Wedgewood Care Ctr., Inc. v. Kravitz
| Decision Date | 18 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Index No. 5545/14,2017–12681 |
| Parties | WEDGEWOOD CARE CENTER, INC., etc., respondent, v. Eric KRAVITZ, appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
198 A.D.3d 124
154 N.Y.S.3d 312
WEDGEWOOD CARE CENTER, INC., etc., respondent,
v.
Eric KRAVITZ, appellant.
2017–12681
Index No. 5545/14
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Submitted—January 5, 2021
August 18, 2021
Blau Leonard Law Group, LLC, Huntington, N.Y. (Steven Bennett Blau of counsel), for appellant.
Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrara, Wolf & Carone, LLP, Lake Success, N.Y. (Jeffrey R. Neuman of counsel), for respondent.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
OPINION & ORDER
MILLER, J.
Under state and federal law, a nursing facility is prohibited from requiring a third party to guarantee the payment of a resident as a condition of the resident's admission to the facility. As this case illustrates, however, a nursing facility is permitted to require a third party to undertake other kinds of contractual obligations, and a nursing facility may recover damages that were proximately caused by a failure of the third party to fulfil those obligations. Where it is alleged that a variety of different contractual obligations have been breached, each such theory of liability must be proved, defended, and analyzed independently. Where an admissions agreement containing pages of third-party obligations is both a requirement for admission and aggressively enforced, the fine legal distinctions between an unlawful third party guarantee and a lawful agreement laden with additional affirmative obligations may have little practical significance for the third party. This is especially true where, as here, the nursing facility's litigation is directed solely at the third party, and recovery is not sought from the estate of the actual resident of the nursing facility. For the reasons that follow, we modify the order appealed from, and remit the matter for further proceedings in accordance herewith.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff is a private corporation that is engaged in the business of providing room, board, and skilled nursing home care services. It is undisputed that the plaintiff provided room, board, and skilled nursing care services to Beatrice Kravitz (hereinafter the deceased resident) beginning on November 14, 2011, until the time of her death on January 7, 2013. The plaintiff asserts that "a balance" for these services in the amount of $49,061.11 remains due and owing to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff commenced this action against the deceased resident's son—the defendant, Eric Kravitz. The complaint asserted one cause of action, sounding in breach of contract.
The complaint alleged that on November 14, 2011, the defendant signed an admission agreement (hereinafter the admission agreement), pursuant to which he undertook an affirmative contractual duty to perform nine separate types of independent acts for the benefit of the plaintiff. The complaint alleged that "[t]he defendant failed to comply with ... his obligations under the [admission agreement],"
and that "by reason of the defendant's default, ... [the plaintiff] has suffered damages in the sum of $49,061.11." The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was personally liable for the entire outstanding sum. Neither the deceased resident nor her estate was named as a party to the action. The complaint did not allege that the plaintiff had made any claim to the estate of the deceased resident for the balance that was allegedly due.
The defendant interposed an answer which set forth nine affirmative defenses. The eighth affirmative defense alleged that the "[p]laintiff is barred from maintaining its causes of action pursuant to the Nursing Home Reform Act, 42 USC § 1296r [sic], and federal and state regulations."
The defendant also asserted a counterclaim against the plaintiff to recover compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to General Business Law § 349. In this regard, the defendant contended that the plaintiff, in "this and other similar lawsuits," had engaged in "deceptive business practices" that were directed at New York consumers and which involved the collection of debts.
The plaintiff subsequently moved for summary judgment on the complaint and for the entry of a judgment in the principal sum of $49,061.11, plus interest from November 14, 2011—the date that the defendant allegedly entered into the admission agreement. The plaintiff's motion papers did not specifically seek dismissal of the defendant's affirmative defenses or address his counterclaim.
As relevant here, the plaintiff contended that the defendant breached the admission agreement in three ways: (1) by having access to the deceased resident's assets and failing to use those assets to pay the plaintiff; (2) by failing to adequately respond to the plaintiff's request for documents; and (3) by failing to fully administer his mother's estate. The plaintiff asserted, in essence, that its evidentiary submissions eliminated all triable issues of fact in this action and that the defendant was personally liable for the total outstanding balance owed by the deceased resident.
The defendant opposed the plaintiff's motion, and separately moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, the defendant asserted that it was conclusory and failed to adequately specify the contractual obligation that he allegedly breached or the manner in which the breach occurred. The defendant contended that the complaint was "legally defective and should be dismissed as a matter of law."
The defendant alternatively argued that he was entitled to summary judgment because his evidentiary submissions demonstrated that he did not possess legal access or control over the deceased resident's assets, and that, in any event, the deceased resident did not have any available assets within the meaning of Nursing Home Reform Act. The defendant similarly contended that he did not have access or control over the deceased resident's documents, and that, in any event, the record demonstrated that any failure to provide documentation was not a proximate cause of the damages sought by the plaintiff.
In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court determined that "[t]he admission agreement required ... that [the defendant] provide the plaintiff with all relevant information and documentation regarding all potential third-party payers, and that [the defendant] timely apply and meet the requirements of third-party payers, including Medicaid." The court continued: "The admission agreement also provided that the defendant could be held personally liable if any act or omissions on his part caused or contributed to the nonpayment of the plaintiff's fees."
The Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff demonstrated, prima facie, its "entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law on the breach of the contract between the parties." In this regard, the court stated that the plaintiff "established, as a matter of law, that [the defendant] breached his obligations under the admission agreement by failing to provide requested information and documentation concerning the finances of [the deceased resident]." Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the complaint, and denied the
defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
The Supreme Court did not specifically address the alternative theories of liability articulated in the plaintiff's motion papers, or analyze that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The order stated that the arguments which were "not specifically addressed [were] denied."
II. Legal Analysis
The defendant appeals. On appeal, the defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment, and that the court should have granted his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, either because the complaint failed to state a cause of action, or because he affirmatively demonstrated his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
The plaintiff contends in response that the complaint states a valid cause of action, and that the Supreme Court properly granted its motion for summary judgment on the complaint.
A. Failure to State a Cause of Action
The defendant contends that the complaint failed to provide him with adequate notice of the specific acts or omissions that allegedly constituted a breach of the admission agreement. The defendant also contends, for the first time on appeal, that the deceased resident's estate is an indispensable party to this action, and that the complaint should be dismissed on this alternative ground.
1. Specificity
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause...
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