Welch v. United Parcel Serv. Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 09–cv–4400 (ADS)(WDW).,09–cv–4400 (ADS)(WDW).
• Citation: 871 F.Supp.2d 164
• Parties: John WELCH, Plaintiff, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., d/b/a UPS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

871 F.Supp.2d 164

John WELCH, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., d/b/a UPS, Defendant.

No. 09–cv–4400 (ADS)(WDW).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

June 30, 2012.

Frank & Associates, P.C. by Neil Frank, Esq., Rashmee Sinha, Esq., of Counsel, Farmingdale, NY, for the Plaintiff.

Day Pitney, LLP by Wendy Johnson Lario, Esq., Kristy L. Grazioso, Esq., of Counsel, Parsippany, NJ, for the Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SPATT, District Judge.

The Plaintiff in this case, John Welch, alleged that his employer, the Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), discriminated against him on the basis of his disability, and also retaliated against him for complaining about that discrimination. Based on these allegations, the Plaintiff asserted (1) federal claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), (2) state claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), and (3) city law claims under the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). A trial was held and a mixed verdict was rendered. Presently before the Court are several post-trial motions filed by both parties.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This case was initiated by the Plaintiff John Welch in 2009 against his employer, the Defendant UPS. Welch was hired by UPS in March 1987 as a part-time package loader at its facility in Brooklyn, New York. Throughout the Plaintiff's long tenure with UPS, only a portion of which is relevant for the legal disputes in this case, the Plaintiff went through a number of transfers to various positions in UPS. These positions included: (1) in March 2005, the Plaintiff was a preload supervisor for UPS's Foster Avenue Facility; (2) in mid–2005, the Plaintiff worked as a P.M. supervisor at the Greenpoint Center; (3) in or about October 2005, the Plaintiff was transferred to Comprehensive Health and Safety Program (“CHSP”) Supervisor for its Long Island City facility; (4) in or about October 2006, the Plaintiff was transferred to a position on the Nassau preload; (5) in or about June 2007, the Plaintiff was returned to a position as CHSP Supervisor; (6) in or about June 2008, the Plaintiff conducted driver safety training out of UPS's Nassau facility and was also transferred back to the Nassau preload; and (7) on or about September 6, 2010, the Plaintiff accepted and commenced the preload assist supervisor (“PAS”) position, which is the position he held at the time of the trial.

The Plaintiff suffers from various medical conditions, including: (1) hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (“HCM”); (2) bipolar disorder; (3) hiatal hernia; (4) restless leg syndrome (“RLS”); (5) sleep apnea; and (6) depression with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Because of these alleged disabilities, namely the HCM and sleep apnea, the Plaintiff made various requests for accommodation under UPS's American Disabilities Act (“ADA”) accommodation policy. His requests for accommodation were as follows: (1) on or around August 23, 2005, the Plaintiff requested an accommodation of no lifting over 30 pounds, light duty, and avoiding extremes of exertion, which UPS claims was satisfied when he was moved to the position of CHSP supervisor in or about October 2005; (2) in 2007, the Plaintiff again requested an accommodation of no lifting over 40 pounds; working shifts of 8 hours or less; and no overnight shifts due to his HCM and sleep apnea, which UPS claims was satisfied when they again returned him to the position of CHSP supervisor in or around June 2007; and (3) in 2010, the Plaintiff requested a third accommodation of no lifting over 20 pounds; no operation of heavy machinery; and no driving of heavy trucks, which UPS claims was satisfied when they put him in the Preload Assist Supervisor (“PAS”) position, which he remains in today.

According to the Plaintiff, the numerous transfers, requests for accommodation, and discussions between him and his employer, led to various instances of retaliation and failures to accommodate his disabilities.

