Smith v. Humphrey

• Decision Date: 10 May 1870
• Citation: 20 Mich. 398
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Ralph C. Smith v. William Humphrey, Auditor General et al

20 Mich. 398

Ralph C. Smith v. William Humphrey, Auditor General et al

Supreme Court of Michigan

May 10, 1870

Heard May 7, 1870 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Appeal in Chancery from Wayne Circuit.

The bill in this cause was filed in the Circuit Court for the county of Wayne in Chancery, by Ralph C. Smith, against William Humphrey, Auditor General, and Paul Gies, Treasurer of Wayne County, and states that he is the owner of a parcel of land, situated in said county, on which in the year 1868 there was assessed as a tax upon said premises, the sum of $ 21.04, for school, township, county and state taxes; that said taxes not being paid, the premises were returned as delinquent therefor to the treasurer of said county, and by him to the Auditor General of said State; that said taxes remaining unpaid, the treasurer of said county, under the direction of said Auditor General, had advertised and given notice that said premises would be sold at the annual tax sales to be held at Detroit, in said County on the first Monday of October, 1869; that by virtue of the laws of this State at the time of the assessment of said tax and return of said premises as aforesaid, complainant was entitled to pay said tax by paying the amount thereof, with interest calculated thereon from the first day of February, 1869, at the rate of fifteen per cent. per annum, and office charges, to the treasurer of said county, or to the State Treasurer, upon the certificate of the Auditor General, at any time prior to the first day of September, 1869.

The complainant further states that on the 16th day of August, 1869, he called upon the treasurer of said county at his office in Detroit, to pay said tax upon said land, and then and there offered to pay, and tendered to said County Treasurer, in lawful money of the United States, the sum of twenty-five dollars, being the full amount of said tax upon said lands, with interest thereon at the rate of fifteen per cent. per annum from the first day of February, 1869, to the day of such tender, and the legal office charges connected with said tax and premises, which amount he is still ready and willing and offers to pay for the purpose of discharging said tax. But said County Treasurer refused to accept such amount so tendered in payment of said tax and said Auditor General and County Treasurer now demand and seek to collect the amount of said tax and interest at the rate of thirty per cent. per annum from the first day of February, 1869, together with the office charges and expenses of sale aforesaid, which amount said Auditor General and County Treasurer claim and insist is a lien upon said land, for the payment of which, said land is subject to sale under the tax laws of this State. And for the purpose of enforcing the payment of such demand, said Auditor General has advertised said land for sale by said County Treasurer, on the first Monday of October, 1869.

The bill provided for an injunction from selling said lands for or on account of said tax, and that said tax, together with the amount charged against said lands by said defendants for interest, office charges, and expenses of sale be declared to be set aside and cancelled, and said lands to be free from all lien on account thereof.

The defendants demurred to the bill, and the cause was heard in the Court below upon the demurrer.

The Court overruled the demurrer and decreed that the tax be void upon the lands described and set forth in the bill, and that an injunction issue restraining the said defendants from selling or offering the lands for sale.

From this decree the defendants appeal to this Court.

Decree of the Court modified. Complainant entitled to costs of the Court but neither party will recover costs in this Court.

F. H. Canfield, for Complainant.

I.--The law of 1869 was intended to act prospectively, and not retrospectively; and therefore has no application to taxes assessed and returned previous to its enactment.

