Wehby v. Springer Equip. Co., Case No.: 2:15-cv-01005-RDP

• Decision Date: 08 January 2016
• Docket Number: Case No.: 2:15-cv-01005-RDP
• Citation: 155 F.Supp.3d 1221
• Parties: Theresa L. Wehby, Plaintiff, v. Springer Equipment Company, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

155 F.Supp.3d 1221

Theresa L. Wehby, Plaintiff,

v.Springer Equipment Company, Inc., Defendant.

Case No.: 2:15-cv-01005-RDP

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

Signed January 8, 2016.

Samuel Fisher, Sidney Monroe Jackson, Wiggins Childs Pantazis Fisher & Goldfarb, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Mac B. Greaves, Sarah C. Blutter, Jones Walker LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

R. DAVID PROCTOR

, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Introduction

This case is before the court on Plaintiff's Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Count II of the Complaint (Doc. # 10), filed November 24, 2015. Plaintiff previously moved for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)

, but Defendant opposed the Motion. (Doc. # 10). Accordingly, the court treated the Motion (Doc. # 10) as one for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), and directed the parties to brief the Motion. (Doc. #11). The Motion is now fully briefed and ripe for consideration. (Docs. # 10, 12, 13). After careful review, and for the following reasons, the court finds that the Motion is due to be granted and Count II of the Complaint is due to be dismissed without prejudice.

II. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on June 15, 2015, alleging two claims: a Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794

, (the “Rehab Act”) claim; and a statutory claim for worker's compensation retaliatory discharge pursuant to Alabama Code § 25–5–11.1.¹ (Doc. # 1). Plaintiff asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

and 1367. (Id. ). Defendant did not assert a jurisdictional challenge in its responsive pleading, or in subsequent motions. (Doc. # 3).

On November 5, 2015, the court held a scheduling conference with the parties. During that conference, the court expressed concerns about whether it had jurisdiction over the Alabama workers' compensation retaliation claim asserted in Count II of the Complaint. Accordingly, the court ordered the parties to confer regarding the issue and to submit to the court a joint report (if they were in agreement about resolution of issue), or briefing (if they disagreed). (Doc. # 9). The parties informed the court that they had discussed the matter, and voluntary dismissal of Count II appeared to be the best approach.

Nevertheless, when Plaintiff filed her Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Count II of the Complaint, it was (surprisingly) designated as opposed. (Doc. # 10). Thus, the court ordered the parties to brief that Motion. (Doc. # 11).

In its opposition brief, Defendant contends that this court has jurisdiction over the retaliation claim. (Doc. # 12). In support of its position, Defendant has distinguished two types of cases which assert a claim filed under Alabama Code § 25–5–11.1

: (1) those cases that were originally filed in (but subsequently removed from) a state court; and (2) those cases that were originally filed in a federal court. (Id. ). Defendant acknowledges that if this case had been removed from state court (instead of initially being filed in this court) there would be no jurisdiction over that cause of action under the operation of 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (“A civil action in any State court arising under the workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the United States.”). (Id. ). But, Defendant asserts that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), supplemental jurisdiction exists over a workers' compensation retaliation claim originally filed in a federal court and that it would be a hardship if it were required to litigate on both state and federal court fronts. (Id. ).

In Plaintiff's reply, she contends that there is no clear legal precedent concerning this issue, and, in any event, that Defendant's concerns of duplicative efforts should not control the outcome of the Motion. (Doc. # 13). Instead, Plaintiff argues that this court may properly exercise its discretion by dismissing the claim due to the unsettled nature of this area of law. (Id. ).

III. Discussion

The court has carefully considered the parties' arguments and determines that Count II is due to be dismissed, but for reasons other than those asserted.

