Weldon v. Kapetan

• Decision Date: 20 February 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:17-cv-01536-LJO-SKO
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: PAUL WELDON, Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN NICHOLAS KAPETAN, FRESNO SUPERIOR COURT, DOES 1-100, Defendants.

PAUL WELDON, Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN NICHOLAS KAPETAN, FRESNO SUPERIOR COURT, DOES 1-100, Defendants.

Case No. 1:17-cv-01536-LJO-SKO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

February 20, 2018

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS BE DENIED WITH PREJUDICE IN PART AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART

(Doc. 1)

OBJECTIONS DUE: 21 DAYS

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is a civil rights complaint, filed on November 17, 2017, by Plaintiff Paul Weldon ("Plaintiff") against Fresno Superior Court and Fresno Superior Court Judge Jonathan Nicholas Kapetan. (Doc. 1 (the "Complaint").) The undersigned has screened Plaintiff's complaint and, for the reasons set forth below, recommends that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend within thirty days, as to Plaintiff's claims against Judge Kapetan for injunctive relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. The undersigned further recommends that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice as to Plaintiff's claims against Judge Kapetan for damages and declaratory relief, pursuant to §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, and as to all of Plaintiff's claims against Fresno Superior Court.

//

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 17, 2017, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action against Judge Kapetan and Fresno Superior Court.¹ (See generally Compl. at 1-2.) On November 21, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 3; see also Doc. 2.) The events at issue in Plaintiff's complaint stem from Plaintiff's appearance before Judge Kapetan at a November 2015 arraignment on misdemeanor charges of driving under the influence. (See generally Compl. at 2-5, 10-21.) Plaintiff contends that Judge Kapetan's actions during the arraignment violated his constitutional rights. (Id.)

According to the transcript from the arraignment, which Plaintiff annexed to the complaint as Exhibit A, Plaintiff appeared in propria persona. (Id. at 9.) While Judge Kapetan was informing Plaintiff of the charges filed against him and the attendant penalties, Plaintiff stated, "Well, actually I'm here to challenge jurisdiction . . . ," and "I'll need all the elements to the arraignment . . . ." (Id. at 11.) At Judge Kapetan's direction, the courtroom deputy handed Plaintiff a copy of the criminal complaint. (Id. at 13-14.) The following exchange ensued:

Plaintiff: Who signed the complaint?

Judge Kapetan: One Jenice—appears Saucedo, Deputy Clerk. How do you plea, sir?

Plaintiff: I'm sorry, can you repeat that?

Judge Kapetan: How do you plea?

Plaintiff: No, before that.

Judge Kapetan: Repeat what?

Plaintiff: The name.

Judge Kapetan: I show Jenice Saucedo.

Plaintiff: Can you spell that for me?

Judge Kapetan: No, sir. It's on the complaint.

Plaintiff: No, sir, it is not.

Judge Kapetan: It's not on yours?

Plaintiff: I don't see it.

. . . .

Judge Kapetan: It's in the lower left hand section, sir. In any event—

. . . .

Plaintiff: I see the Deputy Clerk. Is that scribbling—is supposed to be the name Jenice?

Judge Kapetan: It appears on my complaint, yes, sir.

Plaintiff: Can you spell that for me?

Judge Kapetan: No, sir. I ask you how do you plea?

Plaintiff: I've asked you to spell her name.

Judge Kapetan: Under what authority do you ask me to spell her name?

Plaintiff: Constitution authority.

Judge Kapetan: Show me that Constitutional—either amendment or that section of the Constitution that requires that I give you a deputy clerk's name, when signed your complaint, sir.

Plaintiff: It's not on the complaint.

Judge Kapetan: All right, sir.

Plaintiff: I just told you it says deputy clerk.

(Compl. at 14-15.)

// Given Plaintiff's refusal to enter a plea, Judge Kapetan entered a plea of not guilty on Plaintiff's behalf. (Compl. at 16.) Judge Kapetan set Plaintiff's bond at $10,000, and he set dates for the pretrial conference and trial. (Id.) At that point, realizing that he would be remanded into custody pending his next court date or his ability to post bond, Plaintiff stated, "Well, if this is what it boils down to, I guess I'm gonna take the alternative. I really don't want to be incarcerated." (Id. at 17.) With that, Judge Kapetan took the matter off the record, and, as Plaintiff alleges, Judge Kapetan kept Plaintiff handcuffed while a public defender was summoned to the courtroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 7; see also id. at 9.) Sometime later that same day, Judge Kapetan recalled the case. (Compl. at 9.) Plaintiff withdrew his request to represent himself and agreed to the appointment of a public defender. (Id. at 17-19.) The following exchange ensued regarding Plaintiff's plea:

Judge Kapetan: Have you had enough time to discuss this matter with your attorney?

Plaintiff: Yes.

Judge Kapetan: Did you understand everything you signed and/or initialed on the [change-of-plea] form?

Plaintiff: Yes.

Judge Kapetan: You're charged in count one with a violation of Vehicle Code 23152(b). How do you plead?

Plaintiff: Well, I have to plead no contest.

Judge Kapetan: You don't have to plead anything.

Plaintiff: Well—

Judge Kapetan: How do you plea?

Plaintiff: No contest.

Judge Kapetan: Do you understand no contest plea is treated the same as a guilty plea for sentencing purposes?

Plaintiff: Yes.

Judge Kapetan: Based on your representation, I'll accept the no contest plea as being freely, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. I'll sign and incorporate the change of plea form into the record.

(Id. at 10-11.)

Plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for various constitutional violations. (Compl. 1 ¶¶ 8-9.) In particular, Plaintiff appears to allege, first, that he was denied due process of law because Judge Kapetan did not provide him a true copy of the complaint and the name of the person who signed it. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.) Plaintiff alleges, second, that he was falsely imprisoned when Judge Kapetan kept him handcuffed for the period of time during the arraignment while a public defender was summoned to the court room to represent Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 7-8.) Third, Plaintiff alleges that he was coerced to plead guilty because he faced a Hobson's choice between pleading guilty or remaining in custody until his trial. (Id.) Plaintiff's complaint states a second cause of action under 42 U.S.C § 1986, and, construing the complaint liberally, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, for breach of contract. (Id. at 2, 5.) That is, the complaint alleges that Judge Kapetan violated his "oath to uphold and defend the United States Constitution" by virtue of violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights and subjecting him to public ridicule, humiliation, and embarrassment. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 10.) The complaint seeks judgment against Judge Kapetan and Fresno Superior Court, money damages and fines, and an order "remand[ing] and remov[ing] [Judge Kapetan] from office pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1918." (Id. ¶ 14.)

After screening Plaintiff's complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable federal claims for the reasons set forth below.

III. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen each case, and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the amended complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

The Court's screening of the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is governed by the following standards. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff must allege a minimum factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each defendant fair notice of what plaintiff's claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, e.g., Brazil v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, since Plaintiff is appearing pro se, the Court must construe the allegations of the amended complaint liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). "[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

Further, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' A claim has facial...