Webster v. Bass Enterprises Production Co.
| Decision Date | 13 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 3:00-CV-2109M.,Civ.A. 3:00-CV-2109M. |
| Citation | 192 F.Supp.2d 684 |
| Parties | Barbara WEBSTER, Plaintiff, v. BASS ENTERPRISES PRODUCTION CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Mellannise Henderson-Love, Yolanda D. Montgomery, Henderson-Love Montgomery, Dallas, TX, for plaintiff.
Christopher Edward Howe, Marjorie G Panter, Kelly Hart & Hallman, Fort Worth, TX, for defendant.
Will Pryor, Will Pryor Mediation & Arbitration, Dallas, TX, pro se.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 6, 2001. Defendant Bass Enterprises Production Co. ("Bass"), challenges the sufficiency of the evidence produced by Plaintiff Barbara Webster ("Webster") on her sexual harassment, age discrimination, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Specifically, Bass contends the evidence is that Webster was terminated because of her progressively worsening defiant and contentious behavior, not because of her sex, age, or protected activity, and that she was not subjected to a discriminatory or hostile working environment. Upon consideration, the Court GRANTS the Defendant's Motion in part, and DENIES it in part.
Webster worked in Bass's accounting department from 1978 until her discharge in 1999, performing clerical and administrative duties. It is undisputed that she found it difficult to work with supervisors at Bass. Although the gravamen of Webster's discrimination allegations stem from the time beginning in 1998 when she was supervised by Bonnie Brown ("Brown") and Carl Ernst ("Ernst"), Webster admittedly had a less than amicable relationship with all of her supervisors.2
Bass claims Webster's history of unprofessional behavior toward her supervisors worsened in early 1999. As evidence of Webster's unsatisfactory conduct, Bass points to a computer password incident on February 10, 1999. Webster, who was absent from work, is alleged to have defiantly refused to give Ernst her computer password so he could access a data file, and to have cooperated with him only after he threatened to obtain her password with the aid of the technical department. Bass also produced evidence that when Webster was denied vacation during busy times in the accounting department, she took sick days or behaved contentiously, remarking that she should have the right to take vacations whenever she wanted. Brown, and to a lesser degree, Webster, also testified about Webster's difficulties with filing procedures and bank reconciliations.
Webster claims she approached Brown on February 12, 1999, to discuss problems she was having with Ernst, including the February 10, 1999, computer password incident. Webster said she believed Ernst was retaliating against her because of a 1993 speaker phone incident.3 She speculated that Ernst might manipulate confidential computer-stored information to somehow set her up. Allegedly based on the anger exhibited by Webster during this meeting, Brown decided to recommend to Cotham that Webster be discharged.
Webster also alleges that she met with Gary Reese, on February 18, 1999, and with Brown on February 22, 1999, concerning Ernst's alleged discriminatory treatment of her. Bass apparently disputes this point, but has not offered sworn testimony from Reese to rebut the allegation, and Brown does not mention in her affidavit whether there was a February 22, 1999 meeting.
On February 22, 1999, Brown and Ernst drafted a memorandum detailing Webster's conduct and performance problems, which they gave to Cotham the next day. He sent the memorandum to Keith Bullard ("Bullard"), Bass's personnel manager, who met with Webster on February 24, 1999. In the meeting, Webster complained that Ernst was sexually harassing her.
After an investigation, Bullard found Webster's allegations to be without merit, largely based on his conclusions regarding the 1993 speaker phone incident and Webster's alleged admission, to him, that Ernst had never propositioned or inappropriately touched her. Written findings were drafted and orally communicated to Webster on March 5, 1999. Webster responded that "[e]veryone [wa]s lying." Although she offered no proof of it, Webster then told Brown that Bullard had been previously accused of sexual harassment. On March 9, 1999, Ernst and Brown met with Webster to provide her a written job description, because she had complained she did not fully understand her duties.
Cotham met with Webster on April 1, 1999, after Webster again allegedly refused to e-mail Ernst or Brown her computer password before leaving for vacation. Ernst and Brown claim she verbally attacked them, contending that eight women had previously worked for Ernst and quit because of him. Again she offered no proof to support her allegations. Cotham informed Webster that she would be discharged if she refused to perform her duties or continued to be argumentative or confrontational, and he warned her to cease repeating false allegations about Ernst.4
On April 8, 1999, Webster filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Bass was served with the charge on April 15, 1999.
On April 12, 1999, Brown again complained to Cotham about Webster's confrontational attitude. On April 14, 1999, Cotham issued a "Final Warning" to Webster, stating her behavior toward Brown "constitute[d] insubordination, disrespect and resistance to supervision," and that if she "engage[d] in any subsequent act of misconduct or any type of unacceptable performance, [her] employment [would] be terminated immediately."
On June 4, 1999, Brown issued another memorandum to Cotham concerning Webster's continuing poor performance and inappropriate conduct. Brown described incidents in which Webster resisted supervisory authority during May and June. Upon consideration of the memorandum, on June 7, 1999, Cotham discharged Webster.
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and record evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that, as a matter of law, the movant (Bass) is entitled to judgment.5 The non-moving party, (Webster) must make a positive showing that a genuine dispute of material fact exists.6 The record before the Court will be considered in the light most favorable to Webster, as non-movant.7
Webster complains that Bass subjected her to sexual harassment,8 age discrimination, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The sufficiency of a plaintiff's evidence "must be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the nature, extent, and quality of the evidence."9 Looking to the circumstances in total, the Court concludes that no fact issue exists which should forestall summary disposition of Webster's several harassment, age discrimination, or IIED claims, but that a fact issue exists as to Webster's retaliatory discharge claim.
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."10 Here, Webster claims Bass, through Ernst, subjected her to a hostile or abusive work environment. She also claims Ernst inflicted quid pro quo harassment on her.11
To prove a prima facie case of discrimination arising from an allegedly hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, Webster must demonstrate that she was a member of a protected class (female); she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; the harassment complained of was based upon sex or gender; and the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment.12 To be "severe and pervasive," the workplace must be "permeated with `discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.'"13 Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent impose a heavy burden of production on a plaintiff to show that sexual harassment is severe and pervasive.14 "Courts determine whether an environment is sufficiently abusive to be actionable under Title VII by reviewing all of the relevant circumstances, including the frequency of the conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening ... humiliating ... mere[ly] offensive ... and whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance."15
Mere conclusory or self-contradictory allegations will not protect an otherwise unsupportable claim from summary disposition.16 Webster's allegations are burdened by conclusory and contradictory assertions.17 Her sole support for a large number of claims is her own affidavit. The portions of her affidavit that contradict, without explanation, her prior unchanged deposition testimony will not be considered by the Court.18 When the conclusory and contradictory portions of her affidavit are ignored, as they must be, the objectively mild nature of Webster's hostile work environment claim is revealed.
Webster alleges the following facts give rise to her sexual harassment claim: Ernst yelled at her; once threw his pen down on her desk during an exchange; shook papers in her face; on two or three occasions, came up behind her chair and pushed her into the desk when reviewing her computer screen; yelled at his wife and kids on the phone; once asked her what type of men she liked; on two or three occasions, stated that they should go get drunk; on a few occasions, had "dancing" eyebrows and stuck his tongue out; "invad[ed] her workspace" by keeping in-baskets, note-pads, and supplies at her desk; denied her raises, sick time, and vacation requests; called her at home when she was sick to yell at her for not giving him her personal...
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