Weber v. Smathers, 50327

• Decision Date: 11 October 1976
• Docket Number: No. 50327,50327
• Citation: 338 So.2d 819
• Parties: Charles H. WEBER, as citizen, taxpayer, and elector of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Bruce A. SMATHERS, as Secretary of State of the State of Florida, and the Sunshine Amendment, Inc., Intervenor, Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 819

338 So.2d 819

Charles H. WEBER, as citizen, taxpayer, and elector of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Bruce A. SMATHERS, as Secretary of State of the State of Florida, and the Sunshine Amendment, Inc., Intervenor, Appellees.

No. 50327.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 11, 1976.

Hugh M. Taylor, Quincy, of Bryant, Dickens, Franson & Miller, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., James D. Whisenand, Deputy Atty. Gen., William C. Sherrill, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Donald M. Middlebrooks, Gen. Counsel, Orlando, for appellee.

John E. Mathews, Jr., and Jack W. Shaw, Jr., of Mathews, Osborne, Ehrlich, McNatt, Gobelman & Cobb, Jacksonville, for intervenor.

OVERTON, Chief Justice.

This cause is before us on appeal from a circuit court order of dismissal with prejudice that directly construed provisions of the Florida Constitution. We have jurisdiction. ¹

On July 29, 1976, appellee/defendant Bruce Smathers, Secretary of State, certified that enough electors had signed a petition to place on the ballot for the upcoming general election the following proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution:

'Article II, Section 8 is created to read:

'Ethics in Government--A public office is a public trust. The people shall have the right to secure and sustain that trust against abuse. To assure this right:

'(a) All elected constitutional officers and candidates for such offices and, as may be determined by law, other public officers, candidates, and employees shall file full and public disclosure of their financial interest.

'(b) All elected public officers and candidates for such offices shall file full and public disclosure of their campaign finances.

'(c) Any public officer or employee who breaches the public trust for private gain and any person or entity inducing such breach shall be liable to the state for all financial benefits obtained by such actions. The manner of recovery and additional damages may be provided by law.

'(d) Any public officer or employee who is convicted of a felony involving a breach of public trust shall be subject to forfeiture of rights and privileges under a public retirement system or pension plan in such manner as may be provided by law.

'(e) No member of the legislature or statewide elected officer shall personally represent another person or entity for compensation before the government body or agency of which the individual was an officer or member for a period of two years following vacation of office. No member of the legislature shall personally represent another person or entity for compensation during term of office before any state agency other than judicial tribunals. Similar restrictions on other public officers and employees may be established by law.

'(f) There shall be an independent commission to conduct investigations and make public reports on all complaints concerning breach of public trust by public officers or employees not within the jurisdiction of the judicial qualifications commission.

'(g) This section shall not be construed to limit disclosures and prohibitions which may be established by law to preserve the public trust and avoid conflicts between public duties and private interests.

'(h) Schedule--On the effective date of this amendment and until changed by law:

'(1) Full and public disclosure of financial interests shall mean filing with the secretary of state by July 1 of each year a sworn statement showing net worth and identifying each asset and liability in excess of $1,000 and its value together with one of the following:

'a. A copy of the person's most recent federal income tax return; or

'b. A sworn statement which identifies each separate source and amount of income which exceeds $1,000. The forms for such source disclosure and the rules under which they are to be filed shall be prescribed by the independent commission established in subsection (f), and such rules shall include disclosure of secondary sources of income.

'(2) Persons holding statewide elective offices shall also file disclosure of their financial interests pursuant to subsection (h)(1).

'(3) The independent commission provided for in subsection (f) shall mean the Florida Commission of Ethics.'

Appellant/plaintiff Charles S. Weber on September 23, 1976, filed suit to enjoin appellee Smathers from doing the administrative acts necessary to put the Sunshine Amendment before the people for their approval or rejection. It was dismissed with prejudice. Appellant appeals and contends that the proposed amendment violates Article XI, Section 3, of the Florida Constitution, because it embraces more than one subject. He further contends it violates Article XI, Sections 3 and 5, because it attempts to revise several articles other than the one it purportedly amends. Finally, appellant contends the appellee violated Section 101.161, Florida Statutes, when he approved the wording of the substance of the amendment that it is to appear on the ballots.

