Wedgewood Ltd. Partnership v. Liberty Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2010 Ohio 2068 (Ohio App. 4/28/2010), 09 CAH 07 0064.
| Decision Date | 28 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09 CAH 07 0064.,09 CAH 07 0064. |
| Citation | 2010 Ohio 2068 |
| Parties | Wedgewood Limited Partnership I, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Liberty Township Board of Zoning Appeals, et al., Appellees/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Bruce L. Ingram, Joseph R. Miller, 52 East Gay Street, P. O. Box 1008, Columbus, Ohio 43216-1008, Craig B. Paynter, 65 East State Street, Suite 1000, Columbus, Ohio 43215, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
William L. Loveland, 50 West Broad Street, Suite 3300, Columbus, Ohio 43215-5917, Michael W. Currie, 41 South High Street, Suite 1700, Columbus, Ohio 43215-6101, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Before: W. Scott Gwin, P.J., John W. Wise, J., Patricia A. Delaney, J.
{¶1} Appellant/Cross-Appellee Wedgewood Limited Partnership I appeals the decision of the Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County, which dismissed an administrative zoning appeal brought by appellant regarding a retail superstore project. The Appellees and Cross-Appellants herein are Liberty Township (Delaware County), the Liberty Township Board of Trustees, the Liberty Township Zoning Inspector, and the Liberty Township Board of Zoning Appeals ("BZA"). The relevant facts leading to this appeal are as follows.
{¶2} In November 1991, the Liberty Township Board of Trustees adopted a resolution approving the rezoning of 345 acres of land from farm residential to a "Planned Commercial District." At the same time, the trustees approved and adopted regulations applicable to the newly zoned Wedgewood Commerce Center. These regulations were filed in February 1992.
{¶3} The Wedgewood Commerce Center Development Standards divide the Planned Commercial District into 17 separate subareas within the Wedgewood Commerce Center, of which Subareas 3, 8, and 9 are designated for commercial use.
{¶4} The "Subarea Development Criteria" for subarea 3 provides that the gross building area for that subarea is 220,857 square feet. In turn, the Subarea Development Criteria for subarea 8 states that the gross building area for that subarea is 144,553 square feet, while the criteria for subarea 9 provides that the gross building area for that subarea is 134,520 square feet. Thus, the combined total gross commercial building area is 500,000 square feet. Following the adoption of the development plan for the Planned Commercial District, Liberty Township issued zoning certificates allowing commercial use in subareas that were designated for "suburban office" use rather than for commercial use.
{¶5} Subarea 3 of the Wedgewood Commerce Center, which was platted in 1994 as lot 2069 and comprises approximately 34 acres, has been owned by appellant since 1991. In October 2003, appellant submitted an application for certain variances from the Liberty Township Zoning Resolution in order to construct a Wal-Mart Super Center on lot 2069, but later withdrew its application.
{¶6} On January 19, 2004, the Liberty Township Board of Trustees issued a "Public Statement and Instructions to Zoning Department Regarding Future Administration of Wedgewood Commerce Center Development Plan." In that document, the trustees interpreted the development plan as imposing a "floating" maximum of 500,000 square feet of commercial development in the Wedgewood Commerce Center.
{¶7} The trustees, in the aforementioned public statement, further concluded that "the negotiated plan required an architectural review (design review) board and process which, in our view, has not been considered or operated as contemplated."
{¶8} In June 2004, Charles Ruma, on behalf of appellant, filed two applications for zoning permits concerning Lot 2069 in the Wedgewood Commerce Center, Liberty Township. One application sought approval for a Wal-Mart superstore, approximately 220,000 square feet in size. The other application sought approval for a Murphy Oil gas station, including a 243 square feet building.
{¶9} On September 30, 2004, the Liberty Township Zoning Inspector denied both of Ruma's applications.
{¶10} On October 20, 2004, appellant filed a notice of appeal to the BZA from the zoning inspector's denial. Appellant therein alleged that the zoning inspector had acted improperly in determining that the development plan for Wedgewood Commerce Center was incomplete and in determining that the proposed construction would exceed the maximum square foot limitations. Appellant also alleged that the zoning inspector was incorrect in holding that a zoning certificate could not be issued because there was no approval by the architectural review board and in finding that the application was incomplete.
