Weinberger v. Board of Public Instruction of St. Johns County

• Decision Date: 10 March 1927
• Citation: 93 Fla. 470,112 So. 253
• Parties: WEINBERGER v. BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF ST. JOHNS COUNTY et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

112 So. 253

93 Fla. 470

WEINBERGER v. BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF ST. JOHNS COUNTY et al.

Florida Supreme Court

March 10, 1927

Suit by Charles Weinberger against the Board of Public Instruction of St. Johns County and others for an injunction. From a judgment of dismissal, complainant appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Manner prescribed in Constitution for doing thing is exclusive, and forbids doing it in substantially different manner. Where the Constitution provides the manner of doing a thing, the manner so prescribed is exclusive, thereby forbidding its being done in a substantially different manner.

Legislature may not enact statute defeating purpose of constitutional provisions prescribing manner of doing act. When the Constitution prescribes the manner of doing an act, it is beyond the power of the Legislature to enact a statute that would defeat the purpose of such constitutional provision.

School bonds, whose maturities are fixed by resolution contrary to Constitution, are void ab initio (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 579 et seq., as amended by Laws 1921, c. 8543); Const. art. 12, § 17, as amended [see Acts 1923, p. 484]). Where a board of public instruction undertakes to issue special tax school district bonds upon authority of section 579 et seq., Rev Gen. Stats. 1920, but in its resolution providing for the issuance of the bonds fixes the maturities for the bonds contrary to an express and continuing limitation of the Constitution, such resolution is a nullity, and the proposed bonds void ab initio.

Anything affecting authority of political subdivisions to issue bonds or regularity or legality of issue, may be put in repose by statutory decree; constitutional rights protecting property rights of individual which he may waive or as to which he may estop himself or which Legislature may limit period of assertion may be settled by decree validating bond issue (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, §§ 3296, 3299). Any matter or thing affecting the power or authority of the several political subdivisions mentioned in section 3296, Rev. Gen. Stats 1920, to issue bonds, or the regularity or legality of their issue, including questions of both law and fact, in so far as those matters or things could be lawfully prescribed regulated, limited, or dispensed with by the Legislature in the first instance, or subsequently cured by a validating act, may be put in repose by a decree rendered pursuant to section 3296 et seq., Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920. So, also, may constitutional rights or privileges which are designed solely for the protection of property rights of the individual concerned, and which he may waive, or with reference to which he may estop himself, or as to which the Legislature may lawfully limit the period of time within which such right or privilege may be exercised.

Failure to object to validation of bonds does not prevent taxpayer from setting up constitutional provision as to their maturities (Const. art. 12,§ 17, as amended [see Acts 1923, p. 484]; Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 579 et seq., as amended by Laws 1921, c. 8543, and sections 598, 3296, et seq.). When a board of public instruction attempts by resolution to fix the maturities of special tax school district bonds contrary to an express and continuing requirement of the Constitution, such bonds are void ab initio, and a taxpayer who is otherwise entitled so to do, but who did not intervene and object to such bonds in a statutory validation proceeding in which a decree purporting to validate such bonds was entered, is not thereby barred from subsequently asserting against the issuance of such bonds the mandatory and continuing command of the Constitution prohibiting the issuance of such bonds with maturities as prescribed in the resolution, even though such taxpayer, at his election, might have intervened and raised the point in the statutory validation proceeding.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Johns County; De Witt T. Gray, judge.

COUNSEL

Curtis C. Coxe, of St. Augustine, for appellant.

Bassett & Hunter, of St. Augustine, for appellees.

OPINION

STRUM J.

Appellant, a citizen and resident of St. Johns county, and the owner of taxable property in the school district hereinafter mentioned, as complainant below, brought his bill of complaint against appellees, as defendants below, whereby he sought to enjoin the issue and sale of certain special tax school district bonds for district No. 1 of St. Johns county.

The board of public instruction of said county proposes to issue the bonds in question upon authority of section 579 et seq., Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920, as amended (Laws 1921, c. 8543), and pursuant to a resolution of the said board passed April 30, 1926.