A. The Court Has Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Count II, but Count II is Due to Be Dismissed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2)

The Eleventh Circuit has expressly held that “claims brought pursuant to Alabama's statute barring retaliation for the filing of workers' compensation claims [Ala. Code § 25–5–11.1

] do arise under that state's workers' compensation laws.” Reed v. Heil Co. , 206 F.3d 1055, 1057 (11th Cir.2000). As our circuit has also made clear, this court clearly would have no jurisdiction over the retaliation claim if that cause of action had been removed from state court. Id. at 1058

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) ). However, when such a claim is originally filed in a federal district court, it is less clear whether a federal court has jurisdiction to entertain it. Indeed, a review of case law concerning the filing of claims under Alabama Code § 25–5–11.1 in federal court demonstrates that there is no conclusive answer to this question.

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Reed

can be read to imply that a federal court may have supplemental jurisdiction over Alabama retaliatory discharge claims when initially filed in federal court. After holding that section 25–5–11.1 arises out of the state Workers' Compensation Law in a removed case, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that Congress specifically barred from removal claims in state court “arising under workmen's compensation laws” of the forum state. Reed , 206 F.3d at 1058, 1061 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) ). However, the Eleventh Circuit also recognized that, normally, “federal courts can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that form part of the same case or controversy as the claim with original federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 1058 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) ). While not specifically presented with the issue, the Eleventh Circuit did not categorically rule out the prospect of a federal court exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state workers' compensation laws, and (at least arguably) implied that Sections 1367 and 1445 (perhaps dissonantly) co-exist. See id.; see also

Richardson v. Georgia

–

Pacific Corp., No. 07–cv–0732, 2007 WL 3287361, at *3 (S.D.Ala. Nov. 5, 2007) (“However, using Section 1367(a) to override Section 1445(c) would be inconsistent with Reed, in which the Court acknowledged Section 1367(a) but concluded that remand of the worker's compensation claim was required because Section 1445(c) deprived the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.”).

In other instances, the Eleventh Circuit and district courts within our circuit have had occasion to address section 25–5–11.1

claims filed directly in federal court. For example, although it did not specifically discuss the jurisdictional issue, in a later case the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment involving claims arising under the Family Medical Leave Act and section 25–5–11.1. Sparks v. Sunshine Mills, Inc. , 580 Fed.Appx. 759, 760 (11th Cir.2014) (per curiam); see also

Bradford v. Rent

–

A

–

Center East, Inc., 346 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1205 (M.D.Ala.2004) (granting in part and denying in part motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's federal civil rights claims and Ala. Code § 25–5–11.1, and specifically stating that “jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331...and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ”). Unlike in Reed, the plaintiff in Sparks originally filed a complaint in federal court alleging, among other things, that the defendant violated Alabama Code § 25–5–11.1. Sparks , 580 Fed.Appx. at 762. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Id. at 760. However, jurisdiction was neither raised by a party nor squarely addressed by the court in Sparks.

Id. Nevertheless, this court infers from our circuit's affirmation of summary judgment in that unpublished decision that it necessarily concluded that jurisdiction existed. That inference supports a finding that this court may have supplemental jurisdiction over Count II here.

The court has also looked to a District of Kansas decision that lends support to the court's analysis. In Patton v. AFG Industries, Inc. , 92 F.Supp.2d 1200 (D.Kan.2000)

, the court dismissed the plaintiff's federal claims under the Americans With Disabilities Act. 92 F.Supp.2d at 1206. In determining whether to continue exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state workers' compensation retaliatory discharge claim, the court looked to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)

. (Id. at 1206–07 ) (recognizing that when “it has federal question jurisdiction, a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims which form part of the same case or controversy”). Ultimately, the court ruled that it would keep the retaliation claim (and denied a summary judgment motion directed at that claim). Id. at 1207–08.

In addition to the different approaches taken by our circuit in Reed

and Sparks, and the ruling in Patton, the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) is also essential to this court's reasoning. Section 1367(a) provides that “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added). Indeed, the statutory language is commanding and does not leave room for compromise—but for the preceding clause setting forth exceptions “as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute.”²

Id.; see also

Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir.1994) (“supplemental jurisdiction must be exercised in the absence of any of the four factors of section 1367(c) ” (emphasis in original)).

However, while section 1367(a)

grants jurisdiction, ...