Weber v. Fujifilm Med. Sys. U.S.A., Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 March 2013
• Docket Number: Civil No. 3:10cv401 (JBA).
• Citation: 933 F.Supp.2d 285
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: John J. WEBER, Plaintiff, v. FUJIFILM MEDICAL SYSTEMS U.S.A., INC. et al., Defendants.

933 F.Supp.2d 285

John J. WEBER, Plaintiff,

v.FUJIFILM MEDICAL SYSTEMS U.S.A., INC. et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 3:10cv401 (JBA).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 19, 2013.

Christopher M. Hodgson, Joshua J. Wyatt, Loraine M. Cortese–Costa, Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson & Cortese–Costa PC, Bridgeport, CT, for Plaintiff.

Helen E. Tuttle, Meredith R. Murphy, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Florham Park, NJ, Marc E. Bernstein, Patrick W. Shea, Paul Hastings LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.

RULING ON POST–TRIAL MOTIONS

JANET BOND ARTERTON, District Judge.

Following a jury trial held May 18 through June 5, 2012, the jury returned a verdict on June 11, 2012 finding Defendant FujiFilm Medical Systems U.S.A., Inc. (“FMSU”) liable on Plaintiff John Weber's claimed breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and finding Defendants FujiFilm Holdings America Corporation (“HLUS”) and FujiFilm Corporation liable on Mr. Weber's claimed tortious interference with business contract and tortious interference with business expectancy. The jury found no liability on Mr. Weber's Title VII national origin discrimination claim, Connecticut Fair Employment Act (“CFEPA”) national origin and age discrimination claims, Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) claim, or defamation claim. The jury awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages for non-economic injuries caused by Defendants' unlawful conduct, and $567,357 plus prejudgment interest for economic injuries caused by FMSU's breach of contract.

Plaintiff and Defendants have filed a variety of post-trial motions regarding the validity of these findings. Defendants HLUS and FujiFilm Corporation move for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's tortious interference claims [Doc. # 484] and for remittitur on the award of non-economic damages [Doc. # 485], and all Defendants move for a new trial [Doc. # 486]. Plaintiff moves for assessment of lost wages due for tortious interference with business expectancy [Doc. # 488], for assessment of prejudgment interest [Doc. 478, 479], and for a new trial on his discrimination claims [Doc. # 489]. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion [Doc. # 486] for a New Trial is denied; Defendants' Motion [Doc. # 484] for Judgment as a Matter of Law is denied; Defendants' Motion [Doc. # 485] for Remittitur is denied; Plaintiff's Motion [Doc. # 489] for a new trial is denied; Plaintiff's Motion [Doc. # 488] for Assessment of Lost Wages is granted; and Plaintiff's Motion [Doc. 478, 479] for Assessment of Prejudgment Interest is granted in part.

I. HLUS and FujiFilm Corporation's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law [Doc. # 484]

HLUS and FujiFilm Corporation move pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with business expectancy claims. They argue that Mr. Weber based his tortious interference claims solely on the theory that the improper motive or means required to establish such claims was the alleged discriminatory intent that underlay his national origin and age discrimination claims. Because the jury found against Mr. Weber on the discrimination claims, Defendants claim the jury's finding on the tortious interference claims was unsupported by the evidence and could only have resulted from surmise and conjecture, and therefore those claims fail as a matter of law.

Judgment as a matter of law may be rendered if “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 50(a)(1). A renewed Rule 50(b) motion will be granted “only if the evidence, drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party and giving deference to all credibility determinations of the jury, is insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find in his favor.” Lavin–McEleney v. Marist College, 239 F.3d 476, 479 (2d Cir.2001). Thus, “judgment as a matter of law should not be granted unless (1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or (2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [it].” Id. at 480 (quoting DiSanto v. McGraw–Hill, Inc., 220 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir.2000)). A movant under Rule 50 “faces a high bar.” Id.

