Webster v. Heineken, U.S.A., Inc., CIVIL NO. 00-4057 (JBS) (D. N.J. 5/11/2001)
| Decision Date | 11 May 2001 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 00-4057 (JBS). |
| Parties | ROBERT WEBSTER, Plaintiff, v. HEINEKEN, U.S.A., Inc., Defendant, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Louis M. Barbone, Esquire, JACOBS & BARBONE, P.A., Atlantic City, New Jersey, Counsel for Plaintiff.
Gerald F. Spada, Esquire, EPSTEIN BECKER & GREEN, P.C., Newark, New Jersey, Counsel for Defendant.
In this wrongful discharge case, plaintiff Robert Webster brings suit against his former employer, Heineken, U.S.A., Inc., alleging that his rights under the Federal Family & Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (Count One), the New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11B-1, et seq. (Count Two), the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (Count Three), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq. ("NJLAD"), were violated when plaintiff was discharged from his employment with Heineken in September, 1999. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement of his position and benefits, and interest, fees, and costs related to this suit. Presently before the Court are defendant's motions to dismiss plaintiff's New Jersey Claims (Counts Two and Four) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and defendant's motion to transfer the action to the Southern District of New York, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
The following facts, unless otherwise indicated, are undisputed. Plaintiff Robert Webster ("Webster") is a New Jersey resident, living at 324 Evergreen Avenue, Villas, Cape May County, New Jersey. (Compl. at 1.) Defendant Heineken, U.S.A., Inc. ("Heineken") is a producer and supplier of beer and is incorporated under the laws of the State of New York and has its principal place of business in White Plains, New York. (Compl., ¶ 2; Def.'s Br. at 3.) Heineken regularly does business in New Jersey and maintains offices in the state. In 1994, plaintiff Webster was hired to work as a level one District Manager for defendant in Heineken's Rutherford, New Jersey office. While at the Rutherford office, plaintiff was promoted to the position of District Manager, Level Two. (Compl., ¶ 1; Def.'s Reply Br. at 2.) In 1997, plaintiff was promoted to Metro Off-Premise Division Manager, which required him to service customer wholesalers throughout metropolitan New York, and was transferred to Heineken's White Plains, New York office. (Def.'s Reply Br. at 2; Pl.'s Initial Disclosure Statement, ¶ 1.)
Plaintiff, a recovering alcoholic, advised Heineken of his affliction and ongoing treatment in 1994, upon his initial employment with the company. (Compl., ¶ 3.) No claims were made by either party that plaintiff's affliction caused any work-related problems, or any improper employer action, prior to 1997 while plaintiff worked in the defendant's New Jersey office.1 In the summer of 1998, after working for at least a year in defendant's White Plains, New York office, plaintiff suffered a relapse of his alcoholism, which he immediately reported to his supervisor, Theodore Muro ("Muro"). (Compl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff alleged that he did not abuse his personal or sick time during the recovery period following this initial relapse. (Compl., ¶ 4.) In September, 1999, while still working in New York, plaintiff suffered another relapse and immediately reported to his physician. (Compl., ¶ 5.) The physician ordered plaintiff to refrain from working and initiated a course of treatment and medication. (Id.) Plaintiff advised Muro, via a recorded voice-mail message, that he was ill and under the care of a doctor, and that he would be out of work for a week. (Id.)
With the approval of his physician, plaintiff began intensive outpatient treatment and returned to work at the White Plains office later in September of 1999. (Compl. at ¶ 6.) At some time after his return to work after his second relapse, plaintiff left work and presented himself in an Emergency Room for treatment of unspecified physical symptoms related to his alcoholism. (Id.) Upon his return to the White Plains office later that same day, plaintiff was terminated and, according to him, given no reason for the termination. (Id. )
A. Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) Motions
Defendant first moves to dismiss counts II and IV of plaintiff's complaint for failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., because the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred in New York and, they argue, the New Jersey statutes do not apply. Plaintiff argues that because he resides in New Jersey, he is entitled to seek protection under New Jersey employment laws, and that he has adequately stated a claim for wrongful termination under New Jersey law.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted must be denied "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A district court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint and any and all reasonable inferences derived from those allegations. Schanzer v. Rutgers Univ., 934 F. Supp. 669, 673 (D.N.J. 1996)(citing Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1987)); Unger v. National Residents Corp. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 761 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (D.N.J. 1991). In addition to the Complaint, the court may also consider authenticated documents appended to the submissions of the parties. Schanzer, 934 F. Supp. at 671 n.1 (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1357, at 299 (2d ed. 1990)). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead evidence, and it is not necessary to plead the facts that serve as the basis for the claim. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977); In re Midlantic Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 758 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.N.J. 1990). The question before the Court is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether he can prove any set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). "Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set forth an intricately detailed description of the asserted basis for relief, they do require that the pleadings give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150 n.3 (1984) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Therefore, in deciding a motion to dismiss, a court should look to the face of the complaint and decide whether, taking all of the allegations of fact as true and construing them in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, plaintiff's allegations state a cognizable legal claim. Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d at 103.
Counts II and IV of Webster's complaint are based on New Jersey Statutory law, namely, the New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11B-1, et seq. ("NJFLA") and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq. ("NJLAD"). Defendant argues that New York law applies and that these counts must be dismissed because plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff argues that New Jersey law should apply because New Jersey has an interest in protecting its citizens against discrimination.
As a federal court sitting in diversity on these counts, this Court must apply the law of the state in which it sits, including the choice of law rules of the forum state. See Ruccolo v. BDP, Int'l, Inc., 1996 WL 735575, * 5, 3 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 941 (D.N.J. 1996)(citing Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)). This court must, therefore, look to the New Jersey choice of law rules to determine whether a New Jersey court would apply the law of New Jersey or New York to this employment relationship between a New York employer and a New Jersey resident, where all of the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred at defendant's headquarters in White Plains, New York.
New Jersey courts have adopted a flexible governmental interest analysis to determine choice of law issues. See Ruccolo, 1996 WL 735575, *5 (citing Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 247-48 (1986); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226 (1967); Haggerty v. Cedeno, 267 N.J. Super. 114, 116 (Law Div. 1993), aff'd, 279 N.J. Super. 607 (App. Div. 1993), certification denied, 141 N.J. 98 (1995)). Under this analysis, a court must first decide whether there is a conflict in the laws of the interested states and, if so, the court must then consider the governmental policies underlying the laws and how the policies are affected by each state's contacts to the litigation. Id. at 248. As the Second Circuit has written, "[a]lthough New Jersey recognizes a cause of action for the wrongful discharge of an at-will employee, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980), New York does not, Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983)." Shamley v. ITT Corp., 869 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1989)( that New York, not New Jersey, law applies to a claim brought by a New Jersey resident against a New York employer); see also Buccilli v. Timby, Brown & Timby, 283 N.J. Super. 6, 10 (App. Div. 1995)(citing Shamley with approval and holding that the damage claim of a New Jersey resident for her allegedly wrongful dismissal from out-of-state employment is governed by the law of the state in which she was employed). Plaintiff himself concedes that there is a conflict between New York and New Jersey law on the relevant issue, noting that the State of New...
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