Webb v. Union Elec. Co. of Mo.

• Decision Date: 13 June 1949
• Citation: 223 S.W.2d 13,240 Mo.App. 1101
• Parties: Samuel Webb, Respondent, v. Union Electric Company of Missouri, a Corporation, Appellant
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

223 S.W.2d 13

240 Mo.App. 1101

Samuel Webb, Respondent, v. Union Electric Company of Missouri, a Corporation, Appellant

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Kansas City

June 13, 1949

Delivered

Appeal from Circuit Court of Pettis County; Hon. Dimmitt Hoffman Judge.

Judgment Reversed.

Richmond C. Coburn, Harry H. Kay and John A. Woodbridge for (defendant) appellant.

The defendant is not precluded from maintaining its defense of the statute of limitations. The defendant's answer pleaded the statute of limitations adequately. Bahn v Fritz's Estate, 92 Mont. 84, 10 P.2d 1061 (1932); Clarke v. Lincoln County, 54 Wis. 580, 12 N.W. 20 (1882); 37 C. J., pp. 1221-1222; Houts on Missouri Pleading & Practice, Sec. 2573; Official Form 20 of the New Federal Rules, 28 U.S.C. A., Sec. 723c, p. 797. Where an answer is attacked for the first time on appeal it should be liberally construed and should receive every intendment in its favor. Saxbury v. Coons, 98 S.W. 2d 662 (Mo. Sup., 1936); Jones v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 234 Mo.App. 1189, 122 S.W. 2d 41 (St. L. C. A., 1938). Under the liberalized influence of the New Civil Code, on appeal a pleading must be construed with liberality and upheld unless it wholly fails to state a cause of action or defense. Rogers v Poteet, 355 Mo. 986, 199 S.W. 2d 378 (en banc, 1947). Where a cause is tried in the trial court as if an issue had been pleaded, on appeal the pleadings will be considered as amended to include that issue. Civil Code of Missouri, Sec 847.82, Mo. R. S. A., 1939; Jankowski v. Delfert, 201 S.W. 2d 331 (Mo. Sup., 1947); Hallauer v Lackey, 353 Mo. 1244, 188 S.W. 2d 30 (1945); Copeland v. Term. R. Assn. of St. Louis, 353 Mo. 433, 182 S.W. 2d 600 (Mo. Sup., 1944), cert. den. 323 U.S. 799, 65 S.Ct. 554; Rainwater v. Wallace, 351 Mo. 1044, 174 S.W. 2d 835 (1943); Jenkins v. Kurn, 348 Mo. 942, 156 S.W. 2d 668 (1941): Fuhler v. Gohman & Levine Const. Co., 346 Mo. 588, 142 S.W. 2d 482 (1940); Ilgenfritz v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 340 Mo. 648, 101 S.W. 2d 723 (1937); Ford v. Wabash Ry. Co., 318 Mo. 723, 300 S.W. 769 (1927). Section 847.82 of the Civil Code of Missouri has been construed as liberalizing the principle that where a party fails to contend in the trial court that a pleading is defective, he is in no position to do so for the first time on appeal. Ford v. L. & N. R. Co., 355 Mo. 362, 196 S.W. 2d 163 (1946); Wooten v. Friedberg, 355 Mo. 756, 198 S.W. 2d 1 (1946); Gerber v. Schuette Inv. Co., 354 Mo. 1246, 194 S.W. 2d 25 (1946); Brackmann v. Brackmann, 202 S.W. 2d 561 (St. L. C. A., 1947); Duffy v. Barnhart Store Co., 202 S.W. 520 (St. L. C. A., 1947). This rule is applied to upset a judgment of the trial court as well as to affirm it. Missouri Civil Code, Sec. 847.82, Mo. R. S. A., 1939; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bleedorn, 235 Mo.App. 286, 132 S.W. 2d 1066 (St. L. C. A., 1939); Savage v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 86 S.W. 2d 97 (St. L. C. A., 1935); William E. Peck & Co. v. Kansas City Metal Roofing & Corrugating Co., 96 Mo.App. 212, 70 S.W. 169 (K. C. C. A., 1902). The concurrent negligence rule is not applied to water damage cases. Where several wrongdoers, not acting in concert, obstruct a stream and their wrongful acts concur