Webb v. State

• Decision Date: 17 February 1896
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: R. W. WEBB v. THE STATE

19 So. 238

73 Miss. 456

R. W. WEBB v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 17, 1896

October 1895

FROM the circuit court of Winston county HON. A. G. MAYERS, Judge.

The appellant was convicted of the murder of one Callahan. There was no eyewitness to the killing, and, on the trial, evidence was introduced tending to prove his defense of an alibi. For the purpose of showing a motive for the crime, the state offered, and the court admitted, over defendant's objection, evidence to the effect that the accused had seduced the sister of the deceased and whipped his nephew had refused to marry the sister after promising to do so should her child, when born, resemble him; had threatened to burn the house of the deceased in case he failed to provide for the seduced sister, and had profanely protested against being watched when he visited the sister.

The fourth instruction given for the state is as follows "While the alibi is a good defense in all cases, if shown to cover the time of the crime, it must be by testimony such as the jury believe, to that extent that it raises a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. If there is no such doubt from all the other evidence in the case, and, if the jury believe, from all the evidence in the case, that the testimony of the alibi is untrue, then the jury may disregard such testimony altogether; and, if they believe, from all the facts and circumstances proven in the case, that Webb killed Callahan, the jury ought to say guilty."

The fifth instruction given for the state is quoted in full in the opinion.

The action of the court in granting these two instructions and in admitting the evidence introduced to show motive on the part of the accused, were made the grounds of a motion for a new trial, which motion being overruled, the defendant appealed.

Reversed and remanded.

J. A. P. Campbell, for appellant.

1. The admission of the testimony in reference to the liaison between the accused and the sister of the deceased was a fatal error. Cotton v. State, 31 Miss. 504. It was irrelevant and harmful, and calculated to lead to a conviction, not for the homicide, but the wrong done to the girl.

2. The fourth instruction for the state was clearly erroneous. It makes mere belief that Webb killed Callahan sufficient to require a verdict of guilty. This instruction has been so pointedly condemned that it only remains for me to call attention to the fact that the case was one of circumstantial evidence, so far as the accused was concerned, creating necessity for the avoidance of the slightest error in instructing the jury. Burt v. State, 72 Miss. 408; Brown v. State, Ib., 95; Hemphill v. State, 71 Ib., 877.

3. The fifth instruction is as bad or worse than the fourth. It not only told the jury that all the proven facts and circumstances were required to be "considered together, and not separately, " but, if, so considered, they could not reasonably be accounted for by any other reasonable hypothesis than the guilt of the accused, it was their duty to convict. Inability to account reasonably for all the facts and circumstances, considered together and not separately, although they may be ever so diverse and isolated, having no connection each with the other, it is here said required a verdict of guilty. The law demands great caution in considering circumstantial evidence, and, to warrant conviction by it, requires the actual exclusion of every other hypothesis than guilt, but this instruction required the facts and circumstances, however multitudinous and variant, to be accounted for reasonably, and by a reasonable hypothesis too, consistently with innocence. What a perversion of the law that throws its shield over the victim of circumstances, and demands the absolute exclusion of every other hypothesis than guilt! Algheri v. State, 25 Miss. 584; Starkie on Ev., 865, 859; Wills on Cir. Ev., 149.

Frank Johnston, attorney-general, for the state.

1. The fourth instruction for the state may not be technically expressed in saying that the evidence of the alibi should be such as to raise a doubt of the defendant's guilt, in that it may be suggestive as to the weight of the evidence. But substantially it is correct, for the defendant could not be convicted if there was a reasonable doubt of his guilt.

The fifth instruction is not accurately expressed, but it is not incorrect to say that all the facts, in a case of circumstantial evidence, should be considered together. The latter clause is not clear. It carries the idea, though, of the exclusion of any reasonable doubt of guilt. Under it, if the circumstances could be reasonably accounted for on any hypothesis other than that of guilt, the jury should acquit. That is the reverse proposition implied. If, on the other hand, there should be no reasonable hypothesis other than guilt, then there could be no acquittal. This is the instruction.

2. The reasonable doubt doctrine is fully explained by the instructions given for the defendant.

3. There is no bill of exceptions in the record, and the court will not reverse for error in instructions in such case. Covel v. Smith, 68 Miss. 296; Head v. State, 44 Miss. 731; Evans v. State, Ib., 212. The court cannot say that the verdict was not fully justified by the evidence. It may have been so plain a case of murder that, no matter what errors occurred in the instructions, the judgment should be affirmed.

Wiley N. Nash, attorney-general, for the state.

Since the filing of the brief of my predecessor in office, the evidence adduced on the trial has been brought up by bill of exceptions. It is urged, on behalf of the appellant, that the court below erred in admitting that part of the testimony showing that the accused had seduced the sister of the deceased. This, with the other evidence showing the unfriendly and unusual relations existing between the...