Weems v. Vowell

• Citation: 122 Miss. 342,84 So. 249
• Decision Date: 26 April 1920
• Docket Number: 21098
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Parties: WEEMS v. VOWELL et al

84 So. 249

122 Miss. 342

WEEMS v. VOWELL et al

No. 21098

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 26, 1920

March 1920

APPEAL from the chancery court of Winston county, HON. A. Y WOODWARD, Chancellor.

Suit to enjoin an execution by Mrs. M. E. Weems against certain defendants, in which J. W. Vowell was granted leave to intervene as a party defendant. Decree dissolving the injunction and awarding damages thereon and finding for defendants and entering judgment against complainant and the sureties on her injunction bond, and she appeals. Reversed and decree for plaintiff.

Judgment reversed.

J. A Brantley and Watkins & Watkins, for appellant.

A mere statement of the facts in this case is all that is necessary to justify a reversal of the case. The undisputed proof is that the appellant did not know of the suit of S. C. Weems against Vowell, and never heard of it until the sheriff appeared at her door with an execution against her for damages on the injunction bond The proof is undisputed that Mr. L. H. Hopkins, the attorney for her husband, without her knowledge or consent, or without his knowledge or consent, joined her as complainant in the original bill of complaint filed by S. C. Weems against the appellee. That this was done at the trial of the case at the suggestion of the chancellor; that since she had subsequently acquired the property, she should be made a party to the proceedings. Mr. Hopkins was not her attorney, however, and never obtained her consent or that of her husband that this course might be taken.

The only contention made by counsel for the appellee, as we understand it, is that the appellant is estopped from asserting that she did not know her name had been joined as cocomplainant in the original bill of complaint filed by S. C. Weems. We respectfully submit that there is no element of estoppel in the case. It does appear that subsequent to the filing of the original bill by S. C. Weems, Mrs. Weems, the appellant herein, bought the property under her second deed of trust and held it for several months. There is no proof, however, that she obtained any revenue from the place and even if she did, there is no proof that she knew, or had any kind of notice, that Mr. S. C. Weems had obtained an injunction restraining Mr. Vowell from proceeding with the first deed of trust held upon the property in question.

It is essential that before a party can be estopped by conduct, his or her acts must have been had and done with full knowledge of the facts. Thomas v. Romano, 82 Miss. 256; Yazoo Lumber Co. v. Clark, 95 Miss. 244.

It being undisputed that Mrs. Weems had no notice or knowledge of the suit of her husband, and no notice or knowledge of the fact that she was joined as cocomplainant in the cause, she could not be estopped. Again, it is contended by the appellee that she ratified the act of her husband in suing out the injunction, and that she could not take advantage of her lack of consent to becoming a complainant in the cause. We beg to state, however, that there could be no ratification without notice.

In 31 Cyc., at page 1253, the rule is announced as follows: "As a general rule, in order that a ratification of an unauthorized act or transaction of an agent may be valid and binding, it is essential that the principal have full knowledge, at the time of the ratification, of all material facts relative to the unauthorized transaction; and in order to make this rule operative, the principal must know the actual facts and not merely what the agent suppressed or are unknown, there is no ratification, and the principal is at liberty to repudiate his assent and assert his rights in other ways, and it matters not whether the principal's want of knowledge was due to designed or undesigned concealment or wilful representation on the part of the agent or his mere inadvertence, or whether the question arises between the principal and the agent or as to third persons."

But there is still another and further answer to the doctrine of ratification, and that is, that S. C. Weems in suing out the injunction was acting upon his own account. He proceeded upon the theory that he had placed with Vowell, the appellee; a collateral security, in addition to his own note for five hundred dollars, notes of Brazelle and wife held by him; that he had paid his indebtedness to Vowell, and was entitled to have his note extinguished and the collateral returned to him. He was therefore acting for himself and not for his wife, and therefore, there could be no ratification.