B. Procedural History

On May 16, 2011, the Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing all of the Plaintiff's claims, on the grounds that (1) portions of the Plaintiff's claims were barred by the relevant statute of limitations, (2) the Plaintiff did not have a disability (or record of disability) under the ADA, (3) the Plaintiff was not otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, and (4) the Defendant accommodated the Plaintiff's disability at all times. The Court found there to be genuine issues of material fact in all aspects of the case. Therefore, on September 2, 2011, the Court denied the Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The trial commenced on September 7, 2011. At the trial, which lasted more than one week, the Plaintiff presented various witnesses in support of his claims. The Plaintiff testified himself; as well as Dr. Mark Sherrid, John Guest, Rashmee Sinha, Dr. Marcia Knight, and Michael Ridolfi. After the conclusion of the Plaintiff's case, the Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ.P.”) 50(a), with respect to the Plaintiff's claims of failure to accommodate and retaliation. ( See 9/13/11 Tr., 658:9–677:6.) The Court reserved decision on this motion. The Defendant also moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, which the Court denied. The Defendant then presented its case, offering the testimony of various UPS employees; including Irene Gordon, Robert Rizzo, Beverly Riddick, James Kirk, Kevin DiLibero, Christopher Travaglia, David Mazzola, Steven Wiederhold, and Joseph Mero.

On September 23, 2011, the jury rendered a verdict. With regard to the Plaintiff's disability claims, the jury found that: (1) the Plaintiff did not prove that he was an individual with a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA, namely that he had an impairment which substantially limited a major life activity; (2) the Plaintiff did prove that he was an individual with a “disability” within the meaning of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL; (3) the Plaintiff did prove he was a “qualified individual” within the meaning of the terms as instructed by the Court; (4) UPS failed to accommodate the Plaintiff with regard to his disability and required him to work in a significantly more difficult work area which would adversely affect his physical conditions; but that (5) UPS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it made a good faith effort to identify and provide the Plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation that would allow him to work within his restrictions. Therefore, the Defendant UPS was successful in defending the Plaintiff's failure to accommodate claims under the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL.

With regard to the Plaintiff's retaliation claims, the jury found that: (1) the Plaintiff proved that the Defendant required him to work in a significantly more difficult work area which would adversely affect his physical conditions, after he sent a letter to Kevin DiLibero at UPS; had a letter sent to Kevin DiLibero by his attorney; and filed his EEOC complaint; and that (2) the Plaintiff proved that there was a causal connection between the letters sent to DiLibero and the filing of the EEOC complaint and the requirements to work in significantly more difficult work areas. Thus, the Plaintiff was successful under his NYSHRL and NYCHRL retaliation causes of action. As a result, the jury awarded the Plaintiff $200,000 for compensatory damages and no punitive damages.

On October 21, 2011, the Defendant filed the instant motion for judgment as a matter of law and/or a new trial, and the Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial as well as a motion for attorneys' fees and costs.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. The Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

In substance, Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) provides that if a jury returns a verdict for which there is not a legally sufficient evidentiary basis, the District Court may either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law. In order to grant a motion for JMOL, there must be a “ ‘complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or ... such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded men [and women] could not arrive at a verdict against [it].’ ” Concerned Area Residents for Environment v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Song v. Ives Lab., Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir.1992)); Mattivi v. South African Marine Corp. “ Huguenot ”, 618 F.2d 163, 168 (2d Cir.1980).

“The same standard that applies to a pre-trial motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 also applies to motions for judgment as a matter of law during or after trial pursuant to Rule 50.” Piesco v. Koch, 12 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.1993); see also the Advisory Committee Note to the 1991 Amendment of Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. This Rule is well and clearly explained in the seminal case of This Is Me, Inc. v. Elizabeth Taylor, 157 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.1998). In Taylor, the Court commented that the then recent adoption of the term “judgment as a matter of law” to replace both the term “directed verdict” and the term “judgment N.O.V.” was intended to call attention to the close relationship between Rule 50 and 56. 157 F.3d at 142. The Court then went on to explain the basis for granting a post-verdict Rule 50 motion, as follows:

A district court may not grant a motion for a judgment as a matter of law unless “the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable [persons] could have reached.” Cruz v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1154–55 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1970)) (internal...