolved, and, by Order, dismissed the complaint. From such Order appellant now prosecutes this appeal.

A review of the testimony, as applied to previous decisions of this Court, convinces us that the findings and the decisions of the trial court must be affirmed.

The essence of the pertinent testimony of appellant is: She asked Mr. Sonneman about a month before the accident for permission to park in the rear of his building, and it was orally granted, and that she paid him nothing; the public has been using the sidewalk for years. The undisputed testimony of Sonneman is: The walkway in question is a part of his building, located entirely on private property and is now now and never has been a public walkway.

It is clear, from the undisputed portion of the record, that appellant, when injured, was on the private property of Sonneman Trusts and, this being true, she was a licensee. In the case of Knight v. Farmers' & Merchants' Gin Company, 159 Ark. 423, 252 S.W. 30, the rule is stated in these words:

'In all of our decisions on the subject--and there are many--we have adhered to the rule that one who goes upon the premises of another as a mere licensee is in the same attitude as a trespasser so far as concerns the duty which the owner owes him for his protection; that he takes the license with its concomitant perils, and that the owner owes him no duty of protection except to do no act to cause his injury after his presence there is discovered.'

The above quotation was copied and approved in Garrett v. Arkansas Power & Light Company, 218 Ark. 575, at p. 586, 237 S.W.2d 895.

In this case there is no evidence...