Wechsler v. Novak

• Decision Date: 12 July 1946
• Citation: 157 Fla. 703,26 So.2d 884
• Parties: WECHSLER v. NOVAK et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

26 So.2d 884

157 Fla. 703

WECHSLER v. NOVAK et al.

Florida Supreme Court

July 12, 1946

Rehearing Denied July 31, 1946.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; George E. Holt judge.

J. Lewis Hall, of Tallahassee, and George Schwartz, of Miami, for appellant.

Harold Kassewitz, of Miami, for Ben Novak and Bella Novak, his wife.

Bernstein & Hodsdon, of Miami, for Charles Cohen and Frances Cohen.

Shutts Bowen, Simmons, Prevatt & Julian, of Miami, for Don Levinson and Ethel Levinson, his wife.

CHAPMAN, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff below in his declaration alleged, in part, that on or about June 15, 1943, the defendants were engaged in operating the Atlantis Hotel at Miami Beach, Florida, and the hotel at the time was leased to the United States Army and the defendants were desirous of having the hotel returned to civilian use that on the 20th day of June, 1943, the defendants employed the plaintiff to obtain information and assist in securing the return of the hotel to civilian use; the defendants promised and agreed in consideration of the services to be performed and money spent and subsequent services to be performed in the event the Atlantis Hotel was returned to civilian use that they would pay the plaintiff the sum of $10,000.

The sum of $5,000 would be paid on December 15, 1943, provided said hotel was returned for civilian use on or before December 15, 1943, and the remaining $5,000 was to be paid on or before January 15 1944, plus a bonus equal to 10% of all the gross profits resulting from the operation of the hotel from the date the hotel would be opened and returned for business until January 1, 1945, or in the event the hotel was sold prior to January 1, 1945, the plaintiff was to receive 10% of the gross profits of the sale in addition to the 10% of the gross profits accruing prior to the sale of the Atlantis Hotel.

The plaintiff rendered certain services to the defendants at their request. He appeared before the United States Army Real Estate Board in Washington, D. C., on dates viz.: June 27, 1943; July 11, 1943; September 5, 1943, and October 4, 1943; and assisted the defendants in securing information as to the possibilities of having the hotel released from the Army; the plaintiff reported to the defendants what had transpired at the respective hearings before the United States Army Real Estate Board and the total amount of his expenditures incident to the return of the hotel to the defendants approximated $3,500, and this expenditure was made in accordance with the terms of his contract of employment with the defendants. On November 12, 1943, plaintiff notified defendants that the hotel would be returned to civilian use and they would receive within a few days an official notice thereof through the proper authorities of the United States Army.

The plaintiff had performed and complied with all the terms and conditions of the contract of employment existing between them and as a result of plaintiff's efforts the Atlantis Hotel on or about December 12, 1943, was returned to the defendants, yet the defendants refused and failed to pay the plaintiff the sum of $50,000 cash. The common counts were viz.: for work done and materials furnished at defendants' request; and for money found to be due on accounts stated between them in the total sum of $50,000. A bill of particulars in the total sum of $50,000 by appropriate words was made a part of the declaration.

The several defendants by their respective attorneys filed separate demurrers to the declaration and some of the grounds are common to each demurrer, viz.: (1) the declaration fails to state a cause of action; (2) the original contract sued upon is so vague, indefinite and uncertain that it is incapable of enforcement; (3) the original contract sued upon is contrary to public policy, illegal and void in that the plaintiff was therein seeking compensation for exerting influence upon pulic officials of the United States Government; (4) it is not shown that the plaintiff performed any services for which he was entitled to be paid; (5) it is impossible to determine the exact services rendered by the plaintiff for which he seeks compensation; (6) it appears from the allegations of the declaration that the compensation plaintiff was to receive for the services rendered was and is contrary to public policy. Final judgment on demurrers for the defendants below was entered and plaintiff appealed.

Counsel for appellant pose for adjudication here the question, viz.: Where it appears that the plaintiff was employed to assist in the procurement of the release from Army occupation of a hotel and the plaintiff had rendered services and had expended money in his efforts therefor and the defendants orally agreed, in consideration of the services rendered and to be rendered, in the event the hotel was returned, that they would pay to the plaintiff the sum of $10,000 in cash, for the services therefor, is such a contract contrary to public policy and void?

Counsel for appellees contend that the question presented here is viz.: Is an alleged contract entered into in June, 1943, (during the middle of World War II) to procure for a contingent compensation the release from the United States Army and the return to the owner of a hotel at Miami Beach occupied by soldiers, illegal and void as a contract contrary to public policy?

The early case of Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45, 69 U.S. 45, 17 L.Ed. 868, involved a contract entered into between the Secretary of War and the tool company providing for the delivery of 25,000 muskets of a specified pattern for $20 each, and the muskets were to be delivered by a certain date. The contract was obtained through the exertions of Norris with an agent of the tool company, and it was agreed that if Norris would obtain the contract from the War Department then he (Norris) would receive stipulated compensation to be paid to him by the tool company. Norris brought suit and the court held that he could not recover because his contract was against public policy and therefore invalid. It was said, 'Agreements for compensation contingent upon success, suggest the use of sinister and corrupt means for the accomplishment of the ends desired. The law meets the suggested evil and strikes down the contract from its inception. There is no difference in principle between agreements to procure favors from legislative bodies and agreements to procure favors in the shape of contracts from the heads of departments.'

The case of Trist (Burke) v. Child, 21 Wall. 441, 88 U.S. 441 22 L.Ed. 623, involved a claim of Trist against the Federal Government for services rendered touching the treaty of Guadelupe Hidalgo and he entered into an agreement with Child to the effect that Child would take over the claim and prosecute it before Congress and the compensation for his services would be 25% of such sum as Congress might allow in payment of the claim. Congress appropriated the sum of $14,559 to pay the claim. Trist died and Child brought suit to collect the 25% of the sum appropriated. The Court, in holding that the contract was contrary to public policy and therefore void, in part, said: '* * * The theory of our government is, that all public stations are trusts, and that those clothed with them are to be animated in the discharge of their duties solely by considerations of right, justice, and the public...