Webb v. State Personnel Board

• Decision Date: 05 April 1971
• Citation: 16 Cal.App.3d 542,94 Cal.Rptr. 115
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Sidney J. WEBB, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE PERSONNEL BOARD of the State of California, et al., Respondents. Civ. 12668.

Page 115

94 Cal.Rptr. 115

16 Cal.App.3d 542

Sidney J. WEBB, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE PERSONNEL BOARD of the State of California, et al., Respondents.

Civ. 12668.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

April 5, 1971.

[16 Cal.App.3d 544] Sidney J. Webb, in pro. per.

Wayne N. Stephenson, Calif. State Employees Assn., Sacramento, amicus curiae in support of petitioner.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen. by Anthony S. DaVigo, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for respondents.

BRAY, Associate Justice (Assigned).

This is an appeal by petitioner from judgment denying his petition for writ of

mandate requiring respondent board to make certain findings. ¹

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does section 18682 of the Government Code require the State Personnel Board to make findings upon request in a job classification matter? ²

RECORD

Petitioner is a permanent civil service employee of the State of California holding the position of Public Utility Financial Examiner IV with the Public Utilities Commission, said position having been so classified by the State Personnel Board. During a personnel management survey of the Public Utilities Commission, petitioner requested the State Personnel Board to audit his position and classify him to a higher level.

On May 8, 1968, an audit of petitioner's position was made in a detailed six page memorandum. This recommended that petitioner's position remain allocated to the class of Public Utilities Financial Examiner IV. Thereafter petitioner filed with the State Personnel Board an appeal from the findings and determination of the board's staff, requesting the board to reallocate said position to a new class at a higher level and specifically asked the board to make findings on all issues material to meeting the requirements of section 18801 of the Government Code. ³

After hearing the appeal, the board denied the request for reclassification without making findings. Subsequently petitioner filed with the board a petition for rehearing demanding that it make supporting findings as he claimed is required by section 18682 of the Government Code. The board denied the petition for rehearing, still without making any formal findings. Then petitioner filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court a petition for alternative writ of mandate to compel said board to make the requested findings. The court issued its alternative writ commanding the board either to make findings of fact regarding the classification of petitioner's position or to show cause why it had not done so. The board filed a return to alternative writ of mandate by way of answer and demurrer to petition. After a hearing the court issued its judgment vacating the alternative writ of mandate and denying the petition.

FINDINGS BY THE BOARD

The main cause of the conflict between petitioner and the board is his contention that a large part of his duties and responsibilities fall within a part of the definition of Assistant Chief, Finance and Accounts Division, that the legal aspects of his duties and responsibilities are grossly underrated and that the 'heavy emphasis upon accounting and auditing, as compared with financing and law, in the minimum qualifications for my position, is inappropriate.' He asked that his position 'be reallocated at least to the level of Examiner II, Public Utilities Commission.' On this appeal petitioner states that 'his principal contention on appeal, as it was in the Superior Court, is that respondents refused to make any findings of fact upon which they based their decision.'

Petitioner contends that if compelled to make findings of fact the board 'would be squarely confronted with the inappropriateness of the accounting and auditing education, experience, knowledge and ability requirements in the specification as related to the actual functions of appellant's position.'

In the notification to the petitioner of the board's denial of his appeal appears the statement, 'It has not been the practice of the Personnel Board to issue findings of fact on matters that are quasi-legislative in nature such as classification and pay hearings.'

The question is whether the requirement in section 18682 that upon request findings be made is subject to an exception where the board is considering whether to change the specifications for a particular positional grade. Petitioner's request was that his position be audited and that the duties and responsibilities which he was performing be assigned to a higher class. Petitioner concedes that in the staff report to the board 'My specific duties were incorporated by Board action into the class specification for Public Utility Financial Examiner IV,' and 'The position remains essentially as described in the job specification for that class.' His main contention is that in that class 'Primary emphasis is placed on financial rather than legal expertise.' Does the action of the board which held that no appropriate basis existed for sustaining his appeal require a finding of fact showing that primary emphasis is or is not placed on financial expertise?

No formal or written findings of fact were made. The only indication in the record of the method of denial of petitioner's appeal is in the form of a letter to petitioner from the executive officer of the State Personnel Board dated August 13, 1968, stating as follows: 'The Members of the State Personnel Board have reviewed and considered the information you presented in connection with your recent appeal from the staff recommendation that your position remain allocated to the class of Public Utility Financial Examiner IV. They were unable to find that an appropriate basis existed for sustaining your appeal, and the Board, therefore, on August 9, 1968, denied your appeal.'

It is clear that petitioner made written request for findings specifically pursuant to section 18682 prior to the time the board took the matter under submission. Such request was made in writing on May 31, 1968, at the same time and in the same document that the appeal from the staff recommendation was made to the board and a hearing requested, and the request was repeated on September 3, 1968, with the petition for rehearing before the board after the board denied the appeal following a hearing held on July 25, 1968, at which testimony of petitioner and others was taken.

'* * * The basic purposes of findings are * * * to enable the court to examine the decision of the administrative agency in order to determine whether it is based upon a proper principle (citation), and to apprise the litigants or parties in regard to the reason for the administrative action as an aid to them in deciding whether additional proceedings should be initiated and, if so, upon what grounds (citation).' (Swars v. Council of City of Vallejo (1949) 33 Cal.2d 867, 871, 206 P.2d 355, 358.)

Section 18803 of the Government Code makes it plain that petitioner was entitled to a hearing on allocation of his position and the board did hold such a hearing. There is no dispute over this. The dispute is over the question of findings following such hearing.

Respondents contend that the board is not required to make findings on classification matters because they are quasi- legislative as opposed to quasi-judicial in nature. Respondents also contend that because Government Code section 18803 provides for a '(r)easonable opportunity to be heard' for an employee affected by allocation of his position to a class no formal hearing with taking of testimony is necessary since section 18682 is in a different chapter of the Government Code than section 18803. Both these contentions have no merit. The alleged distinction between quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial proceedings does exist for some general purposes. (See 2 Cal.Jr.2d, Administrative Law, § 20.) But under the statutes here applicable a distinction for finding purposes is unsupported by any citation of judicial authority by respondents. The statutes themselves make no such distinction, and we find no authority or reason to do so. Respondents are asking us to hold that section 18682 applies to only some, but not all, hearings. This contention is similar to that rejected by the Supreme Court in California Motor Transport Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 270, 272, 28 Cal.Rptr. 868, 379 P.2d 324, in which it was held that section 1705 of the Public Utilities Code pertaining to 'any hearing' required findings for all types of commission action, regardless of their nature, wherein a hearing was held. (See also 146 A.L.R. 209.) Section 18682 is plain and unambiguous. It is contained in chapter 2 of part 2 of division 5 of title 2 of the Government Code, and section 18803 is contained in the adjoining chapter 3; but they are both part of the State Civil Service Law, and section 18682 by its language and location clearly applies to any hearing under that law where the...