in causing the plaintiff's damage, each defendant is not liable for all of the plaintiff's damage but only for that part of the damage which is attributable to his wrongful act. Benson v. City of St. Louis, 219 S.W. 575 (Mo. Sup., 1920); State ex rel. Federal Lead Co. v. Dearing, 244 Mo. 25, 148 S.W. 618 (1912); Martinowsky v. Hannibal, 35 Mo.App. 70 (St. L. C. A., 1889); Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., 52 F.2d 364 (C. C. A. 8, 1931), cert. den. 284 U.S. 677, 52 S.Ct. 131; Montgomery Light & Water Power Co. v. Charles, 258 F. 723 (D. C. Ala., 1919); Miller v. Highland Ditch Co., 87 Cal. 430, 25 P. 550 (1891); Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v. Swartz, 77 Colo. 60, 234 P. 1059 (1925); Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Jones, 20 Ga.App. 780, 93 S.E. 521 (1917); Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Glinney, 118 Ill. 487, 9 N.E. 203 (1886); Wm. Tackaberry Co. v. Sioux City Service Co., 154 Iowa 358, 132 N.W. 945 (1911), petition for rehearing overruled, 134 N.W. 1064 (1912); Polk v. Illinois Central R. Co., 175 Ky. 762, 195 S.W. 129 (1917); Davis v. Hambrick, 125 Miss. 859, 88 So. 511 (1921); Boulger v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 41 N.D. 316, 171 N.W. 632 (1918); Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wiggins, 161 S.W. 2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App., 1942); Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Speer, 212 S.W. 762 (Tex. Civ. App., 1919); Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Cochrane, 69 S.W. 984 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902); 56 Am. Jur., p. 522. Where the plaintiff's property would have been overflowed to some extent by natural causes (whether an act of God or not), the defendant who obstructs the stream is not liable for all of the plaintiff's damages but only for the additional damage caused by his obstruction of the stream. Evans v. Massman Const. Co., 343 Mo. 632, 122 S.W. 2d 924 (1938); Sherwood v. St. Louis, S.W. Ry. Co., 187 S.W. 260 (Spfld. C. A., 1916); Standley v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 121 Mo.App. 537, 97 S.W. 244 (K. C. C. A., 1906); Brown v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 195 F. 1007 (D. C. Neb., 1912); McAdams v. Davis, 200 Iowa 204, 202 N.W. 515 (1925); McAdams v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 200 Iowa 732, 205 N.W. 310 (1925); Pfannebecker v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 208 Iowa 752, 226 N.W. 161 (1929); Republican Valley R. Co. v. Fink, 18 Neb. 89, 24 N.W. 691 (1885); Chicago, R. I. & G. R. Co. v. Martin, 37 S.W. 2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App., 1931); Taylor v. San Antonio & A. P. R. Co., 36 Tex. Civ. App. 658, 83 S.W. 738 (1904); Radburn v. Fir Tree Lumber Co., 83 Wash. 643, 145 P. 632 (1915); 112 A. L. R. 1084. The opinion of the witness Benberg having been improperly admitted in evidence by the trial court, it should not be considered in ruling on the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Burge v. Wabash R. Co., 244 Mo. 76, 149 S.W. 925 (1912). The trial court should not permit an expert witness to answer a hypothetical question which is so long, rambling, disjointed and diverse as to be unintelligible to the witness or the jury. Henkel v. Varner, 138 F.2d 934 (C. of A., D. of C., 1943); Thompson v. Standard Wholesale etc. Works, 178 Md. 305, 13 A.2d 328 (1940). This rule has been applied in Missouri to the giving of a long, complicated and confusing instruction. Prince v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 