This Court has been presented, on a number of previous occasions, with the critical decision of determining whether a constitutional amendment may be properly placed on the ballot. ² Previous decisions of this Court have removed amendments from the ballot, ³ but we have historically declined to interfere with the right of the people to vote upon a proposed constitutional amendment absent a showing in the record that the proposal is 'clearly and conclusively defective.' Goldner v. Adams, 167 So.2d 575 (Fla.1964). We must keep in mind the words of Mr. Justice Terrell in Gray v. Golden, 89 So.2d 785, 790 (Fla.1956), wherein he stated:

'. . . (W)e are dealing with a constitutional democracy in which sovereignty resides in the people. It is their Constitution that we are construing. They have a right to change, abrogate or modify it in any manner they see fit so long as they keep within the confines of the Federal Constitution. The legislature which approved and submitted the proposed amendment took the same oath to protect and defend the Constitution that we did and our first duty is to uphold their action if there is any reasonable theory under which it can be done. This is the first rule we are required to observe when considering acts of the legislature and it is even more impelling when considering a proposed constitutional amendment which goes to the people for their approval or disapproval. . . .'

There is no showing by the appellant Weber that the instant amendment is clearly and conclusively defective. Neither the wisdom of the provision nor the quality of its draftsmanship is a matter for our review. ⁴

It is contended by the appellant that Adams v. Gunter, 238 So.2d 824 (Fla.1970), which expressly required the amendment of thirty-three other constitutional sections, and Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So.2d 501 (Fla.1958), which involved a 'daisy chain' of fourteen interdependent amendments, apply and are controlling in the instant case. We disagree. The proposed amendment is sufficiently complete within itself, requiring no other amendment to effect its purpose.

We hold the provisions of the proposed amendment are sufficiently related to withstand an attack that they embrace more than one subject. Further, the proposed amendment, if adopted, will not conflict with other articles and sections of the Constitution, and the wording that is to appear on the ballot is legally adequate.

The order of the trial court is affirmed. In view of the emergency nature of this proceeding, rehearing is dispensed with.

It is so ordered.

ADKINS, BOYD and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.

ENGLAND, J., concurs with opinion in which ADKINS and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.

ROBERTS, J., dissents with opinion.

ENGLAND, Justice (concurring).

The language which is pivotal to our decision in this case, reciting that an amendment or revision of the Constitution by initiative 'shall embrace but one subject' ¹, obviously means different things to different, reasonable people. Appellants view it narrowly and suggest that the proposed amendment embraces at least five 'subjects' ranging from financial disclosure by public officials to limitations on lobbyists and civil penalties on non-governmental employees. Appellees view it broadly and suggest the amendment embraces only 'ethics in government', one subject. Neither offers us any precise historical data as to why this limiting phraseology was selected when it was adopted by the Legislature and submitted to the people for their approval in 1972. ²

In the absence of guidance from the framers of the phrase, it becomes our responsibility to select one or the other interpretation not only looking back on its development as best we can and with a view to its applicability in this case, but as well with a concern for future cases where the right of initiative may be exercised. More for this last reason than for the others, I deem it appropriate to express my understanding of the term 'one subject' in this provision of the Constitution.

When Article XI of the 1968 Constitution was adopted, Section 1 authorized legislative-sponsored changes to a 'section', to one or more 'articles', or to 'the whole' of the Constitution; Section 2 authorized 'revision of (the) constitution' or 'any part' in ten years and each twentieth year thereafter; and Section 4 authorized a 'revision of the entire constitution' by constitutional convention upon petition of the people. Section 3 at that time authorized 'amendments to any section' of the Constitution by initiative. Following this Court's decision in Adams v. Gunter, 238 So.2d 824 (Fla.1970), which distinguished an amendment from a revision, Section 3 was amended to authorize the revision or amendment 'of any portion or portions' of the Constitution, provided that the revision or amendment was limited to 'one subject'.

As I construe the 1972 change in light of what was present in the Constitution before, what was retained in other sections, and Adams, it seems to...