Webster v. Auditor General
| Decision Date | 07 November 1899 |
| Citation | 121 Mich. 668,80 N.W. 705 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | WEBSTER v. AUDITOR GENERAL. |
Application by Simon G. Webster for a writ of mandamus against the auditor general. Writ denied.
Horace M. Oren, Atty. Gen., for relator.
Russell C. Ostrander, for respondent.
This proceeding is to obtain a construction of certain provisions of the tax law. The facts shown by the record are that the relator owned certain real estate in Big Rapids, which, in the year 1897, was assessed to him, the total of the taxes assessed being $2.63. Failing to pay the tax the land was returned delinquent to the county treasurer, and afterwards to the auditor general. The law (Act No. 206, Laws 1893) in force when the land was assessed and tax levied, in section 59 provides that any person may pay the taxes returned, with interest computed from the 1st day of March next after the same were assessed (in this case March, 1898) at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum, with 4 per cent. as a collection fee; this section having also a proviso that, if the taxes remain unpaid at the time of sale prescribed in the act, an additional 70 cents shall be charged to cover the cost of advertising and selling. The time for sale under the law of 1893, as amended in 1895, is the first Monday in December. The last legislature amended certain sections of the tax law, and, among them, section 59, just referred to. The time for sale of lands is fixed for the first Tuesday in May. Section 70. The title to the act of 1893 reads: 'An act to provide for the assessment of property and the levy (and collection) of taxes thereon, and for the collection of taxes heretofore and hereafter levied; making such taxes a lien on the lands taxed, establishing and continuing such lien, providing for the sale and conveyance of lands delinquent for taxes, and for the inspection and disposition of lands did off to the state and not redeemed or purchased and to repeal act number two hundred of the Public Acts of 1891, and all other acts and parts of acts in anywise contravening any of the provisions of this act.' Section 59 of the law of 1893 reads as follows: 'Any person may pay the taxes or any one of the several taxes, on any parcel or description of land returned as aforesaid, or any undivided share thereof, with interest computed thereon from the first day of March next after the same were assessed, at the rate of eight per cent. per annum, and office charges with four per cent. as a collection fee, to the county treasurer of the county in which the lands are situated, at any time before they are sold; provided, that on all descriptions of land on which any of the several taxes remain unpaid at the time prescribed for the sale of such delinquent tax lands there shall be charged an additional seventy cents to cover the cost of advertising and selling the same.' In 1899 this section was amended to read as follows: The amended section became law September 23, 1899. Relator, on the 2d day of October, 1899, applied to pay his tax. He tendered the original tax, the collection fee of 4 per cent., the dollar charge provided for in the section as amended, and interest at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum from March 1, 1898. The auditor general demanded interest at the rate of 1 per cent. per month or fraction thereof. The question, therefore, is whether or not the relator tendered a sufficient amount of interest, since, having tendered the one dollar for expenses, required by the amended section, he has, in effect, determined for himself that, while the enacting clause of the section referred to is not in force, the provise thereto is in force. It is the claim of the relator that, if the construction of the statute which is contended for by the auditor general is to prevail, it will make the law retroactive, and that there is nothing in the law, as amended, indicating that the legislature intended it should be retroactive. In this connection our attention is called to Smith v. Auditor General, 20 Mich. 398. The answer of the auditor general states, among other things: 'For a number of years last past the expense to the state for collecting delinquent taxes has been greater than the sum received by the state for the interest and other charges which by law have been added to the original tax, so that the amount of the state tax levy has not been received, with the result that a considerable deficit exists, and has existed, to supply a portion of which deficit the last legislature added to the state tax levy the sum of four hundred and fifty thousand dollars.' It is his claim that section 59, as amended, took the place of the section before it was amended, and to construe it prospectively only is to defeat the entire claim of the state for interest upon all delinquent taxes existing when the amendment took effect. He says the purpose of the legislature in making the change was to meet the cost of collecting taxes. Treated as retrospective legislation, it would accomplish the purpose the legislature had in view. It would violate no provision of the state constitution or the constitution of the United States. It would invade no vested right of an individual.
It is conceded courts are required to construe statutes as prospective, and not...
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