Weisberg v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 18 June 1951
• Docket Number: No. 31935,31935
• Citation: 409 Ill. 384,100 N.E.2d 748
• Parties: WEISBERG et al. v. TAYLOR et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 748

100 N.E.2d 748

409 Ill. 384

WEISBERG et al. v. TAYLOR et al.

No. 31935.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 18, 1951.

Aronson & Aronson, Chicago (Leo E. Aronson, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen. (Robert J. Burdett and John T. Coburn, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

SIMPSON, Chief Justice.

The plaintiffs, Max Weisberg, a retail liquor dealer, and Stag Beer Corporation, an Illinois corporation and a wholesale beer distributor, filed their suit in the circuit court of Cook County under section 57 1/2 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 110, par. 181.1) against the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, seeking a declaratory judgment that section 4 of article VI of the Illinois Liquor Control Act is unconstitutional. The Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the suit on behalf of the liquor commission. The circuit court allowed this motion and an order dismissing the suit was entered. The constitutionality of a statute being involved, Weisberg appealed directly to this court. The Stag Beer Corporation does not join in the appeal.

The statute involved (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 43, par. 122, sec. 4), summarized as far as is pertinent to the questions here involved, provides among other things, the following: (a) makes it unlawful for any retailer to accept, receive, or borrow money or anything of value, or accept or receive credit from any manufacturer, importing distributor, or distributor, except ordinary merchandising credit, for a period not to exceed thirty days; (b) makes it unlawful for a manufacturer, importing distributor, or distributor, to do any of the things set forth in (a); (c) forbids a retailer, delinquent for thirty days or more in his merchandising accounts, to purchase or acquire alcoholic liquor, and forbids a manufacturer, distributor, or importing distributor, to knowingly grant or extend credit or sell alcoholic liquors to such delinquent retailer; (d) requires the purchase price of beer sold to a retailer to be paid in cash on or before the delivery of the beer; (e) provides that beer sold to distributors, or importing distributors, shall be paid for in cash on or before fifteen days after delivery of the beer; (f) exempts from the act sales to customers or purchasers outside the State of Illinois so long as such liquor is actually transported and delivered to points outside the State; (g) provides that no right of action shall exist for the collection of any claim based upon credit extended to a distributor, importing distributor, or retail licensee, contrary to the provisions of this section of the act.

Weisberg, hereinafter called plaintiff, contends that this statute contravenes section 2 of article II of the Illinois constitution, S.H.A., and the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, for the reason that its provisions are arbitrary, unreasonable, confiscatory, and do not involve or bear any relationship to the health, safety, and welfare of the people; that it is an improper exercise of the police power; that it creates an arbitray and discriminatory classification; that it discriminates against retail licensees in requiring them to buy beer for cash, but permits distributors to purchase the same on credit; that the act makes the Illinois Liquor Control Commission a collection agency, and grants special privileges, immunities and franchises to the distributors of whiskey, wines and spirits not granted to dealers in beer, in violation of section 2 of article II of the State constitution, and that it violates section 11 of article II of the same constitution, which requires all penalties to be proportioned to the nature of the offense. The Attorney General filed his motion to strike, and the circuit court allowed the motion. The plaintiff then elected to stand by his complaint and an order dismissing the complaint was duly entered.

At the outset, we may mention that the plaintiff concedes that he has no inherent right to sell intoxicating liquor; that liquor licenses are not property rights, and that in curbing the evils of the liquor traffic the State may impose regulations on the liquor business more stringent than on other businesses. It is the plaintiff's position, however that the State may not, nevertheless, through the abuse of its police power impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. This statute, the plaintiff says, does just that, in that its provisions bear no direct and substantial relationship to the public health, safety, or welfare.

The plaintiff concedes, and, indeed, it is now well recognized, that the State may, in curbing intended evils, impose regulations on the liquor traffic more stringent than would be permitted or allowable in other businesses. Baim v. Fleck, 406 Ill. 193, 92 N.E.2d 770; Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Mayor of Danville, 367 Ill. 310, 11 N.E.2d 388, 113 A.L.R. 1386; Weksler v. Collins, 317 Ill. 132, 147 N.E. 797; Davis v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 17 S.Ct. 731, 42 L.Ed. 71; Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 44 S.Ct. 257, 68 L.Ed. 596. Notwithstanding this fact, the imposition of such restraints, even though more rigid than permissible in other occupations, must nevertheless be in keeping with constitutional restrictions. Our first inquiry, therefore, is whether or not the imposition of credit restrictions has any relationship to the public health, safety, or welfare within the police powers of the State. The mere statement of the proposition that the extension of credit by a creditor to a debtor does impose on the debtor an interest, supervision, power and influence on the part of the creditor proves itself. Indeed, this has been judicially recognized in Sullivan v. Cann's Cabins, 309 Mass. 519, 36 N.E.2d 371, 372, 136 A.L.R. 1236, where the Massachusetts court stated: 'Its purpose appears to have been to avoid the evils believed to result from the control of retail liquor dealers by manufacturers, wholesalers, or importers through the power of credit. Those evils do not, as a rule, depend upon the nature of the consideration out of which the credit arose. They depend upon the power of the creditor over the debtor.'

The evils of the 'tied house' have long been recognized and most, if not all, of the States, including our own, have prohibited the furnishing by manufacturers or distributors of buildings, bars, equipment, or loans of money to a retailer. The restriction or curbing of credit by legislative enactment is but a logical extension of these prohibitions and is directly connected with the evils long recognized in the 'tied house.' Moreover, few people, if any, would deny that the restriction of credit reduces the power to buy and a reduction in the power to buy reduces the volume of sales. Credit restrictions on a nationwide basis are inaugurated on the theory that they will ultimately reduce sales and the consumption of goods. If the legislature, therefore, believes that the restrictions here imposed will reduce the volume of sales and tend to promote temperance rather than intemperance, then we cannot say as a matter of law that such a conclusion has no connection with the public welfare, safety or...