Webster v. Byrd
Decision Date | 25 July 1986 |
Citation | 494 So.2d 31 |
Parties | 34 Ed. Law Rep. 1290 Robert E. WEBSTER v. Charles L. BYRD. 84-16. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Alvin T. Prestwood, Montgomery, for appellant.
J. Garrison Thompson of Pitts, Pitts and Thompson, Selma, for appellee.
Plaintiff Robert R. Webster appeals from a summary judgment in favor of defendant, Charles L. Byrd, in a defamation action. We reverse and remand.
The motion for summary judgment did not specify whether it was based upon there being no genuine issue of material fact as to any element of the affirmative defense of absolute privilege (as argued in Byrd's brief) or upon there being no genuine issue of material fact as to any element of the cause of action for defamation. If there is a genuine issue of material fact as to any element of the affirmative defense of absolute privilege and if there is any evidence tending to establish all elements of defamation, summary judgment is inappropriate. Our standard of review, in determining whether there is some evidence to support each element of defamation and whether there is no genuine issue of a material fact as to each element of the affirmative defense of absolute privilege, is for this Court to review the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff Webster, the nonmoving party, and to resolve all reasonable doubts against Byrd, the defendant and movant.
Autrey v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 481 So.2d 345 (Ala.1985); Burt v. Commercial Union Insurance Company, 489 So.2d 547 (Ala.1986).
Byrd was president of George C. Wallace State Community College in Selma. Webster was employed as a full-time technical instructor at the college. The allegation of defamation is based on a letter written by Byrd to serve notice upon Webster of the proposed termination of him from his tenured position at the college.
The Alabama legislature has provided that the state board of education has the authority to make rules and regulations to govern the hiring and firing of tenured instructors in our trade schools and junior colleges. Code 1975, § 16-60-111. Pursuant to this grant of authority, the board of education has promulgated regulations specifying the procedures to be followed when it is proposed that a tenured instructor at one of these institutions be fired. These regulations, in pertinent part, provide as follows:
These regulations require the same notice procedure as that mandated by Code 1975, § 16-24-9, for the termination of tenured elementary and high school teachers, except for the requirement of a specified date by which the teacher or instructor must request a hearing (ten days before the hearing rather than five), and except for the fact that the person or entity required to give notice of the proposed termination is different (the president or director of the state technical college or institute rather than the employing board of education). Thus, our decision in this case will apply to notice procedures under that statute, as well.
On October 19, 1978, Byrd wrote a letter to Webster in accordance with these tenure policies to inform him that he was to be terminated as a technical instructor at the college. The letter set forth the grounds for the proposed termination: insubordination, neglect of duty, immorality (including bribery), and "other good and just cause." The letter informed Webster of his right to a hearing.
When Webster demanded a hearing, a review board was appointed by the state superintendent of education. At the conclusion of the hearing, the review board upheld Webster's dismissal, but only on the grounds of insubordination, and it recommended that his name be added to a list of qualified instructors for technical colleges. Webster appealed, but the decision of the review board was upheld.
On October 18, 1979, Webster filed this suit for defamation against Byrd. In his complaint, Webster alleged that the letter of termination written by Byrd was the product of actual malice and contained false and defamatory statements concerning Webster. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Byrd, as set out in the following order:
In the amended pleading Webster alleged, and in the affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment Webster swore, that the letter, or portions thereof, were published to certain named and unnamed individuals in addition to the dean, attorney, and business manager.
Whether there was a publication or publications sufficient to support a suit for defamation is not addressed by the parties. See, Dixon v. Economy Company, 477 So.2d 353 (Ala.1985), and McDaniel v. Crescent Motors, Inc., 249 Ala. 330, 31 So.2d 343 (1947). Byrd contends that the letter of termination to Webster was absolutely privileged.
Whether a communication is privileged by reason of its character or the occasion on which it was made is a question of law for the judge. Fulton v. Advertiser Co., 388 So.2d 533, 537 (Ala.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131, 101 S.Ct. 954, 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981). In this case, the trial court found that the letter of termination was privileged, but did not specify whether this privilege was absolute or conditional.
The only absolutely privileged communications that have been heretofore recognized under Alabama law are those made during legislative or judicial proceedings, or those contained in legislative acts made under authority of law. Mead Corporation v. Hicks, 448 So.2d 308 (Ala.1983). Byrd argues that the letter of termination was an absolutely privileged communication because it commenced a quasi-judicial proceeding. We agree.
This Court has held that tenure hearings are quasi-judicial in nature, State Tenure Commission v. Madison County Board of Education, 282 Ala. 658, 213 So.2d 823 (1968); Board of Education of Choctaw County v. Kennedy, 256 Ala. 478, 55 So.2d 511 (1951); State ex rel. Steele v. Board of Education of Fairfield, 252 Ala. 254, 40 So.2d 689 (1949), but this Court has never decided, until today, whether communications made in the course of quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. We came near to expressing an opinion in this matter with our decision in Dunning v. Boyes, 351 So.2d 883 (Ala.1977), cert. den., 436 U.S. 917, 98 S.Ct. 2261, 56 L.Ed.2d 757 (1978), where we held that defamatory communications made in the course of grievance proceedings under collective bargaining contracts are only conditionally privileged, but that case was expressly overruled in Surrency v. Harbison, 489 So.2d 1097 (Ala.1986), where this Court held that an alleged statement made in the course of a grievance hearing is absolutely privileged. The courts are divided as to whether an absolute privilege attaches to communications made in the course of quasi-judicial proceedings. Some courts recognize only a conditional privilege. Gardner v. Hollifield, 97 Idaho 607, 549 P.2d 266 (1976); Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967). The majority view, and the view we now adopt, is that an absolute privilege attaches to communications made in the course of quasi-judicial proceedings. Brubaker v. Board of Education, School District 149, Cook County, Illinois, 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.1974), order clarified, 527 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.1975), cert. den., 421 U.S. 965, 95 S.Ct. 1953, 44 L.Ed.2d 451 (1975); Mock v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 454 F.2d 131 (8th Cir.1972); Roberts v. Lenfestey, 264 So.2d 449 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1972).
Where an administrative proceeding is conducted with the same safeguards as those provided in judicial proceedings, e.g., notice and opportunity to be present, information as to charges made and opportunity to controvert such charges, the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses, the right to submit evidence on one's behalf, the right to be heard in person, and the presence of an objective decision-maker, see Board of Education of Choctaw County v. Kennedy, supra, that proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature and statements made in the course of the proceeding should be absolutely privileged.
Our inquiry must now turn to whether the...
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