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff contends that Defendants' argument may not properly be considered by the Court on a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b), because the pending motion states a different ground for relief than Defendants' pre-deliberation motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a). Because a Rule 50(b) motion is merely a renewal of the movant's Rule 50(a) motion, it is “limited only to the grounds specifically raised in the prior motion for judgment as a matter of law; new grounds may not be added post-trial.” AIG Global Securities Lending Corp. v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, 386 Fed.Appx. 5, 6 (2d Cir.2010) (citing Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir.2001)). However, the Second Circuit has recognized a limited exception to this rule: “The forfeited issue may be reached if ‘to ignore it would result in manifest injustice’ or if it is a ‘purely legal error.’ ” Id. (quoting Fabri v. United Techs. Int'l, Inc., 387 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir.2004)).

Defendants assert that they did properly raise the grounds for their pending Rule 50(b) motion in their pre-deliberation Rule 50(a) motion. Specifically, with respect to the tortious interference claims, Defendants argued that: “there's got to be some evidence on the part of HLUS and FUJIFILM to sustain a finding of malice, improper means, and improper motives, as with—you know, and evil intent or improper intent as noted in the Court's proposed charge. The only thing that plaintiff points to on this regard, your Honor, is the alleged discriminatory animus of age and/or national origin.” (Trial Tr. (“Tr.”) at 2097). Defendants then went on to claim that because this was the only proffered evidence of malice, the CFEPA preempted Plaintiff's tortious interference claims, an argument which they have since dropped in light of the jury's finding rejecting Plaintiff's discrimination claims. In connection with Plaintiff's discrimination claims, Defendants argued: “On Title VII, CFEPA and ADEA, obviously the evidence is as I think came in at the summary judgment motion that your Honor ruled was sufficient. I do not believe it is sufficient.” ( Id. at 2100.)

Thus, while Defendants do not raise precisely the same arguments in their pending motion, they did argue in their Rule 50(a) motion that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of malice on the tortious interference claims. To the extent that Defendants' motion claims that an inconsistency in the jury's verdict—finding no statutory discriminatory animus but tortious malice—necessitates judgment as a matter of law, this argument obviously could not have been raised before the verdict was returned, see White v. Francis Mcdermott, Civil No. 3:08cv634 (JBA), 2010 WL 4687620, at *1 (D.Conn. Nov. 4, 2010) (permitting defendant to raise an argument based on an inconsistency in the jury verdict for the first time in a Rule 50(b) motion), and thus the Court will consider it to prevent manifest injustice. However, even when this argument is considered, as discussed below, the Court concludes that there was not such a complete absence of evidence showing that Defendants HLUS and FujiFilm Corporation tortiously interfered with Plaintiff's employment contract and business expectancy that the verdict should be set aside.

The elements of tortious interference with contract and/or business expectancy claims are: 1) the existence of a contract or a business relationship; 2) defendants' knowledge of that relationship; 3) defendants' intentional and tortious interference with that relationship; and 4) actual loss suffered by the plaintiff. Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 351, 927 A.2d 304 (2007) (elements for intentional interference with contractual relations); Hi–Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com–Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20, 27, 761 A.2d 1268 (2000) (elements for intentional interference with business expectancy). To succeed on a tortious interference claim, Mr. Weber had to “prove at least some improper motive or improper means,” Biro v. Hirsch, 62 Conn.App. 11, 21, 771 A.2d 129 (2001), used by HLUS and FujiFilm Corporation, resulting in the end of his employment relationship with FMSU. The jury was instructed that to prevail on his tortious interference claims, Mr. Weber had to prove that HLUS and FujiFilm Corporation “wrongfully interfered” with his contract or business expectancy with FMSU, meaning that these Defendants committed “fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation or malicious conduct.” (Jury Ins. [Doc. # 469] at 26–27.) The Court further explained that malicious conduct “is the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse with an intent to inflict injury or implied evil intent.” ( Id.)

Under Connecticut law “a parent company does not engage in tortious conduct when it directs its wholly-owned subsidiary to breach a contract that is no longer in the subsidiary's economic interest to perform,” Boulevard Assocs. v. Sovereign Hotels, Inc., 72 F.3d 1029, 1036 (2d Cir.1995). However, Boulevard articulates an exception: “We do not hold that a [parent company] is privileged to employ any means, no matter how improper, to induce a breach of contract involving its [subsidiary].... [C]ertain behavior may be sufficiently egregious to cross the line and become tortious.” Id. at 1037 (emphasis in original). Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not present evidence of any improper means or motive that would be sufficient to override the...