Welch v. Welch

• Decision Date: 04 September 1945
• Docket Number: 39189
• Citation: 190 S.W.2d 936,354 Mo. 654
• Parties: Ellmore J. Welch and Josephine Holman v. William M. Welch, Lizzie Welch, Oliver Wendell Welch, Rufus M. Welch and Frances Lee Welch, Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

190 S.W.2d 936

354 Mo. 654

Ellmore J. Welch and Josephine Holman v. William M. Welch, Lizzie Welch, Oliver Wendell Welch, Rufus M. Welch and Frances Lee Welch, Appellants

No. 39189

Supreme Court of Missouri

September 4, 1945

Rehearing Denied December 3, 1945.

Appeal from Chariton Circuit Court; Hon. G. Derk Green Judge.

Affirmed.

J A. Collet for appellants.

(1) The court committed error in refusing defendants' instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence. Sehr v. Lindemann, 153 Mo. 276; Lorts v. Wash, 175 Mo. 487; Walter v. Alt, 152 S.W.2d 135; Doll v. Fricke, 171 S.W.2d 755. (2) It is the settled law in this State that a person over eighteen years of age and of sound mind may make whatever disposition of his estate he desires to make and any previous intention or promise to dispose of his estate different from the disposition made of it in his will is not binding on him. Defendants' refused Instruction B announces this principal to the jury and the court committed error in refusing to give it. Hayes v. Hayes, 242 Mo. 155; Beyer v. Schlenker, 150 Mo.App. 671. (3) Discrimination between testator's children or unfairness in distribution among them is not sufficient to authorize the jury to find undue influence. The court committed error in giving plaintiffs' Instruction 3 which authorized the jury to find undue influence from "circumstances inconsistent with honesty and fair dealing." Hughes v. Rader, 183 Mo. 630; Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 35; Gott v. Dennis, 296 Mo. 66. (4) The undisputed evidence having shown that testator had agreed with his children, some years before the making of the will in contest, upon the disposition that he would make of his estate, it was important for the jury to know why he had changed his mind and made a different disposition of his property and plaintiffs' Instruction 4, which told the jury that the evidence showing the feeling that testator entertained toward plaintiffs and his reason for not giving them equal shares in his property with the other children could be considered by the jury only as evidence of his feeling and could not be considered for any other purpose, expressly denied the jury the right to determine whether the will as made was the result of undue influence or was an expression of testator's own will resulting from mistreatment he claimed he had received from these two children and the giving of that instruction was error, because it denied to testator the right to discriminate against respondents in the disposition of his estate if he so desired. See authorities under Point (3) (5) Plaintiffs' Instruction 8 given by the court submitted to the jury the question of undue influence exercised over the mind of testator at the time of making his will by defendants William M. Welch or Lizzy Welch or defendant Oliver Wendell Welch or "any other person." There was no allegation in the petition that any other person than defendants exercised any influence to cause the making of this will and there was no effort to prove that any other person than defendants had anything to do with the making of the will. This instruction is outside of the pleadings and the evidence in the case was clearly error. Myers v. Hauser, 61 S.W.2d 214; Allison v. Dittbrenner, 50 S.W.2d 199; Clark v. Wells, 44 S.W.2d 863. (6) In the absence of any proof of conspiracy among respondents to cause the making of the will in question, any evidence received of statements made by any one of respondents in relation to his knowledge of or influence about the making thereof was admissible only for the purpose of contradiction or impeachment and could not be considered for any other purpose. Schierbaum v. Schemme, 157 Mo. 1; Wood v. Carpenter, 166 Mo. 465; King v. Gilson, 191 Mo. 307.

Errol Joyce for respondents.

