Webster v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd.

• Court: United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Virginia)
• Citation: 534 F.Supp.3d 537
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-344–HEH
• Parties: Regina WEBSTER, Plaintiff, v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 20 April 2021

534 F.Supp.3d 537

Regina WEBSTER, Plaintiff,
v.
CHESTERFIELD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-344–HEH

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

Signed April 20, 2021

534 F.Supp.3d 540

Richard F. Hawkins, III, The Hawkins Law Firm PC, Richmond, VA, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey Lee Mincks, Christopher Michael Midgley, Emily Claire Russell, Chesterfield County Attorney's Office, Chesterfield, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment)

Henry E. Hudson, Senior United States District Judge

This unfortunate case, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,¹ exemplifies the challenging environment faced daily by special education teachers. Plaintiff, Regina Webster ("Plaintiff"), is an Instructional Assistant in Special Education with Chesterfield County Public

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Schools ("CCPS"). In her Complaint, filed against the Chesterfield County School Board ("the School Board"), Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment by an intellectually challenged eight-year-old, second grade student (hereinafter referred to as "SM").² While the School Board does not dispute Plaintiff's allegations that she was subjected to unwelcome touching by the child, it maintains that the evidence would not support a finding that the child is capable of distinguishing between the male and female gender. The School Board also maintains that its evidence would demonstrate that such unfortunate misbehavior is not uncommon in special education classes.

Presently before the Court is the School Board's Motion for Summary Judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The School Board maintains that a vital prerequisite to proof of a sexually hostile work environment is some plausible evidentiary basis for a fact finder to conclude that the alleged hostility was sexually motivated. SM, whose behavior is at issue in this case, is a special education student with Down's Syndrome and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Although he is eight years old, "his mental and emotional capacity is delayed by multiple years." (ECF No. 28 at 13; see also ECF No. 39 ¶ 9.) Notwithstanding the absence of expert testimony challenging the opinion of the School Board's experts, Plaintiff contends that the question of whether SM is capable of a sexually motivated touching is an issue which should be decided by a jury as opposed to the Court. Regardless of her status as a special education teacher who works with some of the most challenging students, Plaintiff alleges that SM's conduct was so severe and pervasive that it was unexpected for a special education teacher to be subjected to such conduct. Indeed, Plaintiff charges that the School Board should be liable for its insufficient response to SM's improper conduct.

Both sides have submitted memoranda supporting their respective positions. The Court heard oral argument on February 9, 2021, and the Motion is ripe for review. For all the reasons stated below, the Court will grant the Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The relevant inquiry in the summary judgment analysis is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [trier of fact] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a genuine factual dispute exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

"[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."

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Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of a party's case. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Hogan v. Beaumont , 779 Fed. App'x 164, 166 (4th Cir. 2019). A genuine issue concerning a material fact only arises when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is sufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to return a verdict in the party's favor. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party as well as conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion. Tom v. Hosp. Ventures LLC , 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, to deny a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he disputed facts must be material to an issue necessary for the proper resolution of the case, and the quality and quantity of the evidence offered to create a question of fact must be adequate ...." Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat'l Cable Adver. , 57 F.3d 1317, 1323 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). "[T]here must be ‘sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.’ " Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc. , 487 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). "A genuine issue of material fact is not created where the only issue of fact is to determine which of the two conflicting versions of the plaintiff's testimony is correct." Barwick v. Celotex Corp. , 736 F.2d 946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984). When applying the summary judgment standard, courts must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Holland , 487 F.3d at 213.

Courts may make inferences based on expert testimony in the record. See Textron Inc. ex rel. Homelite Div. v. Barber-Colman Co. , 903 F. Supp. 1558, 1565 (W.D.N.C. 1995). "Thus, the inferences a court is asked to draw by expert testimony must be reasonable in light of competing inferences." Id. "Neither the factual assumptions underlying an expert's opinion nor the expert's inferences from the facts assumed are automatically established by the absence of directly countering expert opinion." Erie Ins. Exch. v. Stark , 962 F.2d 349, 353 (4th Cir. 1992). "The credibility of competing experts is a question for the jury only if the party with the burden of proof has offered enough evidence to sustain a verdict in its favor." Alevromagiros v. Hechinger Co. , 993 F.2d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1993).

II. BACKGROUND

The evidence in the record reveals that Plaintiff has been employed by CCPS since September 2006 as an Instructional Assistant in Special Education at Providence Elementary School. (ECF No. 50, Ex. 2 ¶ 3.) Until Spring 2018, she was assigned to instruct emotionally disturbed ("E.D.") students. (Id. ) However, in 2018, allegedly without her consent, Dr. Sharon Rucker ("Dr. Rucker"), Principal of Providence Elementary, transferred Plaintiff to a different type of special education classroom, which focused on students with moderate intellectual disabilities ("I.D."). (Id. ¶¶ 4–5.) There, she was assigned to assist Ms. Kesha Ellerbee ("Ms. Ellerbee"), the I.D. classroom teacher. (ECF No. 40 at 2–3, ¶ 7.) Plaintiff was displeased with the reassignment and requested a transfer back to her former assignment in the E.D.

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classroom. (ECF No. 50, Ex. 2 ¶¶ 11–12.) Dr. Rucker declined to do so.³ (Id. )

From the inception of the school year, Plaintiff experienced inappropriate touching by SM. (Id. ¶ 7.) This included "inappropriately touching [her] by putting his hands up [her] dress and touching [her] private parts." (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) Plaintiff maintains that such inappropriate conduct occurred on almost a daily basis. (Id. ) According to Plaintiff, she continuously recounted her experiences with SM to Dr. Rucker and her assistant, to no avail. (Id. ¶¶ 11–12.) Dr. Rucker's response was that she did not "have anywhere else to put [Plaintiff]," so that was where she would stay.⁴ (Id. ¶ 12.) Moreover, Plaintiff maintains that the classroom teacher she was assigned to assist, Ms. Ellerbee, was "generally dismissive of [Plaintiff's] concerns about the harassing behavior and even tried to defend it by saying that it was just SM's personality." (Id. ¶ 13.) Still, SM was "consistently referred to—by teachers, [instructional assistants] and school administrators—as a ‘sweet little boy,’ a ‘sweetheart,’ ‘the sweetest little thing,’ or ‘sweet as he can be.’ " (ECF No. 40 at 3, ¶ 9.)

For the first month of the 2018–19 school year, Ms. Ellerbee used handwritten notes to track student behavior, but thereafter began to record her students' behavior on what...