Weil's Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 13 February 1974
• Docket Number: No. 1,CA-CIV,1
• Citation: 21 Ariz.App. 278,518 P.2d 995
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE of Ruth Bank WEIL, Deceased. Daniel BANK and David Bank, Appellants, v. GREAT WESTERN BANK, Appellee. 2012.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 995

518 P.2d 995

21 Ariz.App. 278

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Ruth Bank WEIL, Deceased.

Daniel BANK and David Bank, Appellants, v. GREAT WESTERN BANK, Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CIV 2012.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

Feb. 13, 1974.

Rehearing Denied March 19, 1974.

Review Denied April 23, 1974.

Carmichael, McClue & Stephens, P.C., by Ronald Carmichael, Phoenix, for appellants.

Snell & Wilmer, by Bruce Norton, Phoenix, for appellee.

OPINION

JACOBSON, Chief Judge, Division 1.

This appeal questions various evidentiary rulings of the trial court in an action in which a jury ultimately found that the deceased had testamentary capacity at the time she executed her will and a codicil thereto.

The contestants-appellants, Daniel Bank and David Bank, the natural children of the deceased, Ruth Bank Weil, raised a narrow issue in the contest of their mother's will--whether she knew and understood the natural objects of her bounty. They conceded that their mother knew the nature and extent of her property and knew and understood the nature of her acts when she executed her will in July, 1969, and her codicil in May, 1970.

This matter was tried to a jury which, by answers to special interrogatories, determined that Mrs. Weil possessed full testamentary capacity upon both dates in question. Judgment was entered upon this determination and following denial of post-trial motions, this appeal was taken.

The facts of this case are as follows: Ruth Bank Weil was formerly married to Dr. Joseph Bank and as a result of this marriage two children were born, Daniel and David Bank. In 1961, Dr. Bank died after a long illness. Following the death of their father, neither child lived in the family home. During the illness of Dr. Bank, the record reveals that the relationship between the sons and their mother deteriorated. While there were brief contacts between the sons and their mother following their father's death, the maternal relationship did not improve.

On July 1, 1969, Mrs. Bank (Weil) executed a last will and testament which recited in part that:

'I declare that I am the widow of Joseph Bank, deceased, and that I am the mother of David Alexander Bank, born on the 4th day of November, 1937, and Daniel Benjamin Bank, born on the 12th day of September, 1940, both being the issue of my marriage with the said Joseph Bank.'

This will, after some minor specific bequests, devised the residue of Mrs. Bank's estate to the trustee of a previously existing trust. The beneficiaries of this trust were various charitable and philanthropic organizations. The will went on to conclude:

'In view of the fact that my sons will receive the principal of the trust created by my mother, Bertha K. Bush, upon the death of the survivor of the death of myself and my brother, Norton Bush, and will eventually receive the principal of Trust B of a trust created by my husband, Joseph Bank, and myself during his lifetime, with the Valley National Bank of Arizona as trustee, I have intentionally made no further provisions for either of my sons, David Bank or Daniel Bank, in this my Last Will and Testament . . ..'

In 1969, Mrs. Bank married Simon Weil and moved from Phoenix, Arizona to Nashville, Tennessee. On May 2, 1970, she executed a handwritten codicil to her last will and testament. This document provided in part:

'I wish to add if there is enuf (sic) another $5,000 each for David and Daniel Bank upon their reaching ages 40, respectively. They may then have learnt (sic) some of the solid virtues their parents by love and example to instil (sic) . . .. The trusts are still operative and helpful.'

On May 2, 1970, Mrs. Weil died as a result of an overdose of barbiturates. At the time of trial, Mrs. Weil's estate was valued at approximately $225,000.00 and the trusts mentioned in her will, of which her sons were beneficiaries, had an approximate value of $80,000.

As previously indicated, it was contestants' theory that Mrs. Weil lacked testamentary capacity because she did not know and understand the natural objects of her bounty. In support of this theory, the contestants called, in addition to other witnesses two psychiatrists, one of whom testified that:

'Mrs. Bank was totally unable to be aware and recognize the relationship to her own children.'

And:

'Mrs. Bank at all times knew the names of her two sons. She did not know the true relationship between her as a mother and her sons as sons.'

