Welch v. Henshaw
Decision Date | 28 February 1898 |
Citation | 49 N.E. 659,170 Mass. 409 |
Parties | WELCH v. HENSHAW et al. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John
F. Tyler, for defendants Strong & Hodgkins.
Shepard Stebbing & Storer, for defendants Samuel, Annie M., Joseph P.B., and Elizabeth L. Henshaw.
This is a petition or bill for instructions brought by one of the executors of the will of Helen C. Bradlee, late of Boston deceased, Samuel Henshaw and Joseph P.B. Henshaw, the other executors, being made defendants, as they are personally interested in the question submitted. By her will, dated May 29, 1896, Helen C. Bradlee gave the residue of her property to Annie M. Henshaw, E.L. Henshaw, Samuel Henshaw, and J.P.B Henshaw, share and share alike, and all these persons have been made defendants. William L. Strong and William H Hodgkins, surviving executors and trustees under the will of Josiah Putnam Bradlee, also have been made defendants. Nathaniel J. Bradlee, who was an executor and a trustee with them, has deceased. It appears to have been taken for granted by all the parties that there is sufficient property of the estate of Helen C. Bradlee, other than that represented by the certificates hereinafter mentioned, to pay the debts and charges of administration, and to satisfy all the legacies contained in her will, except those in the residuary clause. A part of the residuary clause of the will of Josiah Putnam Bradlee is as follows: Under this residuary clause of the will of Josiah Putnam Bradlee, the trustees paid over, from the income of said trust, to Helen C. Bradlee, upon her written request, large sums of money. At the time of her decease there were standing in her name in the Boston Safe-Deposit & Trust Company certain amounts of money represented by certificates of deposit, of different dates and for different sums, amounting in the whole, without including the interest allowed by said company, to $115,000. Some of said certificates were marked, "Not subject to check," and others were not. The dates and amounts of the certificates are as follows:
August 1, 1890 ..... $20,000
August 4, 1891 ...... 10,000
March 16, 1894 ......... 500
March 16, 1894 ......... 500
March 16, 1894 ......... 500
March 16, 1894 ......... 500
August 27, 1894 ...... 5,000
February 11, 1895 .... 2,000
July 16, 1895 ........ 5,000
July 16, 1895 ........ 4,000
July 16, 1895 ........ 5,000
July 16, 1895 ........ 2,000
July 16, 1895 ........ 2,000
July 16, 1895 ........ 2,000
October 21, 1895 ..... 3,000
March 10, 1896 ....... 1,000
March 10, 1896 ....... 1,000
March 10, 1896 ....... 1,000
On many of these certificates there were indorsements of the payment of interest up to January 1, 1896. The statement of the bill which is admitted to be true, concerning the finding of these certificates, is as follows:
received and deposited in the Boston Safe-Deposit & Trust Company before my decease, the amount of the remaining certificates is to be added to my brother's property, and given to the charitable institutions which I have selected for the residue and the remainder of the property in a testament previously made; directions to the trustees of the Ballardvale property for the disposal of the certificates in my name in the Boston Safe-Deposit & Trust Company:
following:
It is evident that the money represented by these certificates must have been the absolute property of Helen C. Bradlee, even although it had been derived from the income paid over to her by the trustees under the will of Josiah Putnam Bradlee. It also is evident that the direction to said trustees, found in her trunk, cannot be regarded as an execution of the power given to her in the latter part of the residuary clause of the will of Josiah Putnam Bradlee, because that is a power over the trust property remaining in the hands of the trustees, and these directions are not executed as a "will, or instrument in the nature thereof." There is nothing in the papers before us indicating that Helen C. Bradlee made any will, or instrument in the nature of a will, other than that of May 29, 1896.
The question is whether the facts stated in the bill establish a gift or...
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