Weeks v. Bridgman
| Decision Date | 05 August 1889 |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
| Parties | CHARLES A. WEEKS <I>vs.</I> COLEMAN BRIDGMAN. |
Oscar Taylor and Lusk & Bunn, for appellant.
M. D. Grover and S. L. Campbell, for respondent.
This is an action under the statute to determine adverse claims to vacant and unoccupied real estate. Both parties claim title, — the plaintiff through the congressional land grant to the territory of Minnesota, March 3, 1857, (11 St. at Large, p. 195,) to aid in the construction of certain railroads; the defendant through one Brott, who is claimed to have made a pre-emption entry of the land prior to the definite location of the road in aid of which the grant of 1857 was made, having the effect to except the land from the operation of that grant. The land was certified to the state by the secretary of the interior in October, 1864, as a part of the grant inuring to it under the act of 1857, and the plaintiff has acquired, whatever title or interest the state had under that congressional grant. In 1871, pursuant to the provisions of an act of congress passed for the relief of Brott in 1860, the same land was patented by the United States to him, and this defendant has whatever title or interest Brott acquired thereby.
We will state somewhat more particularly the facts upon which these conflicting claims of title rest: The land is part of an odd-numbered section, (13,) and is within the six-mile limit of the line of road, as definitely located, in aid of which the grant of 1857 was made, and the title passed to the state unless Brott's pre-emption claim had the effect of excepting this land from the operation of the grant. The line of the railroad — the branch line, extending from St. Anthony to St. Cloud, of the St. Paul & Pacific (the successor of the Minnesota & Pacific) Railroad — was definitely located by the filing of the map of location in the proper department at Washington, December 30, 1857. By an act of congress of March 3, 1855, (10 St. at Large, p. 683,) entitled "An act making appropriations for the service of the post-office department during the fiscal year," etc., it was enacted (§ 1) that "each contractor engaged, or to be engaged, in carrying mails through any of the territories west of the Mississippi, shall have the privilege of occupying stations at the rate of not more than one for every 20 miles of the route on which he carries a mail, and shall have a pre-emptive right therein, when the same shall be brought into market, to the extent of 640 acres to be taken contiguously, and to include his improvement." In September, 1855, Brott entered into a contract with the government to carry the mail from Minneapolis to St. Cloud, from December, 1855, to June, 1858; and he did carry the mail in accordance with that contract. August 11, 1857, Brott filed in the local land-office his application to enter certain described land, embracing that now in controversy, under the act of 1855, above referred to, alleging his settlement upon and improvement of the land as a mail station in January, 1856. The court finds, upon sufficient evidence presented in this case, that Brott did so occupy and improve the land. This application was rejected by the local land-officers, and upon appeal to the commissioner of the general land-office their decision was affirmed, for the reason, as the record evidence discloses, that the mail route covered by Brott's contract was deemed not to be a link in nor part of a connected route from the line of the states west of the Mississippi river to the Pacific ocean, and hence, as was supposed, not such a route as the act of 1855 contemplated. Brott appealed to the secretary of the interior. That officer, in August, 1861, reversed the rulings of the land-officers, and of the commissioner of the general land-office. It was decided that the route was within the terms of the act of 1855, and that Brott's contract entitled him to pre-empt the stations occupied, upon compliance with the provisions of the law, and that he should therefore be permitted to enter the lands mentioned in his application, with certain exceptions not necessary to be referred to, upon proof of the performance of his contract and of the occupation of the station, and upon compliance with the laws and regulations applicable to the case. Before Brott's appeal was thus finally decided, on May 26, 1860, congress passed an act for the relief of Brott, declaring that he should be allowed to enter the land in question upon payment of the usual minimum price. Brott is found by the courts to have made no further effort to enter the land simply as a mail contractor, but it is found that he did enter the same under the act for his relief above referred to, paid for the same, and in 1871 patent was issued to him, as before stated; it being recited in the patent that the land had previously been erroneously certified to the state. The court concluded, on these facts and others set forth in the findings, which we do not deem material for the decision of this appeal, that the plaintiff was the owner in fee of this land, and entitled to possession. The defendant appealed from an order refusing a new trial.
The sole issue in this action relates to the legal title. The defendant only opposes to the plaintiff's asserted title a denial, and a claim of title in himself. No facts are pleaded which might entitle the defendant to equitable relief, and the decision of the court below is solely upon the issue as to the legal title. We state, without pausing to comment upon, some propositions which must be regarded as having been established by numerous decisions of the supreme court of the United States. The act of March 3, 1857, was in itself a grant, and effectual as such to transfer the title of lands to which it should be found to be applicable; and the certification, in 1864, was only evidence, not conclusive in its character, that the lands so certified had become vested in the state under the grant. The certification transferred no title. Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, (7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 985;) Minn. Land Co. v. Davis, 40 Minn. 455, (42 N. W. Rep. 299.) We shall hereafter refer again to this certification. Although this grant was made in præsenti, it was only by the definite location of the line of the railroad that it acquired precision and became applicable to particular land, so as to prevent the acquisition of vested rights by pre-emption which would prevail over those asserted under the prior granting act. The laws relating to pre-emption remained operative until the line of location was definitely fixed, even as to lands which might be found to be within the proper limits of the grant. Baker v. Gee, 1 Wall. 333; Leavenworth, etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 92 U. S. 733; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Kansas Pacific Ry. Co., 97 U. S. 491; Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Dunmeyer, 113 U. S. 629 (5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 566;) Winona & St. Peter R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U. S. 618, 626, (5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 606.) Such precision was given to the grant, as to lands lying in place, by the filing of the proper map of definite location of road in the department of the interior. Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 360, (1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336,) and authorities above cited. The act of 1857, after declaring (§ 1) "that there be, and is hereby, granted to...
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