Weinstein v. Chief of Police of Fall River

• Decision Date: 08 May 1962
• Citation: 344 Mass. 314,182 N.E.2d 525
• Parties: Charles S. WEINSTEIN et al. v. CHIEF OF POLICE OF FALL RIVER et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 525

182 N.E.2d 525

344 Mass. 314

Charles S. WEINSTEIN et al. v. CHIEF OF POLICE OF FALL RIVER et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Argued April 4, 1962.

Decided May 8, 1962.

Edward J. Barshak, Boston, for plaintiffs.

John T. Farrell, Jr., Asst. Corporation Counsel, for Chief of Police of Fall River.

Eugene G. Panarese, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Attorney General.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, KIRK and SPIEGEL, JJ.

WILKINS, Chief Justice.

The plaintiffs in this bill for declaratory relief are Trans-American Spinning Mills, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation engaged in the manufacturing business in Fall River, and Charles S. Weinstein, its treasurer and sole stockholder. The defendants, who are the chief of police of that city and the Attorney General, ¹ demurred to the bill, the demurrer was sustained, a final decree was entered dismissing the bill, and the plaintiffs appealed.

The allegations of the bill are these. Weinstein, the treasurer and sole stockholder, is the one actually in charge of the 'manufacturing' business of the corporation. He is an Orthodox Jew and, in accordance with the tenets of his religion, performs no labor on Saturdays and does not allow any business owned or controlled by him to be open on Saturdays. All the officers of the corporation are also Orthodox Jews who strictly follow the requirements of their religion as to Saturday observance. The corporation has always closed its plant and places of business on Saturdays. Pursuant to G.L. c. 136, § 9 (as amended through St.1953, c. 108 ²), the defendant chief of police has been granting permits to manufacturing businesses allowing them to be open and in operation on Sundays. In all material respects, the businesses to which such permits have been granted and the work performed by such businesses on Sunday are indistinguishable from the business operations of the plaintiff corporation. Since June, 1961, the defendant chief of police has refused to grant Sunday permits requested by the plaintiff corporation solely on the grounds that the plaintiff corporation is closed on Saturdays and, therefore, as matter of law, is ineligible to receive a permit to be open on Sundays.

Other allegations of the bill are these. The defendant chief of police contends that, as matter of law, the religious observance of Saturday by both plaintiffs disqualifies them from procuring a Sunday permit from him. The plaintiffs contend that this interpretation of G.L. c. 136, § 9, as amended, is contrary to the meaning of the statute and that, if this interpretation is consistent with the statute, it is being applied to them in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Commonwealth. The plaintiffs further contend that such an interpretation discriminates against them because of the observance of their religion by the plaintiff Weinstein and the other officers of the corporation. The plaintiffs 'desire and intend to remain open on Sundays in the same manner and for the same purposes as other businesses in Fall River are allowed to be open,' and the defendant chief of police intends to refuse them the same permits granted to others.

The bill asks for a decree (1) construing G.L. c. 136, § 9, as amended, in so far as it affects the rights and privileges of the plaintiffs and the duties of the defendant chief of police and (2) determining the constitutionality of that section as applied to the plaintiffs.

The demurrer, which assigned nine grounds, was sustained generally. The first ground is that the bill does not state a cause of action entitling the plaintiffs to any relief. The eighth is, 'A declaratory decree, if entered, will not terminate the controversy giving rise to the proceedings.'

Either ground could be held to be good. Where a plaintiff has completely failed to state a case presenting a controversy proper for determination under the declaratory procedure, a demurrer may be sustained. County of Dukes County v. New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S. S. Authy., 333 Mass. 405, 406, 131 N.E.2d 206. The court may also refuse to enter a declaratory decree when such decree, if entered, would not terminate the controversy, but if on that ground alone '[t]he reasons for such refusal shall be stated in the record.' G.L. c. 231A, § 3. See Hogan v. Hogan, 320 Mass. 658, 662-663, 70 N.E.2d 821; Kilroy v. O'Connor, 324 Mass. 238, 241-243, 85 N.E.2d 441; Brookline v. Co-Ray Realty Co. Inc., 326 Mass. 206, 213, 93 N.E.2d 581.

The individual plaintiff has made no request for a permit, so the case must be considered upon the basis of the request of the plaintiff corporation. The demurrer does not admit the...