Welch v. State

• Decision Date: 25 September 2008
• Docket Number: No. SC06-698.,SC06-698.
• Citation: 992 So.2d 206
• Parties: Anthony WELCH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

992 So.2d 206

Anthony WELCH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC06-698.

Supreme Court of Florida.

September 25, 2008.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Christopher S. Quarles, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara C. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Anthony Welch appeals his death sentences for the murders of Rufus and Kyoko Johnson. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Because the trial court failed to ask the State for a gender-neutral ground when Welch timely objected to the State's peremptory challenge to a female juror as required by Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1996), we vacate Welch's death sentences and remand the case for a new penalty phase.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sometime in the morning of December 14, 2000, Anthony Welch arrived at the home of Rufus and Kyoko Johnson. Welch told Kyoko that his car had broken down, and Kyoko gave Welch a ride home. Later in the evening, Welch returned to the Johnsons' home intending to at least rob the Johnsons. Welch admitted to law enforcement that he killed the Johnsons by hitting them with an object or objects. Rufus was found lying on the floor next to a sofa in the living room. He was bruised, cut, and stabbed in the face. Some of his bones were fractured from multiple severe blows to his face and the back of the head. His throat was deeply cut. Kyoko's body was found on a bed in the master bedroom. Kyoko was struck and had severe bruising on her face, forehead, neck, hands, arms, legs, and ankles. She was also strangled, stabbed in the face, and cut on the throat. All of Kyoko's wounds were inflicted while she was alive. The medical examiner testified that it took "several minutes" to inflict the wounds on both victims.

After killing the Johnsons, Welch cleaned himself up in the bathroom and took numerous items from the home. However, before leaving the Johnsons' home, Welch used their telephone to call Lisa Headley, a young woman he was dating. Welch also took Rufus Johnson's truck. Around 12:30 a.m. on December 15, 2000, Welch drove Rufus's truck to a Wal-Mart where he met Headley. Headley testified that Welch was pale and trembling but did not appear intoxicated or under the influence.

On December 19, 2000, the victims' bodies were discovered by their children. The criminal investigation revealed that Welch pawned some of the items stolen from the victims' home and kept some of the items in his apartment. During Kyoko's autopsy, the medical examiner retrieved a note from her clothing. The note instructed Rufus to go to his bank and get money or Kyoko would be killed, additionally stating, "I don't want to kill you John. I owe you for trying to save my brother's life." Police subsequently discovered that Rufus had tried to resuscitate Welch's older brother after he committed suicide in 1995. In 1995, the Welch family, including Anthony Welch, lived next door to the Johnsons. On December 21, 2000, Anthony Welch was arrested by law enforcement and subsequently confessed.

Welch was indicted on charges of (1) first-degree premeditated murder of Rufus Johnson; (2) first-degree premeditated murder of Kyoko Johnson; (3) robbery with a deadly weapon; (4) dealing in stolen property; and (5) grand theft of a motor vehicle. Welch filed a motion to suppress the admissions he made to the police on December 21, 2000. The trial court granted Welch's motion to suppress with respect to the statements made while en route to the sheriff's office but denied the motion in respect to Welch's confession at the sheriff's office.

Welch subsequently pled guilty to all counts. During the plea colloquy, Welch indicated that he had consulted with his counsel and understood the nature and consequences of the charges against him, including the possibility of a death sentence. Welch also indicated that his guilty plea was not influenced by any threat or promise.

At the penalty phase, the State introduced physical evidence and witnesses to establish the aggravating circumstances. The jury watched Welch's videotaped confession. Several of the victims' relatives and neighbors testified regarding the circumstances and details leading up to the discovery of the Johnsons' murders. Furthermore, Agent Terry Laufenberg with the Brevard County Sheriff's Office testified regarding the crime scene. Additionally, Heather Bartczak, Welch's roommate, and Lisa Headley, Welch's girlfriend, testified regarding various details of Welch's life surrounding the time of the Johnsons' murders.

Welch presented mitigation evidence, including the testimony of two mental mitigation experts.

