Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing

• Decision Date: 22 May 2008
• Docket Number: Docket No. 273117.
• Citation: 756 N.W.2d 483,279 Mich. App. 150
• Parties: Madeline WEISHUHN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF LANSING and St. Mary's Catholic Church, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

756 N.W.2d 483

279 Mich. App. 150

Madeline WEISHUHN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF LANSING and St. Mary's Catholic Church, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 273117.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 1, 2008, at Detroit.

Decided May 22, 2008, at 9:05 a.m.

Law Offices of Julie A. Gafkay, PLC (by Julie A. Gafkay and Sandra D. Hanshaw), and Joliat, Tosto, McCormick & Bade, PLC (by Michael T. Joliat), Frankenmuth, Flint, for the plaintiff.

Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C. (by Thomas R. Meagher and Stephen J. Rhodes), Lansing, for the defendants.

Before: ZAHRA, P.J., and WHITBECK and BECKERING, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants Catholic Diocese of Lansing (the Diocese) and St. Mary's Catholic Church (St.Mary's) appeal by leave granted the trial court's order denying their motion for summary disposition in this Civil Rights Act retaliatory-termination case. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

I. Overview

This case involves the "ministerial exception." The ministerial exception is a nonstatutory, constitutionally compelled exception to the application of employment-discrimination and civil rights statutes to religious institutions and their "ministerial" employees. The ministerial exception has its roots in the Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion clauses of the First Amendment and generally bars inquiry into a religious institution's underlying motivation for a contested employment decision.

We first conclude that the ministerial exception exists in Michigan. We next conclude that the trial court erred when it concluded that the motion before it—which sought summary disposition of plaintiff Madeline Weishuhn's retaliatory—termination claim on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter because of the ministerial exception-might create a question for the jury. We therefore remand to the trial court for an analysis of, and conclusions regarding, whether Weishuhn was a "ministerial" employee. We direct the trial court, in undertaking that analysis and reaching those conclusions, to focus on the totality of Weishuhn's duties and responsibilities, her position, and her function.

II. Basic Facts and Procedural History

A. Weishuhn's Background

In 1992, Weishuhn obtained her Bachelor of Science degree in elementary education from the University of Michigan. For more than 10 years, until 1999, Weishuhn worked for St. Charles and Helena Catholic Church in Clio, Michigan. She was that church's director of religious education for its "parish religious ed[ucation] program" for approximately eight years. In 2001, she obtained her master's degree in teaching from Marygrove College.

B. Weishuhn's Employment and Duties at St. Mary's

In August 1999, Weishuhn began teaching at St. Mary's Elementary School in Mount Morris, Michigan. Weishuhn taught mathematics for the fifth through the eighth grades and carried out religious responsibilities that included teaching religion for the sixth through the eighth grades. Initially, Weishuhn taught two mathematics classes and four religion classes each day, but she later taught four mathematics classes and three religion classes each day. And in her final year at St. Mary's (2004-2005), she taught four mathematics classes and two religion classes each day.

At her deposition, Weishuhn explained that her religious-education duties entailed teaching sixth-, seventh-, and eighth-grade religion classes. She was also responsible for planning Masses for those grades, as well as assisting a forth-grade teacher with student liturgies. Weishuhn and the St. Mary's pastor discussed the subject matter of the Masses. Weishuhn also prepared her seventh-and eighth-grade students for the sacrament of confirmation, and she developed reconciliation (penance) services twice a year. At her deposition, Weishuhn agreed that her responsibilities were ministerial in the sense that she provided religious direction for her students. She also testified that religion was an integral part of the school's curriculum and her lesson plan.

C. The Proceedings Below

After a series of employment-related incidents, none of which involved the subject of religion, St. Mary's terminated Weishuhn's employment in the spring of 2005. Weishuhn later filed a two-count complaint against defendants, alleging violations of the Whistleblowers' Protection Act¹ and the Civil Rights Act² for retaliatory termination. Defendants then moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting that both of Weishuhn's claims failed as a matter of law. The trial court granted the motion with respect to the Whistleblowers' Protection Act claim, but it denied the motion with respect to the retaliation claim under the Civil Rights Act.

In June 2006, defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4), arguing that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Weishuhn's employment-discrimination claim because of the ministerial exception. Defendants asserted that "[b]ecause [Weishuhn's] duties while employed by St. Mary's School included a `spiritual function,' the First Amendment of the United States Constitution precludes application of the Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act ... to [her] employment relationship with St. Mary's School." The trial court denied defendants' motion, ruling that there was a question of fact for the jury in terms of whether Weishuhn's primary function was spiritual in nature. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court noted that the caselaw cited by the parties used the word "primary." The trial court also acknowledged that there appeared to be some overlap between Weishuhn's duties in terms of secular and spiritual teaching, and opined that "this is a case that maybe could create some new law in this area, at least maybe get some clarification as to whether or not there needs to be an analysis by the court with respect to this primary or secondary purpose." The trial court gave effect to its ruling in a subsequent written order. The trial court also denied defendants' motion for reconsideration of this matter. Defendants now appeal.

III. The Ministerial Exception

A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews de novo a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4).³ "When viewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), this Court must determine whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or whether the affidavits and other proofs show that there was no genuine issue of material fact."⁴ This Court also reviews constitutional issues de novo on appeal.⁵

B. The Civil Rights Act

As noted above, Weishuhn alleged a violation of the Civil Rights Act. One purpose of that act is "to eradicate particular forms of discrimination in the workplace."⁶ The act provides in pertinent part that "a person shall not ... [r]etaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this act."⁷

C. The First Amendment

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[.]"⁸ The First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.⁹ "[T]he state and federal provisions of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution[] are subject to similar interpretation."¹⁰ The Establishment Clause guarantees governmental neutrality with respect to religion¹¹ and guards against excessive governmental entanglement with religion.¹² And the Free Exercise Clause generally prohibits governmental regulation of religious beliefs.¹³

D. The Contours of the Ministerial Exception

The ministerial exception has its roots in the First Amendment's guarantees of religious freedom¹⁴ and, generally, it "bars any inquiry into a religious organization's underlying motivation for [a] contested employment decision."¹⁵ More specifically, the ministerial exception "precludes subject matter jurisdiction over claims involving the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministerial employees[.]"¹⁶ Federal courts have held that the ministerial exception bars employment-discrimination claims under the federal Civil Rights Act,¹⁷ the Americans with Disabilities Act,¹⁸ the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,¹⁹ and common-law claims.²⁰ Courts applying the ministerial exception to employment-discrimination claims base such application on a religious "institution's constitutional right to be free from judicial interference in the selection of ... employees."²¹ And one state supreme court has described the ministerial exception as a "nonstatutory, constitutionally compelled" exception to federal civil rights laws.²²

We note that "[w]ith respect to questions of federal law, this Court is not bound by precedent from federal courts except the United States Supreme Court."²³ "However, where the United States Supreme Court has not resolved an issue, a state court may choose among conflicting lower federal court decisions ... to adopt the rule it determines to be most appropriate."²⁴ And, in applying the ministerial exception to state civil rights laws, one state appellate court has noted that "there is ... no reason why an exemption carved by the courts from federal civil rights laws should not also apply to their state analogs."²⁵

However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has cautioned that "[t]he ministerial exception does not insulate wholesale the religious employer from the operation of federal anti-discrimination statutes."²⁶ The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that the ministerial exception "requires federal courts to determine...