WEBSTER COUNTY COM'N v. Clayton

• Decision Date: 16 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. 25625.,25625.
• Citation: 522 S.E.2d 201,206 W.Va. 107
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: WEBSTER COUNTY COMMISSION, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Caroline CLAYTON, Sheriff of Webster County, Defendant Below, Appellant.

522 S.E.2d 201

206 W.Va. 107

WEBSTER COUNTY COMMISSION, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Caroline CLAYTON, Sheriff of Webster County, Defendant Below, Appellant.

No. 25625.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted April 14, 1999.

Decided July 16, 1999.

Harley E. Stollings, Summersville, West Virginia, Attorney for the Appellant.

Richard E. Rowe, J. David Fenwick, Goodwin & Goodwin, LLP, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for the Appellee.

Michael T. Clifford, Clifford, Mann & Swisher, P.L.L.C., Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney for Amicus Curiae, West Virginia Sheriff's Association.

DAVIS, Justice:

The appellant herein and defendant below, Caroline Clayton, Sheriff of Webster County [hereinafter "the Sheriff" or "Sheriff Clayton"], appeals from orders of the Circuit Court of Webster County filed March 20, 1998, and June 12, 1998. By its order of March 20, 1998, the circuit court granted the appellee herein and plaintiff below, the Webster County Commission [hereinafter "the Commission"], a temporary injunction to preclude Sheriff Clayton from hiring one Barbara Sawyer [hereinafter "Ms. Sawyer"] in light of the Commission's refusal to consent to such hiring as required by W. Va.Code § 7-7-7 (1982) (Repl.Vol.1993). The June 12, 1998, order of the circuit court denied Sheriff Clayton's motion for reconsideration and rendered permanent its injunction prohibiting the Sheriff's hiring of Ms. Sawyer.

On appeal to this Court, Sheriff Clayton complains that the circuit court misinterpreted the provisions of W. Va.Code § 7-7-7. Upon a review of the parties' arguments, the appellate record, and the pertinent authorities, we find that the circuit court did not erroneously interpret the plain and unambiguous language of W. Va.Code § 7-7-7. Accordingly, we affirm the decisions of the Circuit Court of Webster County.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts giving rise to the instant proceeding are generally not disputed by the parties. During a meeting of the Webster County Commission, held in August, 1989, the Commission hired Barbara Sawyer to be employed in the position of "financial administrator." The terms of Ms. Sawyer's employment are recorded in the meeting's minutes as follows: "it is understood with Barbara Sawyer that she is under the responsibilities of the Webster County Commission. It is understood with Barbara Sawyer that she is to work in other offices, if needed during the month." Ms. Sawyer remained in the Commission's employ from August 1, 1989, until her discharge by the Commission on January 6, 1998. In addition to performing duties directly for the Commission, Ms. Sawyer also provided services to the Sheriff of Webster County and the Clerk of the Webster County Commission [hereinafter "County Clerk"]. Ms. Sawyer testified, in a hearing underlying the instant proceeding, that approximately sixty percent of her work time consisted of duties assigned to her by the Sheriff;¹ that she spent about twenty percent of her time working for the County Clerk;² and that the remainder of her work time was devoted to the Commission.³ Although Ms. Sawyer spent the majority of her time performing work for the Sheriff, her entire salary was paid by the Commission.

On January 6, 1998, the Commission terminated Ms. Sawyer's employment. Thereafter, by letter dated January 8, 1998, Sheriff Clayton requested the Commission to recognize Ms. Sawyer as an employee of the Sheriff for the purpose of assisting her with her constitutional duties as treasurer for Webster County. The Commission, however, withheld its consent to such employment. In response to the Sheriff's persistence in employing Ms. Sawyer, despite the Commission's refusal to approve this hiring, the Commission filed a complaint and a motion seeking injunctive relief from the Circuit Court of Webster County. Sheriff Clayton similarly moved the circuit court for injunctive relief, seeking to compel the Commission to compensate Ms. Sawyer for the services she had rendered to the Sheriff since her termination of employment by the Commission.⁴

The circuit court conducted a hearing on the parties' requests for relief, and, by order filed March 20, 1998, the court granted the Commission's request for injunctive relief, but denied the injunction sought by Sheriff Clayton. The court explained its ruling as follows:

1. West Virginia Code § 7-7-7 governs the hiring of employees by the sheriff and other county officers in the counties of West Virginia.

2. West Virginia Code § 7-7-7 expressly states that the sheriff and other county officers may only hire employees upon the advice and consent of the county commission.

