Webner v. Titan Distribution, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. C97-3101.,C97-3101. |
| Parties | Randall Herbert WEBNER, Plaintiff, v. TITAN DISTRIBUTION, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .......................................... 1218
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ....................................................... 1219
A. Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law ............................ 1219
1. Applicable standards ........................................... 1219
2. Sufficiency of the evidence — disability discrimination ........ 1220
a. Actual disability ........................................... 1220
b. Perceived disability ........................................ 1222
c. Record of disability ........................................ 1223
3. Sufficiency of evidence — Webner's qualification ............... 1223
4. Sufficiency of evidence — emotional distress damages ........... 1224
a. Emotional distress damages for the disability claim ......... 1224
b. Emotional distress damages for state law retaliation claim .. 1226
5. Sufficiency of evidence — punitive damages ..................... 1227
a. Punitive damages — federal disability claim ................. 1227
b. Punitive damages — state retaliation claim .................. 1229
6. Sufficiency of evidence — retaliation claim .................... 1229
B. Motion For New Trial .............................................. 1230
C. Plaintiff's Request For Fees and Expenses ......................... 1231
1. Fees claimed ................................................... 1231
a. Reasonable hourly rate ...................................... 1231
b. Hours reasonably expended ................................... 1232
2. Expenses claimed ............................................... 1233
D. Plaintiff's Request For Prospective Equitable Relief .............. 1233
1. Reinstatement .................................................. 1234
2. Front pay ...................................................... 1236
III. CONCLUSION ........................................................... 1239
Following an exceptionally well tried employment discrimination jury trial, the court is called upon to resolve the pending post-trial motions filed by each party. Specifically, the court resolves the defendant's motions for judgment as a matter of law and new trial, as well as the plaintiff's request for fees and expenses, and front pay.
Plaintiff Randy Webner ("Webner") claimed that he was discriminated against by defendant Titan Distribution, Inc. ("Titan") because he had a disability, a record of a disability, or a perceived disability in violation of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, and that Titan retaliated against him for pursuing a workers' compensation claim by terminating him or laying him off. This case was tried before a jury beginning February 14, 2000, in Sioux City, Iowa. On February 17, 2000, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Webner, finding that Webner had been terminated by Titan as a result of his disability, a perceived disability, and a record of disability. The jury also found that Webner had been terminated by Titan in retaliation for pursuing a workers' compensation claim. The jury awarded Webner $13,771.00 for lost wages, $12,500.00 for emotional distress damages on the disability claim, and $12,500.00 for emotional distress damages on the retaliation claim. The jury also returned a verdict of $100,000.00 in punitive damages on each of the two claims. On February 18, 2000, the Clerk of Court entered judgment.
On March 6, 2000, Titan filed a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, In the Alternative, a New Trial, pursuant to Rules 50 and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Titan bases its motion for judgment as a matter of law on the following grounds: (1) that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find disability discrimination; (2) that Webner is not entitled to emotional distress damages as a matter of law; (3) that Webner is not entitled to recover punitive damages; and (4) that there was insufficient evidence for the court to submit the retaliation claim to the jury. Thus, Titan seeks to have the court set aside that judgment in its entirety or, in the alternative, set aside certain aspects of the judgment. Lastly, and in the further alternative, Titan seeks a new trial in this case. Webner resisted these motions, and also filed an application for attorneys' fees and expenses, and a request for front pay. Titan resisted both of these motions.
The court heard oral arguments on these post-trial motions on May 4, 2000. Webner was represented by Mark D. Sherinian and J. Vance Jorgensen. Titan was represented by Gene R. LaSuer and Sharon K. Malheiro of Davis, Brown, Koehn, Shors & Roberts, P.C., Des Moines, Iowa. With this procedural background in mind, the court turns to its consideration of the pending motions.
The standards for a motion for judgment as a matter of law are outlined in Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In pertinent part, Rule 50 provides:
(a) Judgment as a Matter of Law.
(1) If during the trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
(2) Motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before the submission of the case to the jury. Such a motion shall specify the judgment sought and the law and the facts on which the moving party is entitled to the judgment.
(b) Renewing Motion for Judgment After Trial; Alternative Motion for New Trial. If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence, the court is considered to have submitted the action to jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. The movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment — and may alternatively request a new trial or join a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on a renewed motion, the court may:
(1) if a verdict was returned:
(A) allow the judgment to stand,
(B) order a new trial, or
(C) direct entry of judgment as a matter of law; or
(A) order a new trial, or
(B) direct entry of judgment as a matter of law.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated the standards to be applied by the district court — as well as the appellate court — in determining a motion for judgment as a matter of law:
When the motion seeks judgment on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the question is a legal one. Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1220 (8th Cir.1997); Jarvis v. Sauer Sundstrand Co., 116 F.3d 321, 324 (8th Cir.1997). A jury verdict must be affirmed "`unless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have not found for that party.'" Stockmen's Livestock Mkt., Inc. [v. Norwest Bank of Sioux City], 135 F.3d 1236, 1240-41 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 53 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir.1995)).
Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1066 (8th Cir.1998); accord Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) () (citations omitted). Thus, this standard requires the court to:
"[C]onsider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, assume that the jury resolved all conflicts of evidence in favor of that party, assume as true all facts which the prevailing party's evidence tended to prove, give the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the facts, and deny the motion, if in light of the foregoing, reasonable jurors could differ as to the conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence."
Minneapolis Community Dev. Agency v. Lake Calhoun Assoc., 928 F.2d 299, 301 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 989 (8th Cir.1989)); see also Stephens v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 198, 200 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir.1994), in turn, quoting Hastings v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 975 F.2d 506, 509 (8th Cir.1992)); Haynes v. Bee-Line Trucking Co., 80 F.3d 1235, 1238 (8th Cir.1996); Nelson v. Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., 26 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1994) (); McAnally v. Gildersleeve, 16 F.3d 1493, 1500 (8th Cir.1994) (same).
This standard for consideration of a motion for judgment as a matter of law accords the jury's verdict substantial deference. Tilson v. Forrest City Police Dep't, 28 F.3d 802, 806 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied,...
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