The act in question does not amend any previous law, but is an entirely new statute, which, both in its title and context indicates an intention on the part of the Legislature, to establish a rule for "the assessment, collection and return of taxes for the future," is entitled, "An act to provide for the uniform assessment of property, and for the collection and return of taxes thereon." These words are entirely unambiguous, and they preclude the idea that the law was intended to have any retroactive effect whatever. The object of the law, as required by the Constitution, is expressed in the title, and all its sections must be construed so as to carry out that object and none other. The act, as the title indicates, provides for the assessment of taxes for the future, it also provides the means of enforcing the collection of taxes so assessed, and none other. These observations apply to the provisions of the act generally, but particularly to section 70, now under consideration. Sections 67, 68 and 69 set forth the manner in which delinquent lands shall be returned to the Auditor General, and evidently relate to future returns, because at the time the law took effect there were no delinquent lands in the State which had not already been returned. There was, therefore, no subject upon which these sections could operate, until the assessment and return for the year 1869 should be made. And section 70 in express terms relates only to lands returned under those sections.--Laws of 1869, p. 350, Clark v. Hall, 19 Mich. 356, decided at the last October term of this Court. This decision though involving more especially § 164, is also applicable to § 70, now under consideration. The language of the Court in regard to the retrospective operations of the act, applies to the entire act, and pointedly sustains the position which we here assume. Price v. Mott, 52 Pa. 315; Harrison v. Metz, 17 Mich. 377. Cooley's Const. Lim., 362-370; 18 Johns. 139; 49 Barb. 196; 15 Wis. 548; 18 Mo. 599; Sedgwick's Const. L., 599; Blackwell on Tax Titles 480; Brown v. Veasie, 25 Me. 359; 5 La. 380.

II.--A construction different from the one for which we contend, would render the law unconstitutional.

1. If the law relates to the collection of taxes assessed prior to its passage, then it embraces more than one object, and one which is not expressed in its title, and therefore contravenes Sec. 20 of Art. 4 of the Constitution. The construction of the title of the act has already been dwelt upon, and the opinion of this Court relating thereto cited. And we submit that the providing for a penalty upon delinquent taxes assessed in the past, can have no relation to, but is a matter wholly distinct in its nature from regulating "the assessment, collections, and return of taxes for the future."

2. By the express terms of the statute under which the taxes on the land in question were assessed and returned, the complainant had the right to pay the tax, by paying the amount thereof with interest at the rate of 15 per cent., and the office charges specified in that statute, at any time before September 1st, 1869. We insist that this right of the tax-payer cannot be abrogated or interfered with by any subsequent act of the Legislature. The following cases upon the right of the Legislature to interfere with the right of redemption from tax sales, are applicable to this point:--Dickman v. Dickman, 11 Paige 484; Bronson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 341; Adams v. Beale, 19 Iowa 61.

3. The construction of the act contended for by defendants, contravenes the constitutional provision in respect to uniformity of taxation.--Scammon v. Chicago, 44 Ill. 269; re-affirmed in Clayton v. Chicago, 44 Ill. 280.

III.--The rights of the State and tax-payer as they existed under the law of 1853, are not affected by the repealing section of the act of 1869. Such rights are expressly reserved by the proviso of said section. See § 167 Laws of 1869, p. 380.

This section repeals the law of 1853, with its amendments and all other general tax laws of the State, previously existing: "Provided, that the repeal of acts mentioned in this act shall not affect any act done, sale made, or right acquired or established previous to the time such repeal shall take effect." It has already been argued that under the law of '53 the complainant had acquired the right to discharge the lien of tax upon his lands in the manner and by the means provided by that law. Equally clear is it that under that law the State has acquired the right to enforce its lien for the tax by legal proceedings against the land. These rights are recognized and excepted from the effect of the repeal of the law of '53, by the proviso quoted. Not only does it appear from this proviso, affirmatively, that these rights and the mode of enforcing them are still to be regulated by the law under which they were acquired, but the import of the entire section negatives the idea that the act '69 was intended to supersede previous laws in that respect.--Bartruff v. Reiney, 15 Iowa 257; Adams v. Beale, 19 Iowa 61; Penn v. Clemans, 19 Iowa 372; Meyers v. Copeland, 20 Iowa 22,--where the same statute was again under consideration and the decision in Adams v. Beale affirmed.

Dwight May, Attorney General, and Geo. V. N. Lothrop, for defendants.

I. What was the effect of the tax act of April 6th, 1869, upon the collection of taxes then delinquent?

The complainant contends that it did not apply to them at all. On the other hand, we claim that it took up existing taxes where it found them, and furnished the machinery for all subsequent proceedings for collection and sale. This is the issue.

In Clark v. Hall, the Court held that the act was prospective and not retrospective. The question arose on an...