{¶11} A public hearing was held on November 16, 2004. On January 11, 2005, the Board of Zoning Appeals adopted a document titled "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" that affirmed the decision of the zoning inspector.
{¶12} Subsequently, on February 8, 2005, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the BZA's decision with the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, pursuant to R.C. 2506.01. The parties filed briefs in the trial court, and a hearing was held on July 18, 2005.
{¶13} Appellant filed an administrative appeal to the trial court under R.C. Section 2506. On September 22, 2005, the court remanded the case to the BZA for further review and findings.
{¶14} Appellant appealed to this Court from the September 22, 2005 decision. Upon review, we found that said decision was not a final, appealable order. We thus dismissed appellant's appeal to this Court. See Wedgewood Limited Partnership I v. Liberty Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 169 Ohio App.3d 840, 2007-Ohio-62.
{¶15} The BZA thereupon conducted ten evidentiary hearings between September 11, 2007 and June 24, 2008.
{¶16} In the meantime, on September 25, 2008, in a related action in federal court, the United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio, issued a ruling that the 500,000 "floating cap" on commercial square footage referenced above would be enjoined from enforcement. See Wedgewood Ltd. Partnership I v. Township of Liberty, Ohio (S.D. Ohio 2008), 578 F.Supp.2d 941.
{¶17} The BZA, on October 21, 2008, issued a ruling with findings of fact and conclusions of law which affirmed the zoning inspector's denial of the zoning certificate. The BZA further specifically found that Wal-Mart had abandoned its plan to build the superstore and that Wal-Mart's contract with appellant had expired.
{¶18} On November 19, 2008, appellant again filed an appeal to the trial court under R.C. Section 2506.
{¶19} On June 11, 2009, the trial court found the issues in the administrative appeal to be moot and therefore dismissed said appeal. On July 9, 2009, appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court. It herein raises the following sole Assignment of Error:
{¶20}
I.
{¶21} In its sole Assignment of Error, appellant contends the trial court erred in dismissing its Chapter 2506 administrative appeal on grounds of mootness. We disagree.
{¶22} As an appellate court, our standard of review to be applied in an R.C. 2506.04 appeal is somewhat limited in scope. See Kisil v. Sandusky (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34, 12 OBR 26, 465 N.E.2d 848. "This statute grants a more limited power to the court of appeals to review the judgment of the common pleas court only on `questions of law,' which does not include the same extensive power to weigh `the preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence,' as is granted to the common pleas court." Id. at f.n. 4. See, also, Health Management, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals (1997), 118 Ohio App.3d 281, 285. Generally, the issue of mootness is a question of law; an appellate court therefore reviews a trial court's decision finding a matter moot under the de novo standard of review. Harris v. Akron, Summit App.No. 24499, 2009-Ohio-3865, ¶ 6 (additional citations omitted).
{¶23} We have frequently recognized that an appellate court is not required to render an advisory opinion on a moot question or abstract proposition. See, e.g., Moton v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (Dec. 17, 2001), Richland App.No. 01CA4, 2001-Ohio-7041. Unless required to do so by statute or directive by a higher court, we find no reason this principle would not apply to a common pleas court hearing an administrative appeal. Indeed, in the case of Springtime Co. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals (June 11, 1996), Licking App.No. 96-CA-31,1996 WL 363812, a case which originated as a zoning dispute over a planned service station, we concluded: (Emphasis added). We thus held that the appeal was moot at the time it was considered by the trial court, and overruled all of the assigned errors without further analysis. Id.
{¶24} Appellant first contends that the denial of a zoning certificate does not necessarily kill the controversy between the property owner and the BZA simply because a third-party contract to buy the property has lapsed, particularly where the protracted dispute between the property owner and the township has allegedly "caused" the lapse. However, as aptly recognized by the Tenth District Court of Appeals, "`[a] moot case is one which seeks to get a judgment on a pretended controversy, when in reality there is none, *** or a judgment upon some matter which, when rendered, for any reason...
To continue reading
Request your trial