While appellant's attack on this appeal does not center on a lack of evidence to support the jury's determination, this quoted testimony serves as a springboard to discuss the legal principles involved in appellant's contention that Mrs. Weil lacked testamentary capacity and the alleged errors involving the exclusion and admission of evidence on this issue.

In discussing this issue it is important to first differentiate between testamentary capacity generally, which every testator must possess in order to validate his testamentary act and an insane delusion which may invalidate the will or a portion thereof. This distinction was early recognized in Arizona in Estate of Greene, 40 Ariz. 274, 11 P.2d 947 (1932):

"Mental derangement sufficient to invalidate a will must be insanity in one of two forms: (1) Insanity of such broad character as to establish mental incompetency generally; or (2) some specific and narrower form of insanity under which the testator is the victim of some hallucination or delusion." ¹ 40 Ariz. at 279, 11 P.2d at 949.

As it is important to differentiate between the two types of mental derangement which will invalidate a testamentary act, it is also important to differentiate between the two legal tests employed to determine whether such mental derangements are present in the testator's mind.

While there may be some confusion in Arizona ² as to the true test for determining testamentary capacity, it is generally recognized that the rule is that a testator is of sound mind for testamentary purposes if the following questions can be answered in the affirmative: (1) Did the testator at the time he executed the will understand the nature of the act he was performing; (2) at this time did the testator understand the nature or character of his property; and, (3) at this time did the testator recollect his relationship to the natural objects of his bounty and to those who naturally would have some claim to his remembrance? In re Westfall's Estate, 74 Ariz. 181, 245 P.2d 951 (1952); In re Estate of Pohndorf, 11 Ariz.App. 29, 461 P.2d 508 (1969); Atkinson On Wills § 51 (2nd ed., 1953); 94 C.J.S. Wills § 15, pg. 692.

The rationale behind the requirement that the testator recollect who are 'the natural objects of his bounty' appears to be founded upon the reasoning that one of the purposes of making a will is to change the prospective inheritance of heirs so that they would not take the property of the testator in the manner provided for by intestate succession; and that while prospective heirs have no present legal interest in the testator's property, the law regards their expectations as something which a competent testator will normally have in mind, for these expectations will by the very act of making a testatmentary disposition, be changed. See 175 A.L.R. Testamentary Capacity 891. When viewed in this light it is obvious that the injury concerning this element of testatmentary capacity must be focused on whether the testator has the Capacity to know who these objects of his bounty are and to appreciate his relationship to them (i.e., they are my sons) and not whether in fact the testator appreciates his moral obligations and duties toward such heirs in accordance with some standard fixed by society, the courts or psychiatrists. Emerich v. Arendt, 179 Ark. 186, 14 S.W.2d 547 (1929).

This focusing of inquiry on Capacity for purposes of determining testamentary capacity should not be confused with an insane delusion touching the 'natural objects of his bounty.' This is a more narrow type of mental derangement recognized in In re Greene, Supra. Such an insane delusion must be tested against its definition as 'the conception of a disordered mind which imagines facts to exist of which there is no evidence and the belief in which is adhered to against all evidence and argument to the contrary, and which cannot be accounted for on any reasonable hypothesis.' Estate of Cook, 63 Ariz. 78, 89, 159 P.2d 797, 802 (1945). Such an insane delusion may touch any aspect of the testator's will and many of the reported cases indicate that such an insane delusion may attach to close relatives, thus affecting the validity of the testamentary disposition as to them. But it must be kept in mind that where the alleged insane delusion touches the 'natural objects of his bounty', the inquiry is not whether thetestator's bounty', the inquiry is not whether the testator's morally acceptable, but whether the manner in which that bounty was treated in the testamentary document was the result of the insane delusion.

With these principles in mind, we have no hesitancy in holding that the testatrix had the Capacity to know who the natural objects of her bounty were and thus had full testamentary capacity. the will and the codicil executed by the deceased state that the appellants are the sons of the deceased. Moreover, the evidence is uncontradicted, except in one regard which will be discussed next, that the deceased at all times knew exactly who appellants were and that they were her sons. This is also verified by the psychiatric testimony introduced by appe...