214 S.W. 2d 707 (Mo. Sup., 1948). A hypothetical question should not be permitted which omits material facts which are necessary for a fair presentation of the issue and which are required to form a basis of facts upon which an intelligent opinion may be formed. DeDonato v. Wells, 328 Mo. 448, 41 S.W. 2d 184 (1931); Powell v. Union Pacific R. Co., 255 Mo. 420, 164 S.W. 628 (1914); Seelig v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co., 287 Mo. 343, 230 S.W. 94 (1921); Burge v. Wabash Ry. Co., 244 Mo. 76, 148 S.W. 925 (1912); Bennett v. Punton Sanitarium Assn., 213 Mo.App. 363, 249 S.W. 666 (K. C. C. A., 1923); Quinley v. Springfield Traction Co., 180 Mo.App. 287, 165 S.W. 346 (Spfld. App., 1914). All material, undisputed facts in the case must be included in a hypothetical question. DeDonato v. Wells, 328 Mo. 448, 41 S.W. 2d 184, 82 A. L. R. 1331 (1931); Hahn v. Hammerstein, 272 Mo. 248, 198 S.W. 833 (1917). The plaintiff's alleged action is barred by the statute of limitations. Since the defendant's dam was erected pursuant to legislative authority, the maintenance of the same cannot constitute a nuisance. 8 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 2nd Ed. 704; Smith v. City of Sedalia, 244 Mo. 107, 149 S.W. 597, l. c. 600 (en banc 1912); Payne v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. Co., 112 Mo. 6, 20 S.W. 322 (1892); Casey v. Hoover, 114 Mo.App. 47, 89 S.W. 330 (K. C. App., 1905). Where a public authority with the power of eminent domain appropriates property without bringing condemnation proceedings, the property owner has an action at law for damages against the condemnor for the taking of his property. Riggs v. City of Springfield, 344 Mo. 420, 126 S.W. 2d 1144, 122 A. L. R. 1496 (en banc, 1939); Smith v. City of Sedalia, 244 Mo. 107, 149 S.W. 597 (en banc, 1912); U.S. v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 37 S.Ct. 380 (1916); Jacobs v. U.S., 45 F.2d 34 (5 C. C. A. 1930). Where a landowner brings an action against a public authority for appropriating his land without condemning it, the landowner has but one cause of action therefor and must recover all his damages, both past and prospective, in the single action. Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W. 2d 626 (en banc, 1942); Riggs v. City of Springfield, 344 Mo. 420, 126 S.W. 2d 1144, 122 A. L. R. 1496 (en banc, 1939); Smith v. City of Sedalia, 244 Mo. 107, 149 S.W. 597 (en banc, 1912); Middlekamp v. Bessemer Irrigating Ditch Co., 46 Colo. 102, 103 P. 280 (1909); Smith v. Dallas Utility Co., 27 Ga.App. 22, 107 S.E. 381 (1921); City of Centralia v. Wright, 156 Ill. 561, 41 N.E. 217 (1895); Suehr v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 242 Ill. 496, 90 N.E. 197 (1909); Irvine v. City of Oelwein, 170 Iowa 653, 150 N.W. 674 (1915); King v. Board of Council of City of Danville, 128 Ky. 321, 107 S.W. 1189 (1908); Louisville Hydro-Electric Co. v. Coburn, 270 Ky. 624, 110 S.W. 2d 445 (1937); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Little, 274 Ky. 681, 120 S.W. 2d 150 (1938); Kentucky & W. Virginia Power Co., Inc., v. McIntosh, 278 Ky. 797, 129 S.W. 2d 522 (1939); Bruton v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 217 N.C. 1, 6 S.E.2d 822 (1940). Since the plaintiff did not begin his action within five years after the construction of the dam or the time when he first claimed that the dam was causing him injury, his cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Riggs v. City of Springfield, 344 Mo. 420, 126 S.W. 2d 1144, 122 A. L. R. 1496 (en banc, 1939); Middlekamp v....