Weld Cnty. Colo. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Ryan
| Decision Date | 24 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 20CA1445 |
| Citation | 511 P.3d 663,2022 COA 26 |
| Parties | WELD COUNTY COLORADO BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jill Hunsaker RYAN, in her Official Capacity as the Executive Director of the Department of Public Health and Environment for the State of Colorado; Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment; and Colorado Air Quality Control Commission, an agency of the State of Colorado, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Polsinelli, P.C., Colin C. Deihl, Bennet L. Cohen, Gina L. Tincher, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Thomas A. Roan, First Assistant Attorney General, Michael Landis, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
¶ 1 In this action seeking judicial review of an administrative rulemaking, we apply the rule from Martin v. District Court , 191 Colo. 107, 109, 550 P.2d 864, 866 (1976), to determine whether plaintiff, the Board of County Commissioners of Weld County (County), has standing to challenge an air quality control regulation promulgated by the Air Quality Control Commission (Commission) of the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (Department). Because (1) the County is subordinate to the Commission in the context of air quality control and (2) the legislature has not granted the County an express statutory right to seek judicial review of the Commission's rulemaking, the County does not have standing to challenge the rulemaking under Martin . Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order granting the joint motion of the defendants — the Commission, the Department, and Jill Ryan in her official capacity as the Executive Director of the Department (the State Defendants) — to dismiss the County's complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
¶ 2 In April 2019, the Colorado General Assembly passed Senate Bill 19-181 to address, among other things, the effects of oil and gas operations on air quality in Colorado. See Ch. 120, sec. 3, § 25-7-109(10), 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws 502. The bill directed the Commission to adopt new rules to minimize emissions of certain air pollutants and to consider revisions to its existing rules. Id.
¶ 3 In response, in September 2019, the Air Pollution Control Division of the Department (Division) proposed changes to Regulation 7, 5 Code Colo. Regs. 1001-9, which addresses the control of volatile organic compound emissions from oil and gas operations.1 The revisions would impose additional requirements on oil and gas companies, including, as relevant here, (1) more frequent leak detection and repair (LDAR) inspections at well production facilities and natural gas compressor stations and (2) additional emission controls for storage tanks. The Commission initiated an administrative rulemaking process to revise Regulation 7.
¶ 4 The Commission received input from a number of community organizations, industry groups, and local governments, including Weld County — Colorado's largest oil and gas producing county. The County actively engaged in the rulemaking process by submitting comments, filing requests for a regulatory analysis and cost-benefit analysis of the proposed revisions, and participating in the Commission's hearing. During the prehearing phase, the County provided expert testimony that around thirty-five percent of the oil and gas wells in Weld County could potentially be shut down by operators due to the cost of complying with the proposed LDAR and tank control rules.
¶ 5 The Commission ultimately adopted substantial revisions to Regulation 7 that were largely consistent with those the Division had proposed. The adopted rules became effective on February 14, 2020.
¶ 6 Dissatisfied with the revisions, the County filed a complaint in district court asserting claims against the State Defendants under the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA), §§ 24-4-101 to - 204, C.R.S. 2021, and the Colorado Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act (Colorado Air Act), §§ 25-7-101 to - 1309, C.R.S. 2021. The County's claims were primarily based on two decisions of the Commission. First, the County alleged that the Commission allowed a local community group to submit a late-amended proposal regarding the LDAR rules without granting other parties to the rulemaking the opportunity to properly respond. Second, it alleged that the Commission failed to comply with section 25-7-105(16), C.R.S. 2021, by not prioritizing the County's concerns regarding how the proposed revisions would impact its economy and land use powers. The County also sought declaratory relief regarding the applicability of section 25-7-105(16) to the Commission's rulemaking.
¶ 7 The State Defendants moved, in part, to dismiss the County's complaint under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction. They argued that the County, being an agency subordinate to the Commission, lacks standing to challenge the Commission's rulemaking under the rule from Martin . And irrespective of that prudential limitation, they argued, the County had not suffered an injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest that could establish standing. The district court agreed on both accounts and dismissed the County's complaint.
¶ 8 The County now appeals, arguing that, contrary to the district court's conclusion, it has standing to challenge the Commission's rulemaking. Thus, it argues, the court erred by dismissing its complaint for lack of jurisdiction. We are not persuaded.
