Webb v. Roberson

Decision Date17 April 2013
Docket NumberNo. W2012-01230-COA-R9-CV,W2012-01230-COA-R9-CV
PartiesCHARLES WEBB and EVANGELINE WEBB, Individually and as Husband and Wife v. CHARLES ROBERSON, M.D., ET AL.
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

CHARLES WEBB and EVANGELINE WEBB, Individually
and as Husband and Wife
v.
CHARLES ROBERSON, M.D., ET AL.

No. W2012-01230-COA-R9-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

February 19, 2013 Session
Filed April 17, 2013


Interlocutory Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
No. CT-004737-10
Robert S. Weiss, Judge

In this interlocutory appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121, which requires a medical malpractice claimant to provide certain notice sixty days prior to filing suit. We conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 is not an unconstitutional infringement upon the courts' rule-making authority, that it is not preempted by HIPAA, and that it does not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of state and federal law. Affirmed and Remanded.

Tenn. R. App. P. 9; Interlocutory Appeal; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
and Remanded

ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DAVID R. FARMER, J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J., joined.

Louis P. Chiozza, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee; Steven R. Walker, Oakland, TN, for the appellants, Charles Webb and Evangeline Webb

Marty R. Phillips, John O. Alexander, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, Charles Roberson, M.D. and Charles Roberson, M.D., P.C.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, William E. Young, Solicitor General, Stephanie A. Bergmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, TN, for the appellee, State of Tennessee

Jennifer S. Harrison, Memphis, TN, for the appellees, Sabrina Greer, R.N., Brandy Madden, R.N., Jerry Ray, R.N., Tina Cox, R.N., Michael Maharrey, R.N. and AMISUB (SFH), Inc., d/b/a St. Francis Hospital

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OPINION

I. F ACTS & P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY

On September 23, 2010, Charles Webb and his wife, Evangeline Webb, (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed a medical malpractice Complaint against numerous defendants, including emergency room physician Charles Roberson, M.D. and Charles Roberson, M.D., P.C.;1 nurses Sabrina Greer, Brandy Madden, Jerry Ray, Tina Cox, and Michael Maharrey ("Nurses"); and AMISUB (SFH), Inc. and AMISUB (SFH), Inc. d/b/a Saint Francis Hospital ("Hospital").2 The Complaint alleged the negligent failure to timely diagnose and treat Mr. Webb's cancer on or about July 26, 2009. Also on September 23, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Certificate of Good Faith in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122.

Charles Roberson, M.D. and Charles Roberson, M.D., P.C. ("Dr. Roberson") filed an Answer on April 12, 2011, generally denying negligence and asserting that he was not provided with the sixty-day pre-suit notice required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. Specifically, Dr. Roberson alleged that he received a notice letter on or about September 16, 2010-seven days prior to the filing of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

On April 21, 2011, the Hospital and the Nurses filed a joint Answer also generally denying any negligence.

On August 10, 2011, Dr. Roberson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon Plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. Dr. Roberson claimed that Plaintiffs had failed to provide him with notice of the potential claim sixty days prior to the filing of the Complaint, that the statute of limitations, therefore, was not extended for a period of one hundred twenty days, and, thus, that the September 23, 2010 Complaint was filed outside of the one-year statute of limitations. Additionally, Dr. Roberson claimed that Plaintiffs' Complaint failed to comply with section 29-26-121 because it had no attached affidavit stating that timely notice had been delivered and to whom, and because it failed to include the information required within the sixty-day notice.

On September 2, 2011, the Nurses also filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon Plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with the requirements of section 29-26-121. The Nurses

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claimed that the Hospital was served with a notice letter on July 21, 2010, but that the letter "was not served on the individually named nurses and the notice letter that was served . . . did not list the individually named nurses as providers being sent notice." Additionally, the Nurses maintained that the July 21, 2010 notice letter failed to include the "HIPAA compliant medical authorization permitting the provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from each other provider being sent a notice" as required by section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Instead, according to the nurses, Plaintiffs "provided HIPAA compliant medical authorizations allowing all defendants other than these individually named nurses to obtain the plaintiff's medical records."

In response to Dr. Roberson's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs conceded that they had unsuccessfully attempted to personally serve Dr. Roberson with a pre-suit notice letter dated July 22, 2010, and that a letter was not personally delivered to him until September 16, 2010-seven days prior to the filing of their Complaint. However, Plaintiffs argued that service of the July 22, 2010 letter was attempted upon Dr. Roberson "several times at St. Francis Hospital; however, hospital security would not provide a work schedule for Dr. Roberson, and was uncooperative in assisting with service." Additionally, Plaintiffs contended that "T.C.A. § 29-26-121 and the entire Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act are unconstitutional." Likewise, in response to the Nurses's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of section 29-26-121 and the entire Medical Malpractice Act. Due to the constitutional claims, the State of Tennessee was allowed to intervene in the matter and it filed a memorandum of law to defend the constitutionality of section 29-26-121,3 which Dr. Roberson and the Nurses adopted.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted Dr. Roberson's Motion for Summary Judgment. The court concluded that the Medical Malpractice Act is constitutional and that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of section 29-26-121. Specifically, the court found that Dr. Roberson was not served with notice until September 16, 2010, and therefore that Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims. Additionally, the trial court found that Plaintiffs had failed to file an affidavit along with their Complaint establishing delivery under section 29-26-121 and that their Complaint failed to include the information required within the sixty-day notice.

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Following a second hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment4 in favor of the Nurses. Again, the trial court concluded that the Medical Malpractice Act is constitutional, and it further found that the Nurses had not been served with pre-suit notice of a potential claim, that the notice which was provided did not give the Nurses a HIPAA compliant medical authorization to obtain medical records from other providers receiving notice of the potential claim, and that Plaintiffs' Complaint failed to include the information required within the sixty-day notice.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Alter or Amend claiming that the trial court had erred in considering "at least two aspects" of section 29-26-121's constitutionality under a rational basis test rather than under strict scrutiny. The trial court denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend. Plaintiffs then successfully moved the trial court for permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal, and on August 20, 2012, this Court entered an Order granting Plaintiffs' application for an interlocutory appeal.

II. I SSUES P RESENTED

Plaintiffs raised four issues5 in their Application for Interlocutory Appeal:

1. Whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 is an unconstitutional infringement upon the rule-making authority of the courts, and particularly upon Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 3;

2. Whether the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") preempts Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121;

3. Whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 violates the equal protection and due process provisions of state and federal law; and

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4. Whether the entire Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act is unconstitutional.

For the following reasons, we conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 is not an unconstitutional infringement upon the courts' rule-making authority, that it is not preempted by HIPAA, and that it does not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of state and federal law. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Issues of constitutional interpretation are questions of law, which we review de novo without any presumption of correctness given to the legal conclusions of the courts below." Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 882 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Colonial Pipeline v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 836 (Tenn. 2008)). When evaluating the...

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