3. West Virginia Code § 7-7-7 is plain and unambiguous and permits a county commission to refuse to consent to an employee proposed to be hired by a sheriff.

4. Decisions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals have recognized the plain and unambiguous language of West Virginia Code § 6-3-1, holding that the county commission has the positive authority to consent or refuse to consent to an appointment by the sheriff of his deputy and its action in exercising such authority is not subject to judicial review, direction or control. Hockman v. Tucker County Court, 75 S.E.2d 82 (W.Va.1953). Further, the county commission may refuse to consent to such an appointment without expressing any reason for such refusal. Hockman, [138 W.Va. at syl. pt. 3,] 75 S.E.2d at syl. pt. 3; see also [State ex rel.] Dingess v. Scaggs, 195 S.E.2d 724 (W.Va. 1973) and Mozingo v. Barnhardt [sic], 285 S.E.2d 497 (W.Va.1981).

5. The language of West Virginia Code § 6-3-1 requiring consent of the county commission to the Sheriff's hiring of deputies is indistinguishable from W. Va.Code [§] 7-7-7's application to employees (i.e., including non-deputies) sought to be hired by the Sheriff.

6. The Webster County Commission expressed its refusal to consent to the hiring of Barbara Sawyer to Sheriff Clayton.

7. Sheriff Clayton has refused to cease employment of Barbara Sawyer despite the notification of the Webster County Commission of its refusal to consent to her hiring.

....

The Court having further found, and the parties having agreed, that the issue before the Court is a question of law, this temporary injunction shall become permanent 60 days from March 6, 1998 unless one or the other party requests that further proceedings be scheduled on the issues presented herein.

Furthermore, in response to Plaintiff's [the Commission's] motion for a stay of the temporary injunction of 120 days, the Court GRANTS a stay of 60 days....[⁵]

(Footnote added).

Following the circuit court's decision, Sheriff Clayton filed a motion to reconsider the court's ruling, contesting the court's interpretation and application of the governing statute, W. Va.Code § 7-7-7 (1982) (Repl. Vol.1993). A hearing having been held thereon, the circuit court, by order filed June 12, 1998, denied the Sheriff's motion. The court reiterated its earlier ruling by recounting that

[t]he preliminary injunction enjoined Defendant [Sheriff Clayton] from maintaining Barbara Sawyer as an employee of the Webster County Sheriff's Department because the Webster County Commission refused to consent to her hiring by Defendant in January, 1998. The Court ruled that this action was within the authority of the Commission pursuant to controlling law of the State of West Virginia.

Consistent with its earlier ruling and its denial of the Sheriff's request for further consideration of its decision, the court then made permanent the preliminary injunction issued by order of March 20, 1998. From these orders of the circuit court, Sheriff Clayton appeals to this Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Procedurally, the instant appeal arises from the circuit court's disposition of the parties' requests for injunctive relief.

"`The granting or refusal of an injunction, whether mandatory or preventive, calls for the exercise of sound judicial discretion in view of all the circumstances of the particular case; regard being had to the nature of the controversy, the object for which the injunction is being sought, and the comparative hardship or convenience to the respective parties involved in the award or denial of the writ.' Point 4, syllabus, State ex rel. Donley v. Baker, 112 W.Va. 263[, 164 S.E. 154 (1932) ]." Syllabus Point 2, Severt v. Beckley Coals, Inc., 153 W.Va. 600,170 S.E.2d 577 (1969).

Syl. pt. 7, Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Jefferson County Educ. Ass'n, 183 W.Va. 15, 393 S.E.2d 653 (1990). Accord Weaver v. Ritchie, 197 W.Va. 690, 693, 478 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1996); Syl. pt. 11, Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp., 141 W.Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d 891 (1956). Succinctly stated, "[t]he denial or granting of an injunction by a trial court is discretionary and will not be disturbed upon an appeal unless there is an absolute right for an injunction or some abuses shown in connection with the denial or granting thereof." Syl. pt. 6, West Virginia Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Storch, 146 W.Va. 662,122 S.E.2d 295 (1961).

Given that the basis for the circuit court's decision to award the Commission the injunction it had requested was its interpretation of the statute defining the Commission's authority to approve or disapprove of appointees and employees proposed by the Sheriff, it is also necessary for us to evaluate the propriety of the circuit court's decision of law. In this regard, "[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review." Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). Having set forth the standards of review applicable to this proceeding, we turn now to consider the merits of the parties' arguments.

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal to this Court, Sheriff Clayton⁶ complains that the circuit court misinterpreted W. Va.Code § 7-7-7 by upholding the Commission's...