¶ 9 Where, as here, there are no disputed issues of material fact, we review de novo the district court's ruling on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Peabody Sage Creek Mining, LLC v. Colo. Dep't of Pub. Health & Env't , 2020 COA 127, ¶ 9, 484 P.3d 730.
¶ 10 The underlying issue of whether the County has standing to challenge the Commission's rulemaking is a question of law that we also review de novo. Ainscough v. Owens , 90 P.3d 851, 856 (Colo. 2004). We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. E.g. , Ronquillo v. EcoClean Home Servs., Inc. , 2021 CO 82, ¶ 12, 500 P.3d 1130.
¶ 11 "[F]or a court to have jurisdiction over a dispute, the plaintiff must have standing to bring the case." Ainscough , 90 P.3d at 855.
¶ 12 To establish standing, a plaintiff must satisfy the test announced in Wimberly v. Ettenberg , 194 Colo. 163, 168, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977). The test has two prongs: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, and (2) the injury must have been to a legally protected interest. Id. The second prong of the Wimberly test "is a question of whether the plaintiff has a claim for relief under the constitution, the common law, a statute, or a rule or regulation." Ainscough , 90 P.3d at 856.
¶ 13 However, in addition to the Wimberly test, standing may be subject to further, court-made prudential considerations. See Romer v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs , 956 P.2d 566, 573 (Colo. 1998).
¶ 14 "[S]o that courts do not unnecessarily intrude into matters which are more properly committed to resolution in another branch of government," id. , a "general [prudential] rule [provides] that counties do not have standing to obtain judicial review of a decision of a superior state agency," Douglas Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n , 829 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Colo. 1992) ( Douglas ). The rule reflects the axiom that a county is not an "independent governmental entity existing by reason of any inherent sovereign authority of its residents; rather, it is a political subdivision of the state, existing only for the convenient administration of the state government, created to carry out the will of the state." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Love , 172 Colo. 121, 125, 470 P.2d 861, 862 (1970). Thus, only "where the General Assembly expressly provides that a [county] may seek judicial review of the actions of a superior state agency" may standing exist. Romer , 956 P.2d at 573.
¶ 15 This principle is known as the rule from Martin , the case in which it was first explicitly articulated. There, our supreme court held that, absent "an express statutory right, a subordinate state agency" — possibly a county — "lacks standing or any other legal authority to obtain judicial review of an action of a superior state agency." 191 Colo. at 109, 550 P.2d at 866.
The Martin standard thus precludes standing when two conditions are met: (1) the agency seeking judicial review is subordinate to the agency whose decision is sought to be reviewed, and (2) no statutory provision confers a right on the subordinate agency to seek judicial review of the superior agency's decision.
Maurer v. Young Life , 779 P.2d 1317, 1320 (Colo. 1989).
¶ 16 The supreme court has since emphasized that a subordinate agency only has standing to seek judicial review where the General Assembly "expressly provides" such relief — that is, "where a statute explicitly confers a right upon a subordinate agency" to do so. Romer , 956 P.2d at 573. "[W]ithout a plain and unmistakable expression of such intent by the legislature, the judiciary will not expand the rights of a subordinate agency to include the right to obtain judicial review of the actions of a superior agency." Id. "In other words, without an express statutory right to secure judicial intervention, we assume that any intra-agency dispute is better saved for determination through the political, and not judicial, process." Id.
¶ 17 The County contends that (1) it is not subordinate to the Commission in the context of air quality control and (2) even if it is, the Colorado Air Act expressly permits it to seek judicial review of the Commission's rulemaking. Thus, it argues, the district court erred by finding that the rule from Martin precludes it from having standing to challenge the rulemaking. We disagree and thus affirm the district court's judgment.
¶ 18 We first address whether the County is...
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...2023).[55] Id. at 233.[56] Id.[57] Id. at 233-34 (quoting Asmussen v. United States, 304 P.3d 552, 553 (Colo. 2013)). [58] Id. at 236.[59] 511 P.3d 663, 665 (Colo. App. 2022), cert. granted, No. 22CV242 (Colo. Nov. 21, 2022).[60] Id. at 666.[61] Id. at 667 (quoting Martin v. District Court,......