Webber v. International Paper Co., No. 02-63-B-S.

Decision Date09 June 2004
Docket NumberNo. 02-63-B-S.
Citation326 F.Supp.2d 160
PartiesGary S. WEBBER, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

Arthur J. Greif, Gilbert & Greif, P.A., Julie D. Farr, Gilbert & Greif, P.A., Bangor, ME, for Gary S. Webber.

Jonathan P. Harmon, McGuire, Woods, Richmond, VA, Kate S. Debevoise, Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer, & Nelson, Portland, ME, Peter M. Weatherbee, Weatherbee, Woodcock, Burlock and Woodcock, Bangor, ME, Vincent J. Miraglia, McGuire Woods LLP, Washington, DC, for International Paper Company.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL

SINGAL, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Gary Webber sued International Paper Company ("IP") alleging that his dismissal as part of a reduction in force was motivated by his disability, in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), 5 M.R.S.A. § 4551-4634. The action was removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. At trial, a jury found for Mr. Webber and awarded compensatory and punitive damages, which the Court subsequently reduced to $300,000 compensatory damages pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B)(8). Finding that Mr. Webber removed himself from the labor market at the end of 2001, this Court awarded Mr. Webber back pay of $27,384.02, plus prejudgment interest.

Presently before the Court are IP's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion in the alternative for a new trial (Docket # 122) and Mr. Webber's motion to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to back pay (Docket # 121). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS both IP's motion for judgment as a matter of law and its alternative motion for a new trial; Mr. Webber's motion to amend is rendered MOOT.

I. FACTS

In deciding a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court must look at the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Guilloty Perez v. Pierluisi, 339 F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir.2003). The Court must not "consider the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, or evaluate the weight of the evidence." Id. The Court reviews the record as a whole, but disregards "all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

In the light most favorable to Mr. Webber, the facts relevant to IP's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law are as follows. From the early 1980s until he was laid off in July of 2001, Mr. Webber worked at the Bucksport mill in Bucksport, Maine. The Bucksport mill manufactures coated paper for use in magazines and catalogs. At the time of Mr. Webber's termination, the Bucksport mill was owned and operated by Defendant International Paper. In the summer of 2001, International Paper instituted a corporation-wide reduction in force dubbed "Functional FAST," with the objective of reducing by three thousand the number of "corporate overhead" positions (those positions not directly involved in the manufacture of paper).

On June 15, 2001, Fred Oettinger, the manager of the Bucksport mill, met with Roger Purlington, IP's coated paper manufacturing director, and Bill Pierre, the human resources director for coated paper mills, both of whom worked at IP's Memphis offices. Also present at the meeting were Jeff Hamilton, the mill's operations manager, and David Libby, the mill's human resources manager. Serge Sorokin, in training to replace Mr. Purlington, participated from Memphis via telephone. At the meeting, Mr. Oettinger was directed by his superiors to eliminate twenty-one positions at the mill, including eight engineers. He was further advised that the Bucksport mill employed ten mechanical project engineers whereas comparable mills employed only six; he was instructed to pare down the number of project engineers.

Mr. Oettinger decided to reduce the number of project engineers by two, to a total of eight. Of the project engineers, Mr. Oettinger decided to eliminate the positions of Mr. Webber and Wayne Jacobs. Mr. Oettinger testified that he selected Mr. Webber because he did not have an engineering degree and was not capable of working on the high-end engineering projects directly related to the manufacture of paper. Mr. Webber acknowledged that he was less qualified than other project engineers and that there were indeed projects that he was not qualified to do. Mr. Webber only identified one project engineer, Wayne Jacobs, whom he believed to be less qualified than he. Notably, Mr. Jacobs was laid off the same week as Mr. Webber.

Most individuals whose positions were eliminated as part of Functional FAST were notified of their termination on Monday, June 25, 2001. On June 22, Mr. Oettinger told Larry Schaub, the engineering manager, and Stephen Moser, the maintenance engineer manager, about his decisions regarding the termination of project engineers. The undisputed testimony indicates that Mr. Oettinger had already made his decision before he spoke with Mr. Schaub and Mr. Moser. Neither acted to save Mr. Webber's job.

