Weil v. Barthel

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Writing for the Court: McCOMB; GIBSON; CARTER
• Citation: 45 Cal.2d 835,291 P.2d 30
• Parties: Robert G. WEIL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Harvey O. BARTHEL and Erma Barthel, his wife, and Bank of Davis (a Corporation), Defendants and Respondents. Sac. 6398.
• Decision Date: 23 December 1955

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291 P.2d 30 45 Cal.2d 835 Robert G. WEIL, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Harvey O. BARTHEL and Erma Barthel, his wife, and Bank of Davis (a Corporation), Defendants and Respondents. Sac. 6398. Supreme Court of California, In Bank. Dec. 23, 1955.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 18, 1956.

James S. Eddy and Douglas C. Busath, Sacramento, for appellant.

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Robert M. Cole, Davis, for respondents.

Driver & Driver, Sacramento, as amici curiae on behalf of respondents.

[45 Cal.2d 836] McCOMB, Justice pro tem.

Lon B. Rowland, ^* the assignee of the interests of C. E. Burton and his wife in a parcel of real property, brought as suit in the Superior Court of Yolo County entitled 'Complaint to Compel Redemption and to Quiet Title.' Named as defendants were Harvey O. Barthel and his wife and the Bank of Davis. This appeal is from a judgment entered upon an order sustaining a general demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend.

Plaintiff alleged that in an action 'involving title' to the same property here concerned, the land by a prior judgment against the Burtons in the same court was ordered to be sold 'as the property of the plaintiff's said assignors in the manner provided by law for sales pursuant to execution upon real property.' The effect of that judgment, it was alleged, was to create in the Burtons, as an equitable interest, 'a right to redeem said real property according to law.' The complaint includes the official record of the judgment, but its terms are pleaded by a statement of their legal effect.

Pursuant to the judgment, it was alleged, the property was sold by the sheriff to the Barthels, who were purchasers at the 'execution sale.' It was further alleged that prior to the expiration of the period provided by law for the redemption of real property sold upon execution, the sheriff wrongfully delivered a deed to the property to the Barthels, who recorded it; that also of record is a deed of trust to secure a note payable to the Bank of Davis, which claims an interest in the property.

The prayer was for (1) a declaration of Rowland's right to redeem the property; (2) an accounting by the Barthels; (3) an order directing the Barthels to reconvey the property; and the court was also asked to retain jurisdiction of the matter pending a redemption, and to quiet Rowland's title against each of the defendants.

The defendants demurred to the complaint asserting, among other grounds, that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In their memorandum of points and authorities accompanying the demurrer, defendants relied in part upon the terms of the judgment in the prior action. The trial judge considered the prior judgment which 'terminated and foreclosed the interest of the plaintiff's assignors in said [45 Cal.2d 837] real property and enjoined and restrained them forever from asserting any right, title and interest therein,' and held that it was impossible for Rowland to state a cause of action which would enable him to redeem the real property in controversy.

Two contentions are made by Rowland for the reversal of the judgment: (1) That it was prejudicial error for the trial court to consider the prior judgment; (2) that even if such consideration were proper, the record in the former action may not be construed so as to deprive him of the right to redeem the property. Both of these contentions are devoid of merit.

The following rules are applicable to the first contention:

1. A demurrer reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice. (County of Los Angeles v. Security First National Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579(4), 191 P.2d 78.)

2. When a former judgment is properly pleaded in a complaint, such judgment may be considered by the trial court in determining whether it is res judicata of a plaintiff's alleged cause of action. (Cf. Rideaux v. Torgrimson, 12 Cal.2d 633, 638(8), 86 P.2d 826; Spitzer v. Superior Court, 74 Cal.App. 494, 498(1), 241 P. 270.)

Applying the foregoing rules to the facts of the instant case, the judgment relied upon by defendants in bar of the cause of action alleged in the complaint

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was pleaded and identified in the complaint. Therefore, the trial court properly considered the contents of the judgment in ruling upon the demurrer. Since the judgment was pleaded in is unnecessary to consider whether the doctrine of judicial notice is here applicable. We do not decide such question.

As to the second contention, it is the general rule that a final judgment is res judicata of the issues involved therein where the trial court had jurisdiction. (Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 44 Cal.2d 715, 725(10), 285 P.2d 636; San Diego Trust & Sav. Bank v. Young, 19 Cal.2d 98, 100(1), 119 P.2d 133.)

In the present case the record discloses that the Barthels formerly were owners of a tract of unimproved land. In 1948, they entered into an oral contract, which was superseded by a later oral agreement, to sell the land and an abandoned streetcar on the premises to the Burtons. If the consideration was not paid in cash, the Barthels were to receive a note secured by a purchase money trust deed. The Burtons [45 Cal.2d 838] took possession of the property and began constructing improvements but, although demands were made upon them, they refused to pay the purchase price or to execute a note. In October of that year, a third oral agreement was made, the Burtons agreeing to pay immediately $5,000 for the land and to perform certain other obligations which were indicent to...