Webb v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Decision Date | 11 May 1995 |
Docket Number | POST-DISPATC,No. 94-2127,A,94-2127 |
Citation | 51 F.3d 147 |
Parties | 67 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 607, 6 NDLR P 240 Elmer J. WEBB, Jr., Appellant, v. ST. LOUISppellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Elmer J. Webb, Jr., pro se.
Curtis C. Calloway, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellee.
Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
Elmer J. Webb appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant in his action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. We reverse and remand.
Following his discharge from employment with the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Post), Webb, an African-American, filed this suit claiming that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his race. He alleged that, while working as a "flyman," he began to experience a nervous condition due to the intense noise in his working environment; he repeatedly requested transfer to a less noisy area, but his requests were denied. Webb contended that the Post made accommodations for at least one white employee with a similar condition by moving him into an office position, and that the Post's failure to likewise accommodate him forced him to miss work on numerous occasions, resulting in his eventual termination. The Post moved for summary judgment, arguing it had a legitimate reason for terminating Webb; as for the failure to accommodate, the Post asserted that Webb did not have the necessary skills for an office position. Webb, however, maintained that this was a pretext for discrimination, and provided the following deposition excerpts:
Q Can you type, Mr. Webb?
A ... I ain't going to say 50 percent, but some of the [white employees] in the office can't type.... I could call schedule names.... That's what some of the employees did with less seniority than me.
* * * * * *
Q Do you have any computer skills for working in an office?
A No, sir ... [but] I didn't see anybody in there doing computer work.
(R. Doc. 39 Ex. O at 80-81, 82-83.) The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that Webb had been discharged for a valid nondiscriminatory reason, namely, unexcused absenteeism, and that Webb did not challenge the Post's assertion that, unlike the white employee with a similar condition, Webb was not qualified for an office position. Webb appeals.
In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, see Kobrin v. University of Minn., 34 F.3d 698, 701 (8th Cir.1994), we note that summary judgment is proper only "where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion," Johnson v. Minnesota Historical Soc'y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir.1991). It appears that the Post's ultimate decision to terminate Webb was not directly motivated by his race, but by his unexcused absenteeism. Whether the Post discriminated against Webb in failing to accommodate his nervous condition, however, is still in issue: but for the lack of accommodation, would Webb have avoided the absences which resulted in his discharge? See Vaughn v. Edel, 918 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir.1990) ( ). As in Vaughn, "[t]his circuit will not sterilize a seemingly objective decision to fire an employee when earlier discriminatory decisions have infected it." Id. at 523, quoted in Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1325 (8th Cir.1994). In Stacks, we reiterated the necessity of " '[l]ook[ing] beyond the moment the decision [to fire ...] was made' " to find disparate treatment, Stacks, 27 F.3d at 1325 (citations omitted), noting that the employee's subsequent misconduct could not "shield the company from liability" for prior discriminatory acts. Id.
In likewise looking beyond the Post's decision to terminate and disregarding Webb's subsequent malfeasance in not documenting his medical absences, we believe the Post's failure to accommodate Webb's nervous condition possibly constituted discriminatory treatment. See Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F.Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D.Ind.1984) ( ); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1825, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (...
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