On November 21, 2005, the jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death for each of the two murders. A Spencer¹ hearing was held on January 6, 2006. On March 7, 2006, Welch was sentenced to death.²

Welch appeals his death sentences, raising multiple claims.³ Because we hold that the trial court's failure to request the State's reason for peremptorily striking a prospective female juror amounts to reversible error and reverse on that ground, we address the peremptory strike issue first.⁴

ANALYSIS

Peremptory Strike

Welch claims that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to ask for a gender-neutral basis when the State used a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective female juror. We agree and remand for a new penalty phase.

During jury selection, the prosecutor struck a prospective female juror. The defense objected and asked for a gender-neutral basis for the State's peremptory challenge. The colloquy went as follows:

MR. PARKER [Prosecutor]: Strike Ms. Napolitano.

THE COURT: State accept No. 3?

MR. MCCARTHY [Defense Counsel]: Judge, we would challenge—just a second —we would ask Neil, Slappy, and Melbourne for a nongender basis for that.

THE COURT: This is his very first challenge.

MR. MCCARTHY: That's fine. Gender is a specific group. There has to be a nongender basis for a peremptory challenge.

MR. PARKER: Does there have to be a pattern?

MR. MCCARTHY: No, absolutely not. You don't need a pattern. The first one is as good as the last one.

THE COURT: So if he exercised a challenge against a male that would be a gender based challenge?

MR. MCCARTHY: Actually, there is a case that says that.

THE COURT: Show me.

MR. MCCARTHY: Thompson v. State, 648 So.2d 323.

Women are—

THE COURT: I need to see the case. I don't take summaries. I need to see the case.

MR. MCCARTHY: I don't have the case. Every group or every person is a-peremptories are a joke—every person is a group. Member of a group. There has to be a non—whatever base, basis for.

MR. PARKER: Wouldn't there have to be a basis for making the basis such as—

MR. MCCARTHY: She's a female. That is the basis.

MR. PARKER: Such as the defendant is a member of that particular group.

THE COURT: Or that she is the only female on the jury, which is not the case.

MR. MCCARTHY: With all due respect, both of those pronouncements are simply wrong under the case law.

...

MR. MCCARTHY: Judge, I don't have the case in front of me. It doesn't have the pattern that helps show if there has been a pattern of it, it helps whoever is objecting to the peremptories is inappropriate. It buttresses the challenge for the peremptory but it is not for —

THE COURT: I'm not going to require that on the State's first strike.

Defense counsel also cited Abshire v. State, 642 So.2d 542 (Fla.1994), a case in which this Court held that gender was a valid basis to object and that a gender neutral justification cannot be inferred from the composition of the panel.

In Florida, potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection procedures free from discrimination based on gender, race, or ethnicity. See Abshire v. State, 642 So.2d 542, 544 (Fla.1994); Frazier v. State, 899 So.2d 1169, 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). In Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996), we set forth the guidelines for resolving a claim of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Melbourne, 679 So.2d at 764; see also Dorsey v. State, 868 So.2d 1192, 1198-99 (Fla.2003). Specifically, we stated:

A party objecting to the other side's use of a peremptory challenge on racial grounds must: a) make a timely objection on that basis, b) show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial group, and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for the strike. If these initial requirements are met (step 1), the court must ask the proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the strike.

At this point, the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step 2). If the explanation is facially race-neutral and the court believes that, given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a pretext, the strike will be sustained (step 3).

Melbourne, 679 So.2d at 764 (footnotes omitted). Abshire also states:

The fact that several women were seated as jurors is of no moment, for as we have previously said "number alone is not dispositive, nor even the fact that a member of the minority in question has been seated as a juror or alternate." State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 21 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S.Ct. 2873, 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988); see also Johans, 613 So.2d at 1321 ("A [gender-neutral] justification for a peremptory challenge cannot be inferred merely from circumstances such as the composition of the venire or the jurors ultimately seated.").

Abshire, 642 So.2d at 544-45.

In this case, Welch made a sufficient step one objection by objecting to the State's peremptory challenge to Ms. Napolitano, alleging that Ms. Napolitano belonged to a specific gender group and requesting the State to provide a...