Webster v. Harris

• Decision Date: 01 September 1902
• Parties: WEBSTER et al. v. HARRIS et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

69 S.W. 782

111 Tenn. 668

WEBSTER et al. v. HARRIS et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

September 1, 1902

Appeal from chancery court, Lake county; W. H. Swiggart, Chancellor.

Bill for an injunction by W. E. Webster and others against James C. Harris and others, in which defendant Harris filed a cross-bill. From a decree for complainants and dismissal of the cross-bill, defendant Harris appeals. Affirmed.

Deason Rankin & Waddell, for appellant.

Cochran Moore & Wells, for appellees.

McALISTER J.

This case is presented to the court in a most voluminous record and involves the title, ownership, and navigability of Reelfoot Lake, situated in the northwestern corner of the state. It also involves the hunting and fishing privileges and the general riparian rights of the complainants in the waters of said lake. In August, 1899, the defendant J. C. Harris, assuming to be the owner of the soil under the waters of the lake, began to excavate a canal for the purpose of connecting the lake with the Mississippi river, and in this way drain the water from the greater portion of the lands comprising the lake. Thereupon complainants, who are owners of lands, hotels, club houses, fish docks, and other property situated along the eastern shore of the lake, filed this injunction bill to restrain the defendant J. C. Harris from draining it. They base their right to maintain the suit upon the ground that they are riparian owners of certain lands bordering on the lake; that Reelfoot Lake is a public and navigable body of water in a legal sense and as a matter of fact; that as such, under the statutes of the state, it is a public highway; that the obstruction or destruction of its navigability will be a public nuisance, and that the drainage of said lake will create a public nuisance on account of the character of its bottom, which is composed of mud and decaying vegetable matter, and thus greatly injure the health of the people in that vicinity. It is also alleged in the bill that the drainage of the lake would destroy the value of the improvements which complainants have erected upon their lands for the entertainment of guests who visit Reelfoot Lake at all seasons of the year for pleasure and to hunt and fish. It is further alleged that defendant Harris has set up some pretended claim and title to the land under the waters of Reelfoot Lake; that he has declared his purpose to drain the lake; that he has a large number of hands at work digging a canal front the Mississippi river to Reelfoot Lake; and that he will drain the lake, unless restrained by law.

The defendant Harris filed his answer and cross-bill, in which all the material allegations of the original bill are denied. It is alleged by said Harris that on December 28, 1898, he purchased from the Reelfoot Outing Club, by deed conveying the title in fee, all the lands covered by the waters of Reelfoot Lake at ordinary low-water mark, and also all the shores and margins of said lake and of all the islands in said lake. Defendant alleges in the cross-bill that he is the owner of the lake and of all the soil thereunder, and that he has the exclusive right to the hunting and fishing privileges, etc. It is also alleged in said cross-bill that the said Harris and his predecessors in title have exercised acts of ownership over Reelfoot Lake under their said titles, and that the validity of the titles under which he claims has been determined in his favor by the supreme court of Tennessee.

The chancellor, Hon. W. H. Swiggart, assigned to hold the chancery court of Lake county, heard the cause upon the pleadings and proof. A very able and elaborate written opinion was filed by the judge, which has greatly facilitated the labors of this court in the investigation of the case. The result of the chancellor's opinion was to sustain the original bill, perpetuate the injunction restraining the defendant Harris from draining Reelfoot Lake, and to dismiss his cross-bill. The court held that the complainants to the original bill are riparian owners, owning tracts of land in severalty along the eastern shore of the lake, with their western boundaries extending to the water's edge at the low-water mark; that they are entitled to the uses, benefits, and privileges of the waters of the lake for all common, usual, domestic, and farm purposes, and entitled to have the waters of the lake continued in their natural state and condition; that Reelfoot Lake is a public and navigable body of water in the sense of the law as well as in fact, and therefore not the subject of private ownership and control, under the general land laws of Tennessee, but that the soil under said waters and the fisheries therein, as well as the right of navigation, belong to the state, in trust for the benefit of all the citizens thereof; and that the title under which J. C. Harris and his predecessors claim to own Reelfoot Lake is void, and that such title papers confer no title whatever to such of the lands as are covered by water. The court did not determine the title to the islands in the lake, as none of the complainants to the suit are asserting any title thereto. J. C. Harris appealed from the decree of the chancellor and has assigned numerous errors.