On the morning of June 25, 2001, Mr. Webber met with Mr. Oettinger and Mr. Libby, and was informed that his position was being eliminated and his employment terminated. When Mr. Webber asked why he had been chosen, Mr. Oettinger told him that it was because of the quantity and quality of his work, and that his capabilities were limited by the fact that he did not have an engineering degree.

Mr. Webber suffers from problems with his knees, which have necessitated several surgeries since 1997. As a result of his knee troubles, Mr. Webber's mobility is limited, and he walks with a cane. His knee surgeries have sometimes required extended absences from work. Following the advent of his knee difficulties, IP accommodated each of his requests related to his disability. Mr. Webber was permitted to park his car inside the mill, something that no other employee (including the mill manager) did. He received permission to use the freight elevator in the main office building, where his workstation was located, and stair glide chairs were installed in the main office building and the employee development center building at Mr. Webber's request. Mr. Schaub permitted Mr. Webber to work from home, and IP provided a laptop computer for that purpose. Mr. Schaub also worked with Mr. Webber to allow him to work a part-time schedule while recovering from a knee surgery. Mr. Schaub assigned some physical aspects of Mr. Webber's job to other employees. Finally, Mr. Webber was reassigned from an office on the third floor to an office on the first floor at his request.

The comments presented by Mr. Webber to support an inference that he was terminated because of disability discrimination are as follows: (1) an unattributed maxim that Mr. Webber heard during his time at the mill that "salaried people do not get hurt"; (2) a comment made by Steven Finley (then one of Mr. Webber's supervisors) in December 1997 that if Mr. Webber lost twenty pounds, he would have fewer problems with his knee, at which Mr. Finley and Mr. Schaub laughed; (3) the description of a stair-glide chair installed to help Mr. Webber reach his work station as a "Costanza chair" by Mr. Moser, Mr. Schaub (Mr. Webber's second-line supervisor) and Tom Thompson (Mr. Webber's first-line supervisor), in reference to an episode of the television show "Seinfeld" in which the character George Costanza fakes a disability; (4) a discussion with Dr. Read, the mill doctor, in January or February of 2001, two weeks before a scheduled knee surgery, at which Dr. Read suggested that Mr. Webber should go home to avoid injuring himself at the mill; (5) an inquiry by Mr. Thompson in May or June of 2001 as to how long it would take for Mr. Webber's knee to heal; and (6) a comment by Mr. Thompson on June 25, 2001, just before Mr. Webber was notified of his termination (but after the decision to terminate his employment had been made), that "you're the weakest link, you're gone."

Mr. Webber also attempts to infer discriminatory animus from: (1) the mill manager's efforts to reduce work-related "lost-time" injuries; (2) the fact that Mr. Webber can do most of the tasks currently being performed by project engineers at the mill, even without a degree; (3) IP's failure to offer Mr. Webber employment in a different position at the mill when his position was eliminated; and (4) evidence that Dale Wibberly (an employee in the mill's human resources department) had suggested to one of his superiors that Mr. Webber be removed from the list of employees to be laid off because he was not yet back full-time following a knee surgery.

II. THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
A. Overview

The Maine Human Rights Act prohibits employers from, inter alia,"discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of the individual in regard to [the] ... discharge of employees." 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(2). "[B]ecause the MHRA generally tracks federal anti-discrimination statutes, it is appropriate to look to federal precedent for guidance in interpreting the MHRA." Winston v. Me. Technical Coll. Sys., 631 A.2d 70, 74 (Me.1993) (quoted in Doyle v. Dep't Human Servs., 824 A.2d 48, 54 n. 7 (Me.2003)). The parties stipulated that Mr. Webber was "a qualified person with a disability within the meaning of the Maine Human Rights Act." As a result, the only remaining issue for trial was whether Mr. Webber's termination was the product of illegal discrimination based on his disability.

The question before the Court in a motion for judgment as a matter of law is whether the facts and inferences are such that no reasonable factfinder could have reached a verdict against the movant. See Santos v....

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