Appellant asserts that said resolution attempts to fix the maturities of said bonds contrary to and in violation of section 17 of article 12 of the Constitution of Florida, and is therefore void ad initio and inoperative.

Appellees, defendants below, interposed a plea to the bill of complaint, setting up a previous decree of the circuit court of St. Johns county validating and confirming, in all respects, the bonds in question, and decreeing said bonds to be the duly authorized and legally binding obligation of the said special tax school district. The procedure resulting in said decree of validation was that authorized and prescribed by sections 598 and 3296 et seq., Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920. The decree of validation was entered on July 30, 1926. This suit was instituted on September 9, 1926. Appellant did not intervene in the validation proceedings so as to make himself an actual party thereto, though he might have dine so at his election. Nor did the pleadings in the validation proceeding specifically present the constitutional question involved in this suit.

Upon argument, the circuit judge sustained said plea, denied a temporary injunction, and dismissed the bill of complaint; whereupon complaint appealed.

Section 17 of article 12, Constitution of Florida, as amended in 1924, controls the issuance of bonds of the character under consideration. That section, after declaring that the Legislature may provide for special tax school districts to issue bonds for the exclusive use of public free schools within any such special tax school district, under the circumstances therein stated, further provides, amongst other things:

'* * * Any bonds issued hereunder shall become payable within thirty years from the date of issuance in annual installments which shall commence not more than three years after the date of issue. Each annual installment shall be not less than three per cent. of the total amount of the issue. * * *'

According to the resolution of the board of public instruction, pursuant to which it is proposed to issue the questioned bonds, the bonds are to be dated June 1, 1926, are in the aggregate principal sum of $250,000 and the maturities are as follows:

Bonds Numbered Amount Due

1 to 35, inclusive $35,000 00 1929

36 to 70, inclusive 35,000 00 1932

71 to 105, inclusive 35,000 00 1935

106 to 140, inclusive 35,000 00 1940

141 to 175, inclusive 35,000 00 1945

176 to 210, inclusive 35,000 00 1950

211 to 250, inclusive 40,000 00 1955

Obviously, the dates of maturity of the several bonds do not conform to the express command of that portion of section 17, art. 12, of the Florida Constitution, above quoted, which fact is admitted by appellees in their brief. Appellees urge, however, that this is a question which goes 'to the power of the board to issue the bonds and was a proper question to be raised in the proceeding to validate the same'; and since appellant was by statute (section 3296 et seq.) made 'a party defendant to the proceedings to validate the bonds after the election, and having failed either to intervene in the validating proceedings or to appeal to this (the Supreme) Court from the decree of validation, he (the appellant) is now barred both by the statute and the opinion of this court in the case of Thompson v. Town of Frostproof (89 Fla. 92, 103 So. 118) from raising any question in any court of this state affecting the validity of said bonds.'

To support that contention, appellees rely upon the provisions of section 3296, Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920, authorizing any designated political subdivision issuing bonds under the laws of this state to determine its authority to incur such bonded debt, 'and the legality of all proceedings had or taken in connection therewith,' in the manner therein prescribed. Appellees also rely upon the further provisions of section 3299, Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920, to the effect that, when a decree validating such bonds shall have been rendered, and no appeal taken therefrom within 20 days, or, in case such an appeal is taken, then when the decree shall have been affirmed by this court, such decree----

'* * * shall be forever conclusive as to the validity of said bonds * * * against the * * * taxing district, * * * issuing them, and against all taxpayers and citizens thereof; and the validity of said bonds * * * shall never be called in question in any court in this state.'

Appellees rely upon the following language from Thompson v. Town of Frostproof, 89 Fla. 92, 103 So. 118:

'Reviewing the law * * * we think there can be no escape from the conclusion that the purpose of a decree validating and confirming bonds thereunder is to put in repose any question of law or of fact that may be subsequently raised affecting the validity of such bonds. This being our deduction, it is a necessary corollary that in a bond validating suit any question that goes to the power to issue and validity or regularity of the issuance of such bonds is proper to be raised.'

Appellees also cite and rely upon Steen v. Board...