Weed v. Scofield

• Decision Date: 08 May 1901
• Citation: 73 Conn. 670,49 A. 22
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WEED et al. v. SCOFIELD et al.

49 A. 22

73 Conn. 670

WEED et al.

v. SCOFIELD et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 8, 1901.

Case reserved from superior court, Fairfield county; Silas A. Robinson, Judge.

Action by Albert G. Weed and another, as executors of the will of John P. Hamilton, deceased, and as trustees of Ann Morris and Nathaniel H. Weed, against Selina E. Scofield and others, for the construction of certain provisions in the will of John P. Hamilton, deceased. On questions reserved for the advice of the supreme court of errors.

The provisions in question were as follows: "After all my just debts, including my funeral expenses, are fully paid and discharged after my decease, I give and bequeath to the several individuals and religious and benevolent societies and institutions hereinafter named the several sums or amounts named to each of them, as follows, viz.: (1) I give and bequeath to the Greenwood Cemetery, in the city of Brooklyn, New York, the sum of five hundred (500) dollars, in trust (in addition to what I have already given), the interest of the same to be applied to the care, preservation, and repairs of the grounds, fences, monuments, etc., on my lot (No. 1,520) in said cemetery, which lot was conveyed to me by the said Greenwood Cemetery by deed bearing date the 22d of October, 1846, to have and to hold the said lot of land to the said the Greenwood Cemetery and its successors for the purposes mentioned in the third section of the act of the legislature of the state of New York entitled 'An act to amend "An act to incorporate the Greenwood Cemetery," passed April 18th, 18:38,' passed April 5th, 1850. And I hereby designate and prescribe, pursuant to the said act, that the remains of Ann Morris be interred in the front corner of said lot, and the remains of myself by the side of my deceased wife, and that interments in said lot be restricted to the persons so designated, and that said lot of land shall be hereafter inalienable. (2) I hereby order and direct my executors hereinafter named to place an amount at interest sufficient to provide an annual interest or income of six hundred (600) dollars; the said interest to be applied to the support of Ann Morris during her natural life; the same to be paid monthly or quarterly, as may seem to them best,—and also, after her decease, to pay her funeral expenses; and if, by unusual or prolonged disability or illness, the said sum should not be sufficient, then they may add such a reasonable amount as may seem to them to be absolutely necessary. (3) I hereby further order and direct that my executors shall place an additional amount at interest, sufficient to provide an annual interest or income of four hundred (400) dollars; the said interest to be applied to the support of Nathaniel H. Weed during his natural life; the same to be paid in monthly or quarterly payments, as may seem to them best,—and after his decease to pay his funeral expenses." Other bequests followed of specified sums of money to sundry individuals and to sundry religious and benevolent societies and Institutions, amounting in all to $66,000. One of these was to the Institution for the Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled in the City of New York. Small specific bequests of sundry articles of household or personal use or ornament were then made to several of the individuals before named as general legatees, after which came these clauses: "But if it shall appear after my decease that there cannot be realized a sufficient amount, after paying all the individual legacies, to pay the full amounts of the sums named to each of the religious and benevolent societies and Institutions hereinbefore named, then there shall be deducted from each of the said societies and institutions an amount pro rata, or according to the several amounts so named to each one of them. But, if it shall be found that there will be an excess of the amount required, then there shall be added to the amounts or sums to be paid to all the said Individuals, societies, and institutions an amount pro rata, or in proportion to the amount or sums so given to each." A full power of sale was given to the executors. At the date of said will the testator was familiar with the character and value of his property, which consisted of real and personal estate worth about $95,000, $20,000 of which was realty. Said estate remained substantially the same, in character and value, to the time of the testator's death. An administration account of the executors was duly filed, and allowed by the court of probate, in which they charged themselves with assets (including said real estate) to the amount of $101,900, credited themselves with having discharged in full all the legacies to individuals and that to Greenwood Cemetery, and showed a balance on hand a little more than sufficient to satisfy all the other legacies. In this account $18,000 was credited as "estate bequeathed to executors to provide an annual income of $600 for support of Ann Morris, and such additional Income as may be necessary for her support and for payment of her funeral expenses, as provided by second clause of will," and $10,000 as set apart for the legacy in favor of Nathaniel H. Weed. The latter died shortly after the testator. There is no institution or corporation in the city of New York known as "The Institution for the Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled in the City of New York," but there is a corporation there named "The New York Society for the Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled." It was agreed by all parties that this was the Institution which the testator Intended to designate. The heirs at law of the testator were first cousins of the half blood. All but one of them were given legacies in the will.

Edwin L. Scofield, for plaintiffs.

Roger Welles, for defendant American Bible Soc.

Philip P. Wells, for defendant American Seamen's Friend Soc.

Nathaniel R. Hart, for defendants Ann Morris and others. Samuel Young, for defendant American Tract Soc.

Clarence E. Bacon, for defendant Connecticut Industrial School for Girls.

Goodwin Stoddard and Arthur M. Marsh, for defendant heirs at law.

BALDWIN, J. (after stating the facts).

It was the testator's intent that his bequests to Individuals should be first discharged, and then that, if his remaining estate should prove insufficient to satisfy all his charitable bequests, these should abate pro rata, but that, if it should prove more than sufficient to satisfy them, the excess should be applied to increase pro rata the amounts to be paid to all those receiving pecuniary legacies. It is argued in behalf of the heirs that in making these provisions he had in view only the amount to be "realized" by turning his estate into money, as compared with the aggregate amount of all his pecuniary legacies, and so that he has made no direction, as respects the principal set apart for the Morris and Weed trust funds, for its disposition after the expiration of the life estates. To support this position they urge that an heir is not to be cut off by implication, unless it be a necessary one, resting on so strong a probability that an intention to the contrary cannot be supposed. Every will is in derogation of what otherwise would be the right of inheritance. If a devise to the heir at law give him no more than he would have without it, it is treated as of no effect, and he takes by descent Ellis v. Page, 7 Cush. 161. If it does give him more, he inherits so much the less. He can be excluded from any share of the estate if the testator so wishes and provides, and whether such a provision be effectual or not must always depend primarily on the reasonable meaning of the language used. The proposition asserted to be a rule of law governing the case at bar has received the countenance of leading writers on the subject of wills. 2 Jarm. Wills, *1654; Pow. Dev. 411. See, also, 1 Bl. Comm. 450. It embodies expressions which have been used by great judges in the decision of cases. But nevertheless it is, in the form stated, unsound and misleading. The germ of this doctrine is to be found in an English case decided in 1633, in which it was held that the heir was not to be disinherited by ambiguous and doubtful provisions. Spirt v. Bence, 4 Croke (Car. I.) 369. Chief Justice...