(1) The court properly refused defendants' instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence. A submissible case of undue influence was made. Walter v. Alt, 348 Mo. 53, 152 S.W.2d 135; Clark v. Commerce Trust Co., 333 Mo. 243, 62 S.W.2d 874; Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 85 S.W.2d 400; Coldwell v. Coldwell, 228 S.W. 95; Gott v. Dennis, 296 Mo. 66, 246 S.W. 218; McCarthy v. Fidelity Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 325 Mo. 727, 30 S.W.2d 19; Webster v. Leiman, 328 Mo. 1232, 44 S.W.2d 40; Canty v. Halpin, 294 Mo. 96, 242 S.W. 94; Rayl v. Golfinopulos, 233 S.W. 1069; McNealy v. Murdock, 293 Mo. 16, 239 S.W. 126; Ard v. Larkin, 278 S.W. 1063; Grundmann v. Wilde, 255 Mo. 109, 164 S.W. 200; Spurr v. Spurr, 285 Mo. 163, 226 S.W. 35; Moll v. Pollack, 319 Mo. 744, 8 S.W.2d 38; Thomas v. Thomas, 186 S.W. 993; Turner v. Butler, 253 Mo. 202, 161 S.W. 745; Fletcher v. Ringo, 164 S.W.2d 904; (2) The court properly refused defendants' Instruction B as the subject matter of that instruction was covered in defendants' given Instruction 7. Trepp v. State Natl. Bank, 315 Mo. 883, 289 S.W. 540; Maloney v. United Rys. Co., St. Louis, 237 S.W. 509. (3) The court did not err in giving plaintiffs' Instruction 5. Balak v. Susanka, 182 Mo.App. 458, 168 S.W. 650; Cooper v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 227 Mo.App. 608, 55 S.W.2d 737; Thomas v. Thomas, 186 S.W. 993; Hogan v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 322 Mo. 1103, 19 S.W.2d 707. (4) The court did not err in giving plaintiffs' Instruction 3. Clark v. Powell, 175 S.W.2d 842. (5) The court did not err in giving plaintiffs' Instruction 4. Munday v. Knox, 321 Mo. 168, 9 S.W.2d 960; Doll v. Fricke, 171 S.W.2d 755.

OPINION

Douglas, J.

This is a suit to set aside the will of James M. Welch, Sr., on the grounds of mental incapacity and undue influence. The charge of mental incapacity was not proved so the case was submitted to the jury only on the issue of undue influence. The jury found against the will.

The primary question for decision is whether a submissible case was made on the issue of undue influence.

The testator died at the age of ninety-six, leaving five children. By his will made at the age of ninety-four he left to his son Ellmore and to his daughter Josephine, plaintiffs, one dollar each. After making provisions for a daughter who is non compos, the testator divided his estate equally between his two sons Rufus and William, defendants. The evidence shows that some eight years before his death he called all his children together, except his demented daughter, and told them to choose their land, that is, to agree among themselves how his 680 acres of land should be divided among them at his death. They agreed on what tract each should receive and prepared a written memorandum of the agreement which each of them signed. The record indicates testator at the same time made provision by will for the demented daughter out of his personal estate. Thereupon the testator had deeds to each child prepared in accordance with the agreement. The testator signed and acknowledged the deeds but did not deliver them, telling the children they would receive them at his death. William, who is charged as the principal actor in unduly influencing his father later to make the will now under attack, testified he was dissatisfied with the portion of the real estate allotted to him under the agreement even though he joined in it.

William and his wife lived at the family home with the testator. Later the testator built a home across the road for his daughter Josephine on the land allotted to her under the agreement and moved in with her. After a little more than a year elapsed he moved back with William. A month later William took him to a lawyer of his own choosing and with whom testator was not acquainted for the purpose of having the will in question prepared and executed, which was done. Previous to its execution William had the testator examined at the lawyer's office by two doctors who found the testator mentally capable of making a will. There is testimony that thereafter the testator was constantly in William's custody and control.

In addition to the facts related above there is other substantial evidence, disregarding the objectionable evidence found in the record, from all of which a reasonable inference may be drawn that William dominated the testator, prejudiced him against the plaintiffs and designed to prevent them from receiving...