Weil v. Golden
| Decision Date | 31 March 1886 |
| Parties | WEIL v. GOLDEN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
This was an action of contract to recover the amount of a draft drawn by the plaintiff, doing business as Leon Weil & Co., at Philadelphia, March 18, 1879, at four months, upon the defendant at Pawtucket, Rhode Island, and there accepted by him. The defense relied on was that the acceptance was given for the price of intoxicating liquors sold by plaintiff to defendant, to be resold by him in Pawtucket; that at the time of the sale no licenses for the sale of liquors were granted in Pawtucket; and that the sale thereof was illegal and contrary to law, which the plaintiff well knew; and that the plaintiff sold and delivered the liquors to the defendant with full knowledge and intending that the same should be sold contrary to law. At the trial the plaintiff put the acceptance in evidence and rested. The defendant put in evidence the Public Laws of Rhode Island of 1875, c. 508, and especially sections 1, 18, 43, 44. The defendant himself testified that in 1879 he was in the grocery and liquor business in Pawtucket; that he had no license to sell liquors,--carried on business without a license; that in March of that year he bought liquors of Richard Park, who represented Leon Weil & Co., of Philadelphia; that he had bought several bills of him before; that Park sold by sample and agreed to deliver these goods in Pawtucket free of freight; that they came to him by the Clyde Line from Philadelphia; and that he afterwards sold the liquors at retail in Pawtucket. Richard Park testified that in 1878-79 he was employed by Leon Weil & Co., of Philadelphia, as general agent for the sale of their liquors in New England transacted all their business in New England except buying goods; had known Golden many years, and had sold him several bills of liquors for Weil & Co. before. In March, 1879, went to Golden's store, and the latter bought certain lots of whisky. Golden objected to paying freight, and he agreed to deliver the goods at Pawtucket free of freight. Against the plaintiff's objection, defendant was allowed to ask the witness if he knew that Golden had no license to sell liquors, and he answered that he did. He was also asked "What did Golden intend to do with the liquors?" The plaintiff objected, but the question was allowed, and the witness answered, "Sell them again." The defendant then asked him, "Did you sell the goods to him to sell them again,--with a view to that purpose?" To this question the plaintiff objected, both for form and substance, but the court allowed it, and the witness answered, "Yes." He further testified that he paid the freight to Golden as agent of Weil, and charged it to him in expense account. On cross-examination he testified that he had no written instructions from his employers; did not remember this case in particular; had a guaranty of $50 a week to cover expenses, which was paid to him whether he made any sales or not, and a commission on his sales; that he sold in different ways,--no freight, half freight, and with freight; and that, if freight was paid by him, it affected his commissions. It was understood that the acceptance in suit was given in payment of the five barrels of whisky sold by plaintiff to defendant. There was no evidence that the plaintiff had any actual knowledge, either of the laws of Rhode Island in reference to the sale of intoxicating liquors, or that the defendant had no license, and intended to sell the liquors contrary to law, or that his agent had such knowledge, and took the order with intent to aid in such unlawful purpose. The plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury:
(1) If the jury find that the liquors were sold to the defendant in Philadelphia, and the sale in Philadelphia was legal there, they must find for plaintiff. (2) It is for the defendant to show an unlawful sale, if he would avoid the acceptance on which suit is brought. (3) If the jury find that the plaintiff sold the liquors to the defendant, and delivered them to a transportation company in Philadelphia for the defendant, in order to make such a sale unlawful, and avoid the defendant's acceptance, the jury must also find that the plaintiff knew that the defendant purchased the liquors for the purpose of unlawful sale of them in Rhode Island, and that the plaintiff, so knowing of the defendant's unlawful intent, sold the liquors to him for the purpose of aiding in such unlawful sale of them by the defendant. (4) Even if the liquors were sold in Philadelphia, to be sold again in Rhode Island by defendant, a citizen of Rhode Island, contrary to law, and with knowledge and participation of plaintiff in such sale, this would be no defense to this action on the acceptance given for them, and such acceptance can be collected in this commonwealth. (5) If the order of the defendant for five barrels of whisky, at prices named, was sent to plaintiff by Park, and filled by plaintiff in Philadelphia without any knowledge on part of plaintiff that Park himself intended to pay the freight, and charge it to plaintiff as part of his (Park's) expenses, then the sale was completed in Philadelphia when plaintiff delivered the goods to the Clyde Line, and Park's undertaking with Golden to pay the freight was a separate contract between defendant and Park personally. (6) If the jury find that the plaintiff's agent, Park, sold the liquors to the defendant with the intent on the part of the agent to aid him in the violation of the law by their resale, this fact cannot affect the plaintiff's right to recover in this suit. (7) If the jury find that the sale of the liquors was made by the plaintiff to the defendant in Pawtucket, and that such sale was there unlawful, this is no defense to a suit brought in this state upon an acceptance given for the price of the liquors.
The court gave the second instruction, and refused all the others. Upon the points at issue the court instructed the jury in substance as follows:
At Pawtucket, if the sale was there, the sale was unlawful if it was made for the purpose of enabling Golden to violate the laws of Rhode Island, and the contract cannot be enforced in this state; and the sale was made in Pawtucket if the jury believe the agent Park's story. Whether the sale was made in Pawtucket or not can make no difference, so far as the court can see, or whether Weil knew or not of the illegal use intended to be made of the liquors by the defendant, if Park knew of it. His principal is affected with his knowledge, and the plaintiff cannot recover. If the sale was made in Philadelphia, and the plaintiff's agent took the order in Pawtucket to enable the defendant to sell said liquors contrary to law in Rhode Island, and with the intent to aid him in such unlawful sale, the plaintiff cannot recover. And it makes no difference if the plaintiff himself had no actual knowledge that his agent took the order to aid the defendant in such unlawful sale, if you find the agent had such purpose.
The jury returned a verdict for defendant, and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
Read & Dean and W.H. Clapp, for plaintiff.
H.F. & H.V. Fuller, for defendant.
This case was confused at the trial and at the argument by surmises as to what might have been the effect had the sale been made in Philadelphia. There was no evidence of a sale there. The place of sale was where the sale was completed by...
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