In 31 Cyc., page 1251, the rule is announced as follows: "In order that an unauthorized act may be capable of ratification, it is necessary that it should have been performed by one acting as agent on behalf of another as principal. Hence, if an alleged agent does not pretend to assume to be acting for another, but acts solely on his own account, then as to such other, the transaction is neither alios acta, and he cannot make himself a party to it by his ratification of the act; and even where one falsely professes to act as agent, but is actually contracting for himself and in his own name, the alleged principal cannot make himself a party to the contract by ratification. Nor can one person ratify an act done by one assuming to act as agent for another person."

We respectfully submit that the decree of the chancellor was wrong, was utterly unsupported by any kind of testimony, was in contradiction of the undisputed testimony, and that therefore the decree should be reversed and a decree rendered in this court for the appellant.

Robt. B. Mayes and Clayton Potter, for appellee.

The chancery court in trying this case has twice held, as a matter of fact, that the husband, S. C. Weems, was the agent and confidential advisor of Mrs. M. E. Weems, and that she was responsible for his actions. The chancery court twice held that an injunction sued out by the Weems' should be dissolved on the facts. We contend, therefore, that the chancellor's finding of the facts should not be disturbed. The court knew, and this court will know, that Mrs. Weems knew all about this first suit and she knew that her husband had her name inserted, and the court found that he had full authority to do so. S. C. Weems had no interest in the suit. He could not have moved one step without his wife's name being added to it. She was at that time the owner of the property, and the sole one to be benefited by securing the cancellation of Vowell trust deed. If S. C. Weems could have secured the cancellation showing that this trust deed had been paid, it would not have benefited him but would have taken that much burden off the property for his wife; it would have done him no good except through his wife, as she was then the owner of the property. She alone was to be benefited by it for if she got hold of the Vowell trust deed her title stood clear. If the Vowell trust deed was a valid subsisting debt she had to pay the amount of that trust deed before she could clear up her title. Transactions between husband and wife, where the rights of third parties are affected are, and should be, scrutinized closely so as not to permit them to perpetrate a fraud upon the interest of the third parties. The court looked through all the veneer surrounding this transaction.

The decision of the chancellor, is as it ought to have been. This transaction will not stand when an honest light is let in upon it, and the trial court knew this from the facts in the case and so decided it. To permit this transaction would be to permit this husband and wife to perpetrate a fraud on an innocent party by colluding with each other.

Mr. Hopkins, it is true, testified that he was the lawyer in the first suit, and that he had no conversation with Mrs. M. E. Weems about inserting her name as a complainant in the original injunction suit, but Hopkins knew it was not necessary. He knew that the suit he was conducting was really Mrs. Weems' suit; that the husband had no interest in it. He knew that the husband was representing the wife; that he was her agent and he knew that he had full authority to put her name as a party complainant. If the first suit had been successful, Mrs. Weems would never have denied the authority by which her name was placed as complainant.

We respectfully submit that the case should be affirmed.

H. F. Jones, for appellee.

If an agent comes to a knowledge of a fact while acting for the principal, this notice operates as constructive notice to the principal, therefore the agent of M. E. Weems at the sale and purchase on October 23, 1916, having notice of the suit filed involving the land in question, and all that it purported to show is constructive notice to M. E. Weems. Wilcox v. Nouth, 2 S. & M. 476; Ross v. Houston et al., 25 Miss. 591. The notice there should have been sufficient to call upon M. E. Weems for an investigation of the suit, and she would have then found her name in the bill of injunction filed by her husband as set forth.

Whatever, puts a person on inquiry is sufficient notice, where the means of knowledge are at hand; and if he omits to inquire, he is chargeable with all the facts which, by a proper inquiry he might have ascertained. 20 R. C. L. page 346.

The appellant is chargeable with constructive notice of an advertisement duly made as prescribed by law and she is chargeable with the notice of the sale advertised by H. F Jones, Trustee, under the sale of the lands which was enjoined prior to March 7, 1916, at which time the injunction suit was filed by S. C. Weems and according to testimony offered by her here, her name was introduced into the original bill, in open court by an attorney representing her husband; yet she bought this land with this constructive knowledge...