Weisfeld v. Weisfeld

• Decision Date: 15 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 71579,71579
• Citation: 14 Fla. L. Weekly 287,545 So.2d 1341
• Parties: , 14 Fla. L. Weekly 287 David J. WEISFELD, Petitioner, v. Pauline S. WEISFELD, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1341

545 So.2d 1341

58 USLW 2043, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 287

David J. WEISFELD, Petitioner, v. Pauline S. WEISFELD, Respondent.

No. 71579.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 15, 1989.

Maurice Jay Kutner of Maurice Jay Kutner, P.A., Miami, for petitioner.

Kenneth A. Friedman of the Law Offices of Baldwin & Friedman, North Miami Beach, for respondent.

OVERTON, Justice.

We have for review Weisfeld v. Weisfeld, 513 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). The district court reversed both the trial court's denial of the wife's claim to a portion of her disabled husband's workers' compensation award and the award of exclusive possession of the marital home to the disabled husband. We find conflict with Freeman v. Freeman, 468 So.2d 326 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), and have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed, we adopt the analytical approach for determining marital interests in workers' compensation awards, disagree with the district court's construction of Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So.2d 949 (Fla.1980), but approve the result reached by the district court.

The material facts reflect that the Weisfelds were married in 1956 and had two children who had reached majority at the time the dissolution proceeding commenced. In 1979, the husband earned approximately $30,000 as a psychologist employed by Dade County and, in addition, received some supplemental income generated by a private psychology practice. During that year, the husband suffered a work-related ankle injury. He continued to work but, in February, 1980, his leg collapsed and his condition was diagnosed as neurological, requiring corrective surgery. The surgery, performed in May of 1980, left him paralyzed. He spent eight months in the hospital, will probably never be able to walk, and is incontinent in both bladder and bowel. In May, 1981, the husband received a $150,000 workers' compensation settlement for the injury, $100,000 of which was paid then, with $10,000 to be paid annually for five years commencing in January, 1982. The marital home was modified at a cost of $20,000 to accommodate his physical condition. In 1982, he had a heart attack and also underwent gallbladder surgery. In June, 1983, the wife initiated this dissolution proceeding, seeking (a) rehabilitative alimony to enable her to obtain her master's degree; (b) entitlement to the couple's marital home premised on a claim for lump sum alimony because of her husband's deteriorating health conditions and (c) entitlement to one-half of all marital assets including the funds derived from the husband's workers' compensation award.

The husband testified that his workers' compensation award was for current and future medical expenses. No other testimony was presented by either party concerning the basis of the settlement award. The record reflects that the husband has been under the care of a psychiatrist for extreme anxiety and depression related to his injuries and is required to have regular physiotherapy for his condition. At the time of the final hearing, the Weisfelds were still plaintiffs in a malpractice action arising out of the surgery which paralyzed the husband. Further, as reflected in the trial court's findings, most of the workers' compensation settlement funds were invested in certificates of deposit and bonds, with some originally placed in joint names but thereafter transferred by the husband to his name alone. The following are the material findings of the trial court:

C. The Court recognizes the difficulty in fashioning an equitable distribution of the assets of this marriage and finds that both parties must equally shoulder the emotional and financial realities of a marital dissolution. The Husband is permanently physically disabled, yet is desirous of pursuing his vocation of psychology on a much reduced schedule. The Wife complains of certain ailments, yet works on a daily basis and is presently working towards her Masters degree.

D. The Court finds that the Wife is in need of, and that the husband is able to pay to the Wife rehabilitative alimony in the sum of ONE HUNDRED ($100.00) DOLLARS per week, which the Court orders him to pay for a period of two (2) additional years from the time of his decree.

E. The Court finds that both parties are joint owners of record of the marital residence and that each is to share equally in the equity of same.

F. The Court has considered the Wife's claim for an award of the marital residence as lump sum alimony or a partition of same. However, in an attempt to balance the equities, the Court recognizes that the Husband has specially adapted this home to fit his needs and maintains same as an office. In order to encourage the Husband to continue to practice his vocation with a minimum of disruption or discomfort, the Court hereby awards the Husband exclusive possession of the marital home, subject to his death, remarriage, or cohabitation with a female. Upon the happening of any of these events, the marital home will be partitioned and each of the parties or their representatives shall be entitled to share the equity equally. The Husband shall make all payments during such possession, including mortgage, taxes, insurance, utilities and all repairs and maintenance. At the time of eventual sale, the Husband or his representative will be entitled to a credit of one-half of all payments made for such purposes.

G. The Court awards sole title and entitlement to all bonds and Certificates of Deposit to the Husband. It is the finding of the Court that these monies were derived as the result of the injuries the Husband sustained and cannot, by any [stretch] of the imagination, be considered marital assets, but belong to the Husband alone.

The district court reversed the trial court judgment, holding the trial court erred: (1) by finding that the funds derived from the husband's workers' compensation award were not marital property subject to equitable distribution; and (2) in awarding the husband exclusive possession of the marital home because the need for possession was not directly connected to any support obligation.

Workers' Compensation Award as Marital Property

The district court found the proceeds of a workers' compensation award could be marital property and adopted the principles of the "analytical" approach to be utilized in determining whether the wife is entitled to a portion of the workers' compensation proceeds. The district court noted that the trial court's inquiry should focus "on the elements of damages the particular award was intended to remedy or, stated another way, the purpose of the award," 513 So.2d at 1281, and concluded that the trial court was under the "mistaken belief that workers' compensation awards are simply not marital property," and directed the trial court to hold hearings to establish "what portion of the award is marital property subject to equitable distribution." Id. at 1282. In so holding, the district court set forth the following principles for allocating damage awards:

[D]amage awards may be separated into three different components: (1) compensation for the injured spouse for pain and suffering, disability, and disfigurement, (2) compensation for the injured spouse for lost wages, lost earning capacity, and medical and hospital expenses, and (3) compensation for the uninjured spouse for loss of consortium. Compensation paid to a spouse for non-economic and strictly personal loss under (1) and (3) is considered that spouse's personal property, while the portion of damages paid to the injured spouse under (2) as compensation for economic loss during the marriage is marital property.

513 So.2d at 1281 (citations omitted).

In Freeman, the Fifth District Court of Appeal recognized that a disability pension, like a retirement pension, may be considered in determining support for a spouse or a minor child, but concluded that "it is not a marital asset for the purposes of equitable distribution" because a disability pension "is designed to compensate an employee for lost earnings and injuries (including pain and suffering) sustained on the job. See In re Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal.3d 457, 119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420 (1975). As such, it is personal to the employee." 468 So.2d at 328. Given the fact that workers' compensation benefits are designed to compensate an injured worker for diminution in earning capacity, loss of earnings, and necessary medical expenses, ¹ it is in part difficult to reconcile all the factors contained in the opinion of the Third District Court of Appeal in the instant case with Freeman.

There is no uniformity among the states concerning the treatment of workers' compensation awards. ² They are generally considered with other personal injury awards. See 2 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property § 23.08 (J. McCahey ed. 1988). Three basic approaches exist.

The first is the mechanistic approach. In most instances, under this approach, if a personal injury or workers' compensation award was acquired during the marriage, then it must be considered marital or community property and divided as such unless it falls within specific but limited statutory exceptions. The courts are controlled strictly by the statutory definition of what is separate and what is marital property. Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Vermont follow this view. See Liles v. Liles, 289 Ark. 159, 711 S.W.2d 447 (1986); In re Marriage of Fieldheim, 676 P.2d 1234 (Colo.Ct.App.1983); In Re Marriage of Dettore, 86 Ill.App.3d 540, 42 Ill.Dec. 51, 408 N.E.2d 429 (App.Ct.1980); Heilman v. Heilman, 95 Mich.App. 728, 291 N.W.2d 183 (Ct.App.1980); Jobe v. Jobe, 708 S.W.2d 322 (Mo.Ct.App.1986); Maricle v. Maricle, 221 Neb. 552, 378 N.W.2d 855 (1985); Platek v. Platek, 309 Pa.Super. 16, 454 A.2d 1059 (Super.Ct.1982); Condosta v. Condosta, 136 Vt. 360, 395 A.2d 345 (1978).

The second approach is analytical and looks to the nature of a workers'...