Webber v. St. Louis County
| Decision Date | 16 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. ED94271,ED94271 |
| Parties | MIKE WEBBER, PAUL MARQUIS, and CATHY ARMBRUSTER, Appellants, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, IESI MO CORPORATION, VEOLIA ES SOLID WASTE MIDWEST, LLC, and ALLIED SERVICES, LLC, Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County
Honorable Robert S. Cohen
Introduction
Plaintiffs, Mike Webber, Paul Marquis, and Cathy Armbruster appeal the judgment of the trial court dismissing their Amended Petition against Defendants, St. Louis County and IESI MO Corporation, Veolia ES Solid Waste Midwest, LLC, and Allied Services, LLC (the Haulers).1 In their Amended Petition, Plaintiffs challenged the validity of the County's Ordinance Nos. 23, 023, 23, 221, and 23, 795 (the Ordinances). We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Background
In December 2006, the County Council enacted Ordinance No. 23, 023, adding Sections 607.1300-1310 to the County's Revised Ordinances and allowing the County to enter into the trash collection business in unincorporated St. Louis County. Specifically, Ordinance No. 23, 023, authorized the County Executive to establish "collection areas" in unincorporated St. Louis County "for the collection and transfer of waste and recovered materials" and to award contracts to individuals with the most "responsible" bids to provide exclusive trash collection services in one or more of the collection areas.2 In May 2007, the County enacted Ordinance No. 23, 221, which maintained the provisions added by Ordinance No. 23, 023.
In November 2008, the County enacted Ordinance No. 23, 795, Section 607.1310 to add additional conditions for the trash haulers the County selected and prohibiting any trash hauler not selected from providing trash collection services to a household within a designated collection area.3 Ordinance No. 23, 795 also amended Section 607.960, which provides a maximum $1000 fine and maximum one-year incarceration for any person convicted of violating a provision of Ch. 607 of the County's Revised Ordinances.4
Pursuant to the Ordinances, the County established eight collection areas in unincorporated St. Louis County and awarded contracts to the Haulers to service the collection areas. Subsequently, the Haulers began providing trash collection services in unincorporated St. Louis County and Plaintiffs contracted with and paid the Haulers for their services.
Plaintiffs filed their initial petition on September 11, 2009 and filed their Amended Petition on December 10, 2009. In the first count of their Amended Petition, Plaintiffs sought adeclaration that the Ordinances were void ab initio on two independent theories.5 First, Plaintiffs contended that the Ordinances were void because the County failed to comply with the election provision of Article II, Section 2.180.24 of the County's Charter (Art. II, § 2.180.24) (Count 1(a)). Art. II, § 2.180.24 authorizes the County Council to "[p]rovide for the creation of districts in unincorporated areas of the county within which may be provided... garbage and refuse collection and disposal... as the voters therein by a majority may approve, the same to be paid for from funds raised by special assessment, general taxation or service charge...."6 Plaintiffs alleged that the County violated Art. II, § 2.180.24 by failing to hold an election prior to enacting the Ordinances and establishing the collection areas in unincorporated St. Louis County.
Second, Plaintiffs contended that the Ordinances were void because the County failed to comply with the notice provision of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 260.247 (Cum. Supp. 2007) (Count 1(b)).7 Section 260.247 provides that before "[a]ny city or political subdivision" intending to expand "solid waste collection services into an area where the collection of solid waste is presently beingprovided" shall provide the current trash haulers notice of its intent to provide such services by "certified mail" and shall not commence waste collection services in the area for "at least two years from the effective date of the notice."8 Plaintiffs alleged that the County violated Section 260.247 by failing to provide the trash haulers previously servicing unincorporated St. Louis County the required two-year notice by certified mail.
In their remaining three counts, Plaintiffs sought reimbursement for all of the monies Plaintiffs paid to the Haulers for their trash collection services. Plaintiffs brought their claims under the theories of money had and received (Count 2), the Merchandising Practices Act (Count 3), and unjust enrichment (Count 4).9
In response to Plaintiffs' Amended Petition, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. With respect to all counts in the Amended Petition, Defendants argued that the claims were barred by the doctrines of laches and mootness. With respect to Count 1(a), Defendants claimed Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for a declaratory judgment because Art. II, § 2.180.24 only applies to the creation of "taxing districts" and no voter approval was required to enact the Ordinances. With respect to Count 1(b), Defendants contended that Plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce Section 260.247's notice provision, which is intended to protect trash haulers. With respect to Counts 2and 4, Defendants contended that Plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts establishing the elements of money had and received and unjust enrichment. Finally, with respect to Count 3, Defendants asserted that Plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of the Merchandising Practices Act and, in any event, their claim was barred by the voluntary payment doctrine.
After a hearing on Defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court entered judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' Amended Petition. The trial court did not specify the grounds for dismissal in its judgment. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Huch v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721, 724 (Mo. banc 2009). We treat all allegations in the petition as true, grant all reasonable inferences therefrom, and construe the allegations favorably to the plaintiff. Breeden v. Hueser, 273 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo.App.W.D. 2008). "[T]he petition is reviewed in an almost academic manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case." Reynolds v. Diamond Foods & Poultry, Inc., 79 S.W.3d 907, 909 (Mo. banc 2002). In addition to reviewing the petition, we also review any attached exhibits, which are considered to be part of the petition for all purposes. Suburban Bus. Prods., Inc. v. T.E. Schmitt Co., 796 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Mo.App.E.D. 1990); see also Mo. Sup. Ct. Rule 55.12.
Where, as here, the trial court does not specify its reasons for dismissing a petition, we presume the trial court based its judgment on one of the reasons stated in the motion to dismiss. Shores v. Express Lending Servs., Inc., 998 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Mo.App.E.D. 1999). We will affirm the judgment of dismissal if is supported by any of the grounds raised in the motion to dismiss, regardless of whether the trial court actually relied on that ground. Id.
Discussion
Raising eight points, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their Amended Petition because none of the various grounds set forth in Defendants' motion to dismiss supports the trial court's judgment of dismissal. To facilitate analysis, we address these points out of order, first considering those that relate to the trial court's dismissal of all of the counts in the Amended Petition, and then resolving the remaining points that pertain to the dismissal of each individual count.
In their fourth point, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their Amended Petition because the doctrine of laches is not a proper basis for dismissal. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that laches is an affirmative defense and dismissal is inappropriate because the elements of laches are not clearly established on the face of the Amended Petition without exception. Defendants contend that laches is a proper basis for dismissal because Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed bringing their action by filing their original petition after the County "fully implemented" its trash collection program.
As Plaintiffs correctly assert, laches is an affirmative defense. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. City of Springfield, 793 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Mo.App.S.D. 1990); Mo. Sup. Ct. Rule 55.08. Where an affirmative defense is asserted in a motion to dismiss, a trial court may dismiss the petition only if the petition clearly establishes "on its face and without exception" that the defense applies and the claim is barred. Sheehan v. Sheehan, 901 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Mo. banc 1995) (quoting Int'l Plastics Dev., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 433 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Mo. banc 1968)); see also Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 98 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Mo. 1936).
The doctrine of laches bars a party's claim where the party has knowledge of the facts giving rise to his or her rights and delays assertion of the rights for an excessive amount of time causing legal detriment to the opposing party. Ewing v. Ewing, 901 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo.App.W.D. 1995). "[M]ere delay does not of itself constitute laches, the delay must be unreasonable and unexplained and must be shown to have caused disadvantage and prejudice to the defendant." Id (quoting Higgins v. McElwee, 680 S.W.2d 335, 341 (Mo.App.E.D. 1984)).
Here, the requisite elements for laches are not established without exception on the face of Plaintiffs' Amended Petition. The facts alleged in the Amended Petition reveal only that Plaintiffs filed their original petition within three years after the County enacted Ordinance No. 23, 023, which first authorized the County's entrance into the trash collection business, and approximately one year after the County contracted with the Haulers and...
To continue reading
Request your trial