The first assignment is that the court erred in holding that Reelfoot Lake is a public and navigable body of water in the sense of the law as well as in fact. Second. The court erred in holding this lake is not the subject of private ownership and control, under the laws of Tennessee, but that the soil under the lake and the fisheries therein, as well as the right of navigation, and all other rights, incidents of property, and easements thereto, belong to the state, in trust for the benefit of the citizens thereof. It is insisted this holding of the chancellor was erroneous. The test of a navigable stream is whether, in the ordinary state of the water, it has capacity and suitability for the usual purposes of navigation. Stuart v. Clark's Lessee, 2 Swan, 9, 58 Am. Dec. 49. It was further said in that case: "We are aware of no less exceptionable criterion than that to be extracted from some of the cases, namely, a river capable, in the ordinary state of the water, of navigation, ascending and descending, by sea vessels; that is, such vessels as are employed in the ordinary purposes of commerce, whether foreign or inland, and whether steam or sail vessels." Judge McKinney in that case said: "The distinction between the technical sense of the term and its common acceptation is important to be kept in view in inquiring into the respective rights of the public and the riparian owners in reference to the property in the soil, as well as the use of the water courses. *** If the river be a public, navigable stream in the legal sense, the soil covered by the water, as well as the use of the stream, belongs to the public. But if it be not navigable in the legal meaning of the term, *** the ownership of the bed of the stream is in the riparian proprietor, but the public have an easement therein for the purpose of transportation and commercial intercourse. A distinction is taken by the common law between streams which in the common acceptation of the term are suited to some purposes of navigation and small shallow streams which are not so. In respect to the former,--which, though not navigable in the sense of the law, are yet of sufficient depth naturally for valuable floatage, as for rafts, flatboats, and perhaps small vessels of lighter draught than ordinary,--while it is settled that the right of property in the bed of the stream is vested in the riparian proprietor, and in that respect it is to be regarded as a private river, still it is equally well settled that the public have a right to the free and uninterrupted use and enjoyment of such stream for all the purposes of transportation and navigation to which it is naturally adapted." These principles were reaffirmed by this court in Holbert v. Edens, 5 Lea, 207, 40 Am. Rep. 26; Sigler v. State, 7 Baxt. 493; Goodwin v. Thompson, 15 Lea, 209, 54 Am. Rep. 410. But it was held by this court in Irwin v. Brown, 3 Tenn. Cas. 310, that a stream which is not of sufficient depth naturally for valuable floatage, such as rafts, flatboats, and small boats of lighter draught than ordinary, is not navigable in either a strict legal sense or ordinary sense. Hence it was held that capacity to float a saw log in Hind's creek to a river was not a test of the navigability of said creek. To the same effect is Allison v. Davidson, 39 S.W. 905, decided by the court of chancery appeals, and affirmed by this court. It was held in Goodwin v. Thompson, 15 Lea, 209, 54 Am. Rep. 410, that, if a stream is navigable in a legal sense, the title to the soil under the water is in the state, in trust for the public, and individuals setting up a claim thereto must be able to show an express grant by an act of the legislature; and that the title to the soil under such streams was not intended to be secured by individuals under our general land laws. With these definitions and principles in view, we proceed to inquire if the facts disclosed in this record establish that Reelfoot Lake is a navigable body of water in the legal sense, as held by the chancellor. The following diagram is shown to be an accurate representation of the shape of the lake, its banks, boundaries, tributaries, etc., and will serve to illustrate the bearing of the facts established by the evidence:

(Image Omitted)

The origin, history, and description of the lake is given in the following extract, which we take from the very able and learned opinion of Judge W. H. Swiggart, viz.:

"The proof shows that Reelfoot Lake is a large body of water, lying in the northwest corner of the state of Tennessee,

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