Weiss v. Thompson, 53018-6-I.
| Decision Date | 08 March 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 53018-6-I.,53018-6-I. |
| Citation | 85 P.3d 944,120 Wash.App. 402 |
| Parties | Martin WEISS, Appellant, v. Steven THOMPSON, Honorable Arthur Chapman, and City of Seattle, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Christine A. Jackson, Kimberly N. Gordon, The Public Defender, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.
Richard E. Greene, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.
Under RCW 10.77.090(1)(D)(i)(C), incompetent misdemeanor defendants can be placed at a mental health facility for competency restoration treatment for up to 14 days, excluding reasonable time for transport. Martin Weiss petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his substantive due process rights were violated when, in addition to the 14 days he was treated at Western State Hospital (WSH), he was detained for 15 days at county jail before receiving treatment due to a lack of bed space at WSH. He argued that such a delay does not constitute reasonable time for transport. The trial court denied his petition because he had not yet pursued an appeal in his criminal case.
We conclude that the trial court erred in denying Weiss's application for habeas corpus relief because such relief is not conditioned on appealing his criminal conviction. There was no constitutional violation, however, because the delay in commencing treatment was not excessive when balanced against the governmental interests in restoring incompetent defendants and bringing accused persons to trial.
On June 26, 2002, the City of Seattle charged Martin Weiss in Seattle Municipal Court with two counts of second degree criminal trespass and one count of obstruction of a public servant. On August 6, Weiss was found incompetent to stand trial and ordered to be placed for mental competency restoration treatment at WSH. Because WSH lacked open bed space, he was not transported from King County jail to WSH until August 21, 15 days after the municipal court had ordered treatment. At a competency hearing on August 22, defense counsel informed the court of the delay and moved to dismiss for failure to comply with the RCW 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C) 14-day time period for competency treatment. The court denied the motion to dismiss.
Weiss filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus on August 26, seeking immediate release and dismissal of the criminal charges against him. The next day, the trial court denied the application. On September 4, 14 days after Weiss was admitted to WSH, he was returned to King County jail. He renewed his motion to dismiss the criminal charges for violation of RCW 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C). After hearing evidence regarding the reasons for the delay, the court again denied the motion. Weiss was convicted of second degree criminal trespass. The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Weiss's application for a writ of habeas corpus.
RCW 7.36.010 provides, "Every person restrained of his liberty under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered therefrom when illegal." Weiss filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, citing this provision as the authority for his application. At the time of filing, Weiss was receiving court-ordered competency restoration treatment at WSH. Weiss alleged that he was unlawfully detained because the 14-day period for treatment permitted by RCW 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C) had expired. The trial court denied the petition, stating that a writ of habeas corpus was not appropriate to review another court's decision denying Weiss's motion to dismiss. It further stated that an appeal would be an adequate remedy.
The City of Seattle argues that the trial court's decision was correct because Weiss argued his petition by referencing the court's authority to issue constitutional writs, including writs of certiorari, and because he specifically challenged the denial of his motion to dismiss for violation of RCW 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C). Thus, the City argues, Weiss improperly sought review of another court's decision. We disagree.
Weiss's petition, titled, "Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Certification, and Memorandum in Support of Application," relied upon the habeas corpus statute, chapter 7.36 RCW. Weiss sought a writ of habeas corpus in part because it was his sole means of obtaining immediate release from his allegedly illegal detention. The City's argument that Weiss has not established a violation of due process for the purpose of habeas corpus relief is at odds with its concession that his liberty was restrained. Incapacitated criminal defendants have liberty interests in freedom. Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1121 (9th Cir.2003).
Our Supreme Court has held that pursuing postconviction relief is not a precondition of petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus. Toliver v. Olsen, 109 Wash.2d 607, 610, 746 P.2d 809 (1987). If Weiss's detention was unconstitutional, he was entitled to immediate habeas corpus relief. But while an appeal is not a prerequisite for seeking a writ of habeas corpus, only an appeal can be used to collaterally attack a court order. In re Newcomb, 56 Wash. 395, 396-97, 105 P. 1042 (1909). Accordingly, issuance of a writ of habeas corpus cannot result in one of the remedies sought by Weiss—dismissal of the criminal charges against him.
Weiss contends that his detention was unconstitutional because his competency was not restored within the statutory 14-day period. RCW 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C) permits the court to order treatment of incompetent misdemeanor defendants as follows:
The court shall order the secretary [of DSHS] to place the defendant: (I) At a secure mental health facility in the custody of the department or an agency designated by the department for mental health treatment and restoration of competency. The placement shall not exceed fourteen days in addition to any unused time of the evaluation under RCW 10.77.060. The court shall compute this total period and include its computation in the order. The fourteen-day period plus any unused time of the evaluation under RCW 10.77.060 shall be considered to include only the time the defendant is actually at the facility and shall be in addition to reasonable time for transport to or from the facility; (II) on conditional release for up to ninety days for mental health treatment and restoration of competency; or (III) any combination of (d)(i)(C)(I) and (II) of this subsection.
If competency has not been restored by the end of the mental competency restoration period, the charges are dismissed and the defendant is referred for evaluation under the procedures for civil commitment. RCW 10.77.090(1)(d)(ii).
Weiss argues that RCW 10.77.090(1)(d)(ii) unambiguously requires dismissal of the charges and his release because his competency was not restored within 14 days of August 6, when the municipal court stayed the proceedings and ordered competency restoration treatment.1 His argument fails because the plain, unambiguous language of the statute provides that the 14-day period for mental competency restoration applies only to the time the defendant is actually placed at a facility for treatment.
Unambiguous statutes do not require interpretation. Davis v. Dept. of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999). The statute authorizes the court to order the secretary to place the defendant at a secure mental health facility, then it provides that the "placement" shall not exceed 14 days. The statute also states, "The fourteen-day period ... shall be considered to include only the time the defendant is actually at the facility and shall be in addition to reasonable time for transport to or from the facility." RCW 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C). Because Weiss's detention at WSH did not exceed 14 days, there was no violation of RCW 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C).2 Time spent at King County jail waiting for open bed space does not qualify as placement in a secure mental health facility.
The parties dispute whether the delay caused by the lack of open beds at WSH can constitute "reasonable time for transport to or from the facility." The meaning of "reasonable time for transport" is ambiguous because in the context of the cited statute, it could mean travel time alone or the time required to arrange and conduct transport. When a statute is ambiguous, it must be construed to effectuate the legislatures intent. Davis, 137 Wash.2d at 963, 977 P.2d 554. The latter interpretation is the most logical. Daily transportation is not an option for most, if not all, counties sending patients to and retrieving patients from WSH. As a practical matter, it makes little sense to allow 14 days for placement at the treatment facility, but provide only a few hours for transportation, depending on the distance to be traveled. Thus, reasonable time for transport must be interpreted more broadly than simply the time required to travel from one place to another. But we agree with Weiss that the wait for bed space is not a transportation issue—it is a capacity issue. For that reason, it does not qualify as "reasonable time for transport." We therefore look beyond the plain text of the statute to determine whether a due process violation occurred.
The proper test for determining whether there has been a substantive due process violation is to balance the individual's interest in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining individual liberty. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (Harlan J. dissenting)). Weiss relies upon a recent Ninth Circuit decision holding that incompetent defendants' due process rights were violated when they were held in jail for weeks and months at a time before being transferred for mental competency restoration treatment under